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HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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HITLER COULD NOT STOP

By Hermann Rauschning

SOME people believed that Hitler could be induced by certain limited concessions, made dependent on his fulfillment of certain specified conditions, to change his methods of procedure and limit his aims. Germany would then cease to figure as a troublemaker in the world and would fit into a new international equilibrium. The view was based on a number of sound assumptions and was justified by the example of the movement for German unification between 1864 and 1870. Bismarck often expressed the idea. He said that once the unified Reich had been constituted, one of his main concerns would be to create general confidence in its pacific intentions. After rectifying the *injuria temporum* (the Bismarckian phrase), German policy would set itself the task of becoming a force for peace in Europe. Bismarck's national policy was based exclusively on force and was eminently "practical." But its objectives were always limited. At the given moment it saw the necessity of fixing its own limits, and never overstepped them.

Sharply in contrast with Bismarck's "art of the possible" stands the hazy, impulsive policy of William II. At a critical moment during the latter's reign, the Morocco crisis of 1905, Sir Arthur Nicolson remarked that the German Foreign Office did not itself know what it wanted; and he went on to say that the real danger in German policy was not so much its expansionist outlook as its vagueness. That was entirely true. It was impossible to work out a policy of harmonious collaboration with a person who did not know what he wanted. William II based his foreign policy on surprises and sudden impulses, and that fact, much more than Germany's striving for world power, led directly to the World War.

Hitler's policy at first differed strikingly from the policy of

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William II. It differed also from the policy of the Weimar Republic, which was also — though for different reasons, chiefly the Republic's inherent weakness — wavering and uncertain. Hitler's policy was outspoken and showed that it was clearly conscious of its goals. Frankly nationalistic, setting out to revise the Versailles Treaty and rectify an obvious *injuria temporum*, it moved along lines noticeably similar to Bismarck's. It began, then, as the continuation of a policy which, in the previous century, after achieving its aims, resulted in over forty years of peace for Europe.

In the beginning Hitler's policy was strictly and exclusively national. Its one aim seemed to be to transform the "little Germany" that Bismarck had founded into the "greater Germany" that still lived in the thoughts of all German patriots. This was to be achieved by revision of the territorial provisions in the peace treaty, which in the long run would have proved unendurable anyway. Germany possessed many friends among her sometime war opponents. These would probably have approved of such a reasonable policy if certain revolutionary features attending its application, along with its terroristic methods, had not chilled good will abroad and intensified foreign hesitations. Even so, however, one still could argue that the extravagant features of the new German policy were superficial and would automatically correct themselves in due course.

Objectively, however, the policy of the Third Reich could be considered constructive only so long as it had a definite and limited scope. In other words, only if National Socialist foreign policy aimed specifically at uniting actually German territories in an enlarged German state could it expect that other states would tolerate the gradual reorganization of Europe under German leadership.

During the early years of the National Socialist régime, therefore, foreign criticism took the form mainly of moralistic disapproval of certain of its domestic methods. There was little disapproval of its aims as such. Indeed, some authoritative interpreters abroad exerted themselves to put even the domestic procedures of National Socialism in a better light, thereby strengthening a natural inclination on the part of many persons to ignore certain repulsive revolutionary aspects of the movement as being strictly the private concern of the German people, explicable probably on the basis of the delight which they habitually take in discipline and "order." The austere forms which the German national

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regimentation adopted were calculated in many ways to beguile foreign criticism. The advantages of authoritarian methods became apparent in the ease with which Germany overcame many surface symptoms of her social and economic crisis. The country seemed to be on the road to order and recovery; hence (it was assumed), once a transitional period of unrest had passed, on the road to peace.

The domestic opponents of National Socialism among the former ruling classes of Germany reached a similar view. During a first short period they grossly underestimated the strength of the new régime. There followed a second short period when the dominant feeling was one of shock and resentment at its brutal methods. Then finally the educated and patriotic middle classes settled down in the persuasion that the various outrages of National Socialism were ephemeral revolutionary manifestations that must needs be borne with for the time being.

In non-Nazi circles in those days, among the army leaders, the bureaucracy and in business, the word was passed to allow the revolutionary outburst "to wear itself out." The movement, it was said, would "clean itself up." The wise course was felt to be to enter the Party so as gradually to reshape it from within. Many important holders of public office felt, of course, that it was impossible to reconcile the Party's unscrupulous conduct with their individual consciences and that it was their duty to resign. They were reminded that to do so would only strengthen the new movement and intensify its extremist character. They were told that rather it was their duty to hold their positions as long as possible, in order gradually to weed out the "catastrophe makers," or, at the worst, to serve as brakes on "the plunge into catastrophe." Reasoning of this sort had a certain semblance of soundness, and it appealed, among others, to men such as Baron von Neurath, in foreign affairs, to Count Schwerin-Krosigk, in finance, and to Eltz Rübenach, in commerce. They decided not to break with National Socialism, but to work with it, to retard and moderate it, and to prevent another lapse into bloody revolution.

These motives were intelligible enough, but they were none the less mistaken. The National Socialist movement could not be reformed. It was obeying an inner iron-bound law of its own being. It was following the relentless urge toward extremism to which every revolutionary movement is destined. The collaboration of conservative and competent officials and men of affairs strength-

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ened the régime; but they could not change it. They wore themselves out, and the movement went on regardless. An adjustment of the nature of a civil war was avoided; but in the end the price was the total capitulation of the "restorative" elements in the ruling and educated classes and of the liberal and democratic elements in business and labor.

The question now arises whether, in following a sometimes temporizing and sometimes frankly pro-Nazi policy, the western democracies did not make the same mistake in the foreign field which inside the Reich led to the capitulation and enslavement of the German citizenry as a whole. The policy of domestic collaboration avoided civil war within Germany; the conduct of the democracies in compromising with Germany aimed to avoid a European war. To be sure, there would be solid grounds for reasoning the other way round — that the disposition of the democracies to yield, without setting any clearly discernible limits on what they would yield, was what first made war a real danger. However that may be, there can be no doubt that pressure upon Germany from abroad might very well have led to the fall of the National Socialist régime. But would that have led to any lasting adjustment for Europe as a whole? Perhaps the overthrow of National Socialism would have set a genuinely revolutionary development in motion. A period of anarchy might then have ensued. Or a strictly Prussian and militaristic solution might have been found, compared with which even the National Socialist régime might have seemed the lesser evil.

How such a gross misreading of National Socialism could have held sway for so long in the world is hard indeed to comprehend. The lack of critical sense and foresight shown by German business leaders doubtless contributed. They merely noticed with satisfaction the temporary relief brought them through currency control and the new methods of dealing with labor problems, and they paid no attention to the disturbing revolutionary disintegration of all the elements composing what is called public order. They were simply obsessed by the idea that National Socialism's energetic methods offered the chance of at least temporarily escaping from the general world depression.

There was another reason in addition to the apparent cessation of the depression in Germany which contributed substantially to the foreign inclination to view the course of events there with a certain amount of optimism. German unemployment was closely

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interrelated with a number of problems which, generally speaking, could be solved only by the coöperation of all countries; but above all it was related to the problem of raw materials. Now Germany's difficulty in securing raw materials would probably not have arisen under conditions of peaceful international commerce. But international commerce had been upset by the depression. It seemed only natural, therefore, to seek economic remedies for the critical situation in Germany which was driving her to adopt a policy of political expansion. If certain territories were handed over to Germany to be exploited, and if her need for raw materials were met, would not her menacing revolutionary trend be eliminated or diverted? An economically satisfied Germany, it was argued, would dissipate its explosive energies in peaceful labor.

Plausible as these considerations are, they fail to explain why, in spite of progressive surrenders to National Socialist demands from year to year and in one area after another, the desired peaceful results were not achieved, but on the contrary German demands constantly grew.

The fact is, of course, that the whole form of reasoning outlined above rested on false assumptions. It grossly exaggerated the importance of economic considerations in the German situation and overlooked its irrational or non-rational motivations. Many observers were led astray by the patriotic impulses which the National Socialist movement satisfied and failed to notice its disintegrating revolutionary tendencies. What especially was overlooked was the movement's anti-moral background, which was what gave it its peculiar destructive power.

It is important to realize that Germany adopted the goal of economic autarchy not for economic or social reasons but for reasons having to do with national power — or, more exactly, national defense. We find the germ of this policy as far back as the time of Bismarck, whose economic protectionism was closely related to military policy. Then came Germany's decisive experience during the World War. Germany's geographical situation always puts her in danger of being cut off from world markets, and this fact, given her inadequate raw material resources, forces her to plan either to enlarge those resources by technical devices or to obtain a supply of them through territorial expansion.

The dilemma is plain. But the full effect of it in National Socialist thought has by no means been realized abroad. The Nazi thesis runs as follows:

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Numerically the German nation is next to Russia the largest in Europe. But her inadequate territory bars her from "full sovereignty" as a "world people." In peaceful times Germany of course could easily cover her raw material requirements. But in time of war her dependence on the world market makes her fatally weak. With the enormous development that has taken place in technical instruments of warfare, she no longer can prosecute a war on several fronts with any prospect of success. Her ability to employ her great technical and military capacities breaks down on the single circumstance that she is dependent economically on foreign nations. Attainment of her "full" status as a "world people" seems thus to be denied to Germany for all time, and she is condemned to play second fiddle to a numerically smaller nation like Great Britain and even to France, who has a colonial empire and free access to the open sea.

The distinctive trait of a "world people," continues the Nazi argument, is its complete freedom of political action. The United States has this freedom. So have the British Empire, Russia, and (though to a somewhat lesser extent) France. If Germany wants to keep company with those Powers and not rest satisfied in a secondary position, she has to adjust herself in terms of power to the present-day significance of "economic space." To describe her resulting effort as part of a contest between "haves" and "have-nots," between wealthy nations and proletarian nations, is to misrepresent it. That formulation of the situation is merely a psychological weapon in the war of opinion. The fact is that the largest and technically most advanced nation in Europe has been kept from playing more than a secondary rôle in the world. For Germany to accept the situation would have required either stern resignation or a resolve to seek a solution otherwise than through the assertion of power. Germany has felt herself too young and virile a nation to accept the former course; as for the latter, the World War left her without the requisite atmosphere of friendly collaboration.

Economic autarchy is an artificial instrument which must be used temporarily in the diplomatic and economic fields in order to achieve "natural independence." It is not a permanent solution, the Nazis grant, and has never been thought of as such. It runs against the nature of things and is therefore foredoomed to failure. But for the time being it has afforded Germany the brief period of independence required for her to obtain, by diplo-

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matic or military means as the case may be, her real goal — "full sovereignty" as a "world people."

"*Lebensraum*," the space required by a nation for living, is not, in Nazi terminology, the mere space sufficient for subsistence under a system of free exchange of goods. It means a domain sufficiently comprehensive to provide Germany with "absolute" freedom of action. The limits of that domain expands automatically as the requirements of modern warfare expand. What would have been adequate in the year 1880 to make Germany self-sufficient and "sovereign" had become wholly inadequate by the end of the World War. To become truly "sovereign" under postwar conditions Germany must now expand the domain under her control eastward as far as the Caucasus and including the Ukraine, and westward as far as the open sea. She must have the oil of the Caucasus, the minerals of the Ukraine, and the grain of Hungary and Rumania; also she must have the steel of northern France, control of the shore line of Belgium, Holland and northern France, and the colonial domains at present belonging to those countries. In this policy the law of the minimum controls; for the soundness of the policy varies with that factor, not with the maximum.

Such are the ideas of National Socialism. The fundamental thing which emerges is the impossibility that olive branches and concessions in this or that particular could ever serve any purpose. Either it is "full sovereignty" for Germany or it is nothing.

Hitler's foreign policy therefore allowed him no freedom of choice. His particular aims all stood in a fixed and necessary relation to his comprehensive aim: "full sovereignty" for Germany as a "world people." Germany will be satisfied only when she controls a completely self-sufficient territory. In the perspective of that policy, all projects for a return to a purely economic organization of the world necessarily remained uninteresting. The dependence of parts of the world on the whole, and the interdependence of all the parts, are the very things which must be rectified, abolished, and this not on doctrinaire grounds but because of the plain requirements of practical politics. Thus there were but two alternatives: Germany's complete surrender, her renunciation of all hope of becoming a "world people;" or an uncompromising struggle to attain the complete goal. The goal can be attained only by German control over all Europe. Only when European hegemony has been won can National Socialism

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accept a system of international exchange of commodities as not any longer disturbing to German sovereignty. In view of this, the effort to make National Socialist imperialism believe that it would do well to go back to a system of free international exchange, and to explain to National Socialist chieftains that other countries are only too anxious to help them satisfy Germany's economic needs, were perfectly fatuous.

Other facts fortified the National Socialist determination never to abandon their full aims in the foreign field. Of great importance, for instance, was the National Socialist conviction that Germany's eagerness for world dominion corresponded to a real change in the power relationships of the nations. In this view, German foreign policy merely recognized an actual state of fact hitherto obscured by the antiquated manner in which the world's territory was distributed. In Nazi eyes England is a paper Power, whose strategic position is in full disintegration. France is a dying nation, biologically unable any longer to play the part of a world Power, much less a "world people." The United States is no longer a young nation. It is, moreover, a hodgepodge of peoples and so can never attain a stable political form. It is not ambitious — hence, by definition, not a "world people." The proper sort of touch from the outside at the right moment would send it reeling into revolution.

The complacency of National Socialists who thus interpreted the realities of the world scene was not very much upset by the changes of the last half year. Reorganization in France and rearmament in Great Britain were regarded as mere show, specious bustle. The National Socialists considered that the democracies lacked one thing which is basic and essential — namely, the unshakable resolve to assert themselves in terms of power.

Hitler himself has commented on the sort of aggressive foreign policy described above. His opinion of the results of making concessions in diplomacy is particularly important. In a characteristic passage in "Mein Kampf" he writes:

> The shrewd victor will, when possible, present his demands to the conquered piecemeal. He can be sure that a people without character — and such will be any people that voluntarily submits — will see no sufficient reason for again going to war over any one of his separate encroachments. The more extortions of this kind are docilely accepted, the more unjustified will it seem to people finally to go to war over a new act of oppression, ostensibly isolated, but really

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recurring; especially since they all in all have already put up with so much more and greater abuses in patient silence.

We come now to the central question as to the real nature of National Socialism. Is it actually a national movement? Here we shall do well to consider not so much its political theories as its tactics. In his tactics, Hitler carries over into the general field of politics, and especially into the fields of foreign policy and military strategy, certain modern doctrines of the coup d'état and of civil war. His policy is one of *permanent conspiracy*. It is warfare by psychological pressure in accordance with methods of conspiracy and revolutionary disintegration. His policy is one of *world revolution*. But world revolution is not conceived of as the ultimate goal (as Lenin conceived it), but as a permanent activity aiming at the progressive decomposition of all elements of order. Hitler has absorbed and set logically in his mind the theories of the coup d'état developed by Trotzky and Malaparte. From them he derived the characteristic resort of his policy, the *crippling of the will* of his antagonist by bewildering it and "splitting" it. Combining threats and promises, his strategy aims to procure the *voluntary submission* of his opponent. He hopes to make the surrender easier by parcelling out his demands and encroachments in small doses, so that no one of them will seem important enough by itself to fight over rather than to compromise. Hitler manœuvres his antagonist into the position held by the old régime in the typical revolution. He thinks the western democracies in the great world revolution now in full course are in the position of the old régimes and former élites which have capitulated and abdicated in the lesser revolutions of the past.

Actual experience convinced Hitler of the soundness of his judgment and of the practicability of his revolutionary system. And from that experience he drew the conclusion that his personal significance in history lies in his having perceived how hollow was the strength of the old states and that his personal mission was to liquidate them from their antiquated positions in the hierarchy of power. His confidence naturally was in no wise shaken by the fact that the risks which he supposedly had been running in his many foolhardy adventures proved in the result to have been no real risks at all. The seemingly impossible turned out unfailingly to be quite feasible. The old régimes, with all their enormously superior resources, time and again capitulated before the revolutionary squads of National Socialist Germany.

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From this standpoint could concessions and offers of peace from an antagonist seem anything but symptoms of his readiness to capitulate? No, they merely sharpened the eagerness for attack! A mistaken psychology on the part of the Powers of Western Europe proved to be what brought on the very war which they had tried to prevent by being reasonable and conciliatory. In essence the war was being fought all along. It was stupid, then, to try to prevent its breaking out. The proper program would have been to try to put an end to it without a ruinous shedding of blood. This could have been done only by compelling Hitler to abandon his methods of conspiracy, and the only effective means to that end would have been prompt, continuous and unequivocal assertions of principle backed by evidence of an unflinching determination and ability to maintain the position taken.

But the diplomatic situation was far from requiring Hitler to do anything of that sort. Rather it supplied him with more and more opportunities for his psychological victories. To grasp the real significance of this fact it must be realized that according to Hitler's doctrine of strategy, war in the old-fashioned military sense is secondary. In his conception of war, the bloody military action in the field has merely the function that pursuit after a victory has in ordinary military strategy. *The really decisive action is supposed to take place before the outbreak of war.* It consists in a demoralization of the enemy. In his plan, the resort to weapons merely completes, by a last extreme act of force, the defeat which has already been determined by the methods of diplomatic conspiracy.

In recent months Hitler found himself fighting the early and what he imagined would be the decisive phases of a war. Strategic retreats now and then seemed necessary. But the first stages, to his way of thinking, offered very bright prospects. Why should he, then, bring the war to a halt? He was convinced that the total mobilization of the German people could be indefinitely endured, for National Socialist discipline had deliberately trained them to withstand hardships; whereas the democracies would find a state of continuous mobilization for war utterly foreign and inevitably provocative of fatal social unrest. So, too, the liberal economic system, in spite of its incomparably stronger position in actual wealth, would collapse sooner than the planned war economy of National Socialism, despite its far smaller economic reserves. True, the Western Powers were making rapid progress in re-

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armament; but time, in Hitler's view, was none the less working in the long run for National Socialism.

How then, with Hitler viewing things in this way, could he have been induced to abandon his political objectives and voluntarily fall in with a new and far-reaching world adjustment on a basis of international collaboration and peace? One thing was certain. He would never be brought to do so by concessions. Hitler began with motives of patriotism. But whether forced by the inner logic of his policies, or perhaps guided from the start by his doctrine of the psychological war, he went on and on, until he had become the leader of a world revolution at the end of which loomed "a new partitioning of the earth."

This idea of a new division, an offspring of Marxian ideas, but with the class war within nations worked over into a class war among nations, was most attractive to the "dynamic Powers," since it allowed them to extend their fronts in their psychological war more and more widely, until finally the moment arrived to assert their leadership and control over the whole earth.

One last consideration. National Socialism was also compelled to go forward by conditions at home. Its one chance of keeping in power in Germany was to continue the revolutionary movement and to intensify it. It could not give up any of its instruments of control. It could not dismantle the economic structure which was one of its main sources of power. It could not go back to freer social and legal forms of organization without surrendering all along the line. It might for a time agree to limit its armaments, for what it needed, it had decided, was psychological superiority no less than military preponderance. In any case, though, there were specific things which clearly it could not do: It could not establish a state of law. It could not grant a constitution universally applicable to all individuals and classes. It could not relax its terroristic rule.

Under these conditions, any real political or economic coöperation with other countries was unthinkable, *i.e.*, there was no possibility of a return to normal commercial intercourse, a normal credit policy or a free exchange. While all the elements of a system of law and even the barest outlines of a system of public audit were completely lacking, could anyone seriously imagine that new billions of credit would ever be made available for Germany?

Any régime that has limited aims can compromise, can dispense with the complete attainment of every one of its objectives.

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Not so National Socialism. Compromise, for National Socialism, is death. The alternatives facing it were and are total success or total capitulation. One or the other. Any retreat abroad would at once create difficulties at home that would lead to the régime's collapse. From it, then, one could and can expect nothing but an unwavering advance along the road on which it set out — the road to hegemony over Europe and to world revolution.

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EUROPE WITHOUT THE LEAGUE

By Marcel Hoden

THE suggested epitaph — "Died at the age of twenty!" — is not correct, for actually the League of Nations did not live even that long. Born in 1919; denied at birth by the United States; nevertheless flourishing for a time; but later neglected by France and Great Britain, and then abandoned by them outright, it finally succumbed at the end of September 1938 under the repeated and unresisted blows of the totalitarian aggressors. The destruction of the League signified more than the decline of a political system in which Great Britain and France had played the dominant part. That would have been dangerous enough. But in addition it meant the collapse, for the time being at least, of the most powerful barrier which men had ever sought to erect against war. Without it Europe lacked its most promising instrument for preventing the overthrow of civilization and a return to chaos.

Some authorities, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries, attribute the League's downfall to its weakness in the Manchurian affair, or to its failure to solve the disarmament problem, or to its lack of any effective procedure for the revision of treaties. These were all important matters, though they were connected with imperfections in methods of operation (responsibility for which lies at the door of the Great Powers) more than in any basic principle. The writer gives it as his opinion, formed after participation in League activities from the very start, that its faults in procedure were far from dooming it to death. As a matter of fact the League never seemed more flourishing or more powerful than it did in 1934 and 1935.

The destruction of the League was an integral part, indeed the most important and necessary part, in the deliberate design of the totalitarian states — Germany, Italy and Japan — to divide, weaken and immobilize the peace forces in the world and thus to open the door to domination of the world. In the following pages the writer proposes to trace the origin, the underlying causes and the principal phases of this struggle — which in less than three years (1936–1938) brought the project of the totalitarian states to success.

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I. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LEAGUE AND THE TOTALITARIAN STATES

The League as given shape at the Peace Conference in 1919 was not a pacifist Utopia. It represented an attempt to establish international relations on a juridical and contractual basis, and to give the people of the world practical and effective means for expressing and affirming their will to peace. In its preamble the Covenant set forth the principles which henceforth were to govern relations between the member states of the League "In order to promote international coöperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another."

Thus the League of Nations brought to the world a basic law, a code of obligations, methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and agencies for putting those methods into practice (the Assembly and the Council). Under this system all states had the same rights and the same obligations, if not the same responsibilities. Respect for the sovereignty, independence, individuality and dignity of each state was proclaimed and established. Under this system no state had the right to take the law into its own hands; resort to violence was prohibited; problems were to be studied and discussed so as to solve them fairly; and provision was made for mutual assistance against aggression.

For fifteen years the League worked and developed. Its achievements were respectable and it seemed gradually to be winning a position as an indispensable element in modern international life. Then came the decline. This was caused by the impact of National Socialism and Fascism.

The doctrines, aims and practices of the totalitarian states are in direct conflict with the purpose and actions of the League. Achievement of its hopes and aims is certainly not less desirable or necessary today than when President Wilson stated them over twenty years ago. But it is by nature incompatible with the hopes and aims of the totalitarian states. The dictators do not respect international pledges because the nature of their aims

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are such that they cannot. They scorn the independence of states just as they scorn the liberty of individuals. They refuse to discuss their claims on equal terms with other states because it is an essential part of their thesis that states and races are not equal. They proclaim instead their supreme "right to existence" in the form of a vital "living space." They countenance no limits on their "natural aspirations." They cannot renounce the use of force, for it is their accepted mode of action. The only negotiations which they will carry on are those with a single other Power, because in such circumstances the advantage lies with the stronger. They reject every restraining action because their success depends on surprise and intimidation. They repudiate any and every form of collective security because it would make them vulnerable.

Besides their instinctive and natural hatred of the League, both doctrinal and practical, they also feared the strength which association with it gave to Britain and France. Japan and the Third Reich were the first to resign from the League. Japan announced her intention to withdraw on March 27, 1933, after having flouted successfully her obligations under the Covenant in her dispute with China and having escaped the application of sanctions. The Third Reich promptly followed suit. Germany resigned from the League on October 21 of the same year, in order that the Nazi leaders might proceed with rearmament free of all restraint, preparatory to embarking on their determined course of treaty violations and *coups de force*. Both countries broke with the League so that they might without hindrance carry out their plans for conquest in Asia and in Europe and throughout the world.

II. THE LEAGUE: CENTER OF RESISTANCE TO THE TOTALITARIAN STATES

Despite the withdrawal of Japan and Germany, the League continued to be a center of considerable attraction for the nations which desired peace, and of resistance against the would-be aggressors. The admission of Soviet Russia to membership, the condemnation of German rearmament, and the application of sanctions to Italy are three striking evidences that it retained great vitality and power.

In 1934, Louis Barthou, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Doumergue Cabinet, decided to utilize the League as the main-

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spring in a positive plan of political action. His Eastern European Pact, based on the Covenant and renewing the tradition of the Franco-Russian alliance, aimed at rallying within the League framework all those nations which were firmly determined to make a stand against the imperialism of the Third Reich. On French instigation Soviet Russia was invited in September 1934 to become a member of the League and to occupy a permanent seat on the Council. This move was of capital political importance, for it marked the return of Russia to the European community at the moment Germany was leaving it. It was a victory for France and her friends, and it was a victory for peace, because Soviet Russia was an international factor for peace rather than for war. For Germany it was a resounding defeat, as was also the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact in the following year. Admission of Soviet Russia to the League was the signal for Germany and Italy to begin their campaign of propaganda against the League's "Bolshevization" — a line of argument, incidentally, which they subsequently used successfully to tar other good institutions and causes.

In March 1935, Germany denounced the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. On April 17, on the motion of France, the League Council condemned this violation of a treaty. At the same time the Council decided to study "measures to render the Covenant more effective in the organization of collective security." Indignation ran high in Berlin. Germany had secured an important specific goal; but longer-range German calculations seemed to have misfired. In abandoning the League the Third Reich had intended not only to create a large military force free from outside supervision, but to make sure of being completely free to use it however she might choose. The resolution of April 17 was an unpleasant warning. The shot found its mark; for a year thereafter, until March 7, 1936, the Nazi Government refrained from breaking the Covenant or any individual treaties.

Italy voted for the resolution condemning Germany's violation of the treaty. But the successful German example was persuasive. Within six months the Fascist Government had invaded Ethiopian territory, thereby not only violating the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship, but also the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the League Covenant itself. The world thereupon witnessed an unprecedented phenomenon — the spontaneous formation of a

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coalition of fifty states against an aggressor state. The League furnished this coalition with its means of action. In the forefront stood England, where public opinion had just expressed itself, in the famous "Peace Ballot," as being overwhelmingly in favor of enforcing the collective security clauses of the Covenant. On June 26, the day before the final results of the Ballot were announced, Prime Minister Baldwin, anticipating this striking victory for the supporters of the League, had declared that "The Covenant of the League of Nations is the sheet anchor of British policy."

It was on October 3 that Italian troops crossed into Ethiopian territory. Swiftly, on October 7, the League Council denounced this as aggression. At its meeting four days later the Assembly took the same course, and also decided to apply sanctions. This was a unique moment in the short life of the League, and indeed in modern history. Those of us who lived through it hour by hour felt that at last an international conscience, a collective soul, had been created. Gravely and with a full sense of their responsibilities, each of the delegates to the Assembly went to the rostrum to affirm his country's intention of remaining faithful to its pledges under the Covenant and of upholding whatever decisions the League might take. Immediately after the Assembly vote, a Coördinating Committee (really a conference of states members of the League) met to consider applying Article XVI of the Covenant. Between October 11 and 19 the Committee adopted four proposals aimed to deprive Italy of certain products and raw materials indispensable for waging war and to limit her financial resources. November 18 was set as the date for imposing sanctions. In the interval Great Britain had obtained from the smaller Mediterranean states assurances of their naval support in those waters.

Thus it took the League Council only four days to decide and declare that aggression had taken place. In four days more, a coalition of the member states had been formed. And five weeks later sanctions were put into force.

The reverberation of these events was extraordinary. Intense fear was aroused both in Germany and Italy, as we know now for a certainty from numerous witnesses, diplomatic, military and other. Mussolini has never been able to forgive or forget the deep anxiety which descended on his people, while in Germany too the impression made on the public by the League's prompt and vigor-

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ous action was profoundly disturbing to the Nazi Government. From that moment the two dictators realized that they had no choice: the influence of the League must be destroyed.

Even so, the Covenant had not really been fully applied, either in letter or in spirit. Although faced by an undoubted (indeed avowed) war of aggression, the member states had refused to demand the severance of diplomatic relations with the aggressor and had continued the Council in its rôle of conciliator. They rejected the most important of all sanctions, that on oil. And they deliberately avoided military sanctions. In other words, they limited sanctions to economic measures which would make themselves felt in Italy only after a considerable lapse of time. They thus mutilated Article XVI and thwarted the mechanism for applying it.

Chief responsibility for these fatal errors, which in the end were to lead to Mussolini's victory over Ethiopia and over the League, rests on the government of Pierre Laval. His policy was a personal one, and it was contrary to the treaties, traditions and interests of France. His blows against the League, keystone of French diplomatic policy, came, moreover, at the very moment when the British people and their government were in process of being converted to the French view on collective security. After long years of effort, a Prime Minister of France at last had an opportunity to obtain Britain's promise of automatic aid in case of a threat of war. In this crisis Laval wavered, reserved French liberty of action, and ended up by favoring the aggressor.

The effects of Laval's behavior on British opinion were clear and immediate. As early as October 16, Sir Austen Chamberlain had declared in an interview in the *Paris-Soir:* "If the Covenant triumphs, our confidence in it will be fortified, and Great Britain will have created a precedent which will govern her attitude in other crises to come. If, on the other hand, other nations which have signed the Covenant, which have repeatedly declared their loyalty to it, and which have sometimes accused the representatives of Great Britain of being lukewarm in their support of it, now default on their engagements in this decisive hour, then Great Britain will consider that she has been released from her obligations."

In spite of this and many similar warnings, Laval stuck to his chosen course. On December 8, he obtained Sir Samuel Hoare's consent to certain proposals for settling the Italo-Ethiopian con-

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flict. The plan, which in effect would have rewarded aggression, aroused the indignation both of British public opinion and of the British Parliament. It forced Sir Samuel Hoare to resign and obliged Prime Minister Baldwin to make humiliating excuses in the House. But although the Council of the League discarded the Hoare-Laval plan, the damage was done. Laval's policy had estranged England from France, paralyzed the League, and headed the whole system of collective security towards the abyss.

III. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE LEAGUE BY THE TOTALITARIAN STATES

Thereafter events came thick and fast. In April 1935 the League had condemned German occupation of the Rhineland in violation of treaty obligations. In October 1935 the League had voted limited sanctions on Italy for her attack on Ethiopia. By September 1938 the totalitarian states had definitely worsted the League. Through each of the Italian, German and Japanese adventures which now took place the main objective can be easily discerned. As in the reoccupation of the Rhineland and the Italian war on Ethiopia, so in the war in Spain, the Sino-Japanese "incident" of 1937, the debates on the "reform" of the League Covenant, Mr. Chamberlain's experimentation in European settlement outside the framework of the Covenant, Germany's annexation of Austria, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and Italy's seizure of Albania — all were stages marking the League's decadence and final destruction.

Let us look back briefly at the chief of these events. In January 1936 Anthony Eden, new head of the British Foreign Office, strove sincerely and with youthful energy to rally the dispersing League forces and to assume moral and political leadership at Geneva. At the Quai d'Orsay Laval was succeeded by Flandin. For France, the change was merely a jump out of the frying pan into the fire. Flandin continued Laval's policy by refusing to accept Eden's proposal for an oil sanction, alleging that he had received threats from Rome that "the oil sanction means war" and that Mussolini would leave the League (*sic*) if this new and effective measure were taken against him. Thus once again France refused to run the risks of collective security and headed toward the alternative risks of war.

This brings us to March 2, 1936. Less than a week later, on March 7, Hitler denounced the Treaty of Locarno and sent the

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Reichswehr into the Rhineland. Hesitating to resort to force, the French Government swung round towards the League. Here, now, it was her turn to find herself abandoned. The League Council met at London. A wave of Gallophobia had enveloped Parliament, the City, society and the press. Hitler had been clever enough to follow up his violation of the Locarno Pact by presenting a "Peace Plan." British public opinion swallowed it and demanded negotiations with Germany. Some League members saw in all this a just reward for France's policy in the Ethiopian conflict. But most of them were as much dismayed by French passivity before the new German menace as by the menace itself. It was impossible to obtain more from the Council than moral condemnation. Attempts to form a "second coalition" met with a cold hostility in Britain and produced only confusion in the other countries. The League functioned poorly because France had been discredited, because she had become estranged from Great Britain, and because all the nations of Europe had consequently fallen prey to suspicion and fear.

If in the closing days of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict the League managed to save its honor by upholding the law, this was thanks mainly to the courageous stand of the smaller countries and the Soviet Union. Three times during 1936 — in April, in June and in September — Mussolini tried in vain to make the League withdraw its condemnation of his aggression and accept the *fait accompli* in Ethiopia. By May the defeat of the Negus had been complete and in July sanctions had been lifted. Yet to each Italian demand the Council or the Assembly replied by repeating the declarations and the decisions they had previously made. The League thus emphasized its intention not to reconsider its earlier condemnation nor to recognize the conquest of Ethiopia.

In September, in particular, the Italian Government (encouraged by a much-criticized visit made to Rome by the Secretary-General of the League) sought to prevent the League Assembly from seating the representatives of Ethiopia. Notwithstanding pressure from various sources, the Assembly allowed the Ethiopian delegates to take their seats. The steadfast attitude of the League delegates reflected not only their desire to protest against Italy's violation of the Covenant, but a feeling of betrayal and anger on the part of the smaller states toward the Great Powers. This was especially evident as regards Great Britain. The smaller states felt that after having won them to the policy of collective

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security, British statesmen had left them (and especially the Mediterranean states which had agreed to naval coöperation) to the tender mercies of Italy.

We now come to the Spanish war. London (in the lead) and Paris (reluctantly) adopted the principle of "non-intervention." Heedless of the requests of the Spanish Government, long a loyal member of the League, neither the Council nor the Assembly was willing to recognize that Italy and Germany were guilty of aggression in Spain. To contrary proofs they shut their eyes.

In the Sino-Japanese "incident" which began on July 7, 1937, the League evinced the same hesitations, and in the end refused similarly to act, even though the Chinese Government formally informed the Council that Japan's action was "an aggression against the territorial integrity and existing political independence of China, a Member of the League of Nations." In both the Spanish and Chinese cases a sense of caution, if not of impotence, seemed to have affected the British and French Governments. Their fear of "irritating" the totalitarian states spread through the entire League.

Despite all these blows the moral force and the potential strength of the League remained considerable. The feeling that they belonged to an international community still persisted among the member states and preserved the basis for concerted action whenever leadership should appear. Though they showed signs of timidity in putting the Covenant into effect, the nations still thought of it as a reserve fund of security for future use. In Paris and London there were men who understood this situation. Though handicapped by the injury done Anglo-French solidarity by Pierre Laval, the Blum Government sought to revive confidence in France and in the League. "France boldly declares," said the Premier in the Chamber on July 1, 1936, "and will attest by her acts, her loyalty to international law. She will put far from her mind at this hour all thought of disappointment or discouragement. She gives her word; she will keep it. Her wish is to make the idea of collective security a reality. She will contribute by all the means in her power to revive within the League and around it that outburst of enthusiasm and faith which threw a lustre on certain great days: in 1924, at the time of the Protocol; in 1932, when the Disarmament Conference opened; and again last autumn, when the associated states proclaimed their unanimous resolve."

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In London, Anthony Eden and Lord Cranborne remained sincere advocates of collective security, despite their inability to follow an always logical course in supporting it on specific occasions; for though they understood the League's value, the same could not be said for the British Government of which they were a part. The Prime Minister and his most powerful colleagues had decided to draw a lesson from the defeat suffered in the Italo-Ethiopian affair and to go a separate way regardless of France and the League. They were determined that, since apparently the Covenant could not be applied, it should be amended by lessening its obligations, notably those concerning sanctions in Article XVI. Furthermore, with Berlin making overtures to London, many British Tories began to envisage the return of Germany to a modified League and the resumption of Italy's collaboration "without obligations or sanctions."

This was the genesis of the idea of reforming the Covenant, as put on the League agenda by the British Government as early as July 1936. It was an artificial question, for, as Titulesco once remarked, "If the League has miscarried, the fault lies not in the Covenant, but in man." The question was full of dynamite, too, for to discuss the Covenant might jeopardize the high purpose of the League and was almost certain to shake its unity.

At first there was considerable resistance to the idea: France, Soviet Russia, and the members of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente decided that any new study of the Covenant undertaken should aim at "reinforcing the authority of the League" and "increasing the true efficacy of the guarantees of security which the League offered its members." They purposely adopted a slow procedure. But at the end of May 1937 Stanley Baldwin retired and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Neville Chamberlain. He retained Eden as head of the Foreign Office, but with the tactic of "imprisoning" him and at the same time using his presence in the Cabinet to reassure the Opposition and the French Government. In the past Chamberlain had rendered at least lip service to the League, and had campaigned on a League platform. But he neither liked the League nor really understood it. He had come to think of it as not merely useless but positively dangerous. He allowed Eden to affirm the British Government's fidelity to the League; but in his own mind he had chosen another policy, that of direct negotiation for the defense of limited British interests as he understood them. He discour-

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aged the little nations from appealing to Geneva. He preferred Franco to win in Spain. He sought personal contact and reconciliation with the dictators. At the end of July he sent a personal message to Mussolini; in November, profiting by Eden's absence in Brussels, he sent Halifax to Berlin.

Meanwhile, what of France, rent by domestic dissension? After the advent of M. Chautemps to power in June 1937 she followed the lead of Great Britain. Her allies in Eastern Europe forsook her; her best friends were in disgrace. Poland, with the approval of England, drew steadily closer to the Third Reich and let the Nazis assume a dominant position in Danzig. Belgium, under van Zeeland and Spaak, slipped gradually into what was called neutrality. In Rumania, Titulesco had already been removed from power. Jugoslavia, where Premier Stoyadinović had fostered German economic penetration, concluded a political agreement with Italy after consultation with London. The Little Entente was shaken to its foundations. Czechoslovakia, against which a German campaign had already begun, slowly became isolated. Henlein started his series of trips to London and Berlin and Berchtesgaden. Soviet Russia, prey to an intense and bloody domestic crisis, withdrew within herself. The Franco-Soviet Pact became a dead letter.

In November 1937, MM. Chautemps and Delbos went to London. Neville Chamberlain did not hide from them his scorn for the League. The French ministers heard him out. For the first time in seventeen years the communiqué issued after Anglo-French conversations did not mention the League. To Eden's surprise the French ministers did not object. They accepted Chamberlain's formula reaffirming "the desire of their Governments to coöperate with all countries in the common task of promoting international appeasement by methods of free and peaceful negotiation." Downing Street had won. Eden was beaten on his own ground. He resigned soon thereafter.

The great "Chamberlain experiment" had already begun, and we must note in fairness that it had at heart the tacit approval of the French Government. It was to continue for many months at the expense of both Great Britain and France, as well as of Europe and the League. We all know into what terrifying territory it eventually led us.

The consequences for the League of the Anglo-French communiqué of November 30 were soon evident. Earlier that month

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an Anti-Communist Protocol had been signed at the Chigi Palace in Rome by Ciano, von Ribbentrop and Hotta, Japanese Ambassador to Italy. This pact became the nucleus of the totalitarian coalition against the League at the very moment that Great Britain and France deserted it. On December 11, 1937, Mussolini announced to the world, on a great flood of publicity, that Italy was withdrawing from the League; on the next day the official Nazi press bureau published a communiqué in which the German Government solemnly declared that "a return to Geneva will never be considered." These reciprocal assurances gave birth to the "Axis." It was not coincidence, we might note, that this expression became a part of the world's political vocabulary simultaneously with the first overt steps against the League. "We are withdrawing from the tottering temple where they do not work for peace but prepare for war," declared Mussolini in a speech on December 11. The German press followed suit and warned the smaller states that the League was merely "a war machine" and that "to adhere to the Covenant is to enlist."

Never had arguments of doctrine, used to show the inevitability of the conflict between the League and the totalitarian states, been so clearly and vigorously expressed. Never had the attack on the Anglo-French political system been so direct or so frank. According to the totalitarian spokesmen, the German-Italian-Japanese alliance was undertaking a task even more universal than that of the League — to put an end to "obsolete positions of monopoly" and to "create a world-order in which the really vigorous nations can live together." The warning to the Western democracies thus was clear: the goal of the new confederation was a world domination. The totalitarian states had set out by promise and by threat to tear the League asunder, thus isolating France and Great Britain for the final *Machtprobe*.

Faced with this menace, London and Paris came to life. They had two opportunities to reply to the dictators: the one-hundredth session of the Council, which met at Geneva on January 26, 1938; and the meeting of the Committee of 28, created to study the reform of the Covenant. In the Council, the French and British delegates answered Mussolini's speech of December 11 and the German communiqué of December 12 by reaffirming their loyalty to the League. All the other members thereupon followed their example. Said Mr. Eden: "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom does not think it inappropriate, at

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a moment when it has to acknowledge the repudiation in some quarters of the League of Nations, to declare that its faith in the aims and ideals that inspired the League remains unchanged." "The Government which I represent," declared M. Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, "desires to reaffirm its loyalty to the League of Nations and its continued faith in the future of that organisation." The Soviet representative boldly approached the ideological problem and cleared up misconceptions created by totalitarian propaganda. "But there is another kind of ideology," he said, "the essential principles of which are respect for the integrity and independence of all existing states, inviolability of their frontiers, renunciation of war as an instrument for settling international disputes, recognition of the equal rights of all peoples, great and small. The League of Nations undoubtedly, if it wishes to be true to its aims, cannot but be a bloc of that kind of international ideology."

In late January and early February 1938, 17 states represented on the Committee of 28 — Finland, Argentina, Czechoslovakia, China, Soviet Russia, Iran, Turkey, Colombia, Canada, Spain, Mexico, Greece, Bulgaria, France, Rumania, Great Britain and New Zealand — announced that for the time being they were opposed to any reform or to any modification, either unilateral or collective, in the articles or the application of the Covenant, and that as regarded the future they were against any decision which might weaken the Covenant or circumscribe the League's authority and its field of action. The representatives of The Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, while they would have liked the Committee to recognize formally that under existing conditions Article XVI could not be applied in its entirety, nevertheless emphasized that their governments rejected the idea of neutrality, that they intended to remain faithful to the principle of collective security, and that they hoped some day to be able to reëstablish the obligation to impose sanctions.

The offensive against the League was thus for the time being repulsed. The small states, reassured and appeased, stayed within the fold; at heart most of them were glad that nothing had been done to Article XVI, a source of anguish and yet of comfort to them all. At this juncture it would still have been possible for France and Britain to draw the other countries firmly within the framework of the League. But this would have required the

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adoption of a resolute stand by France and Britain themselves — and for this neither showed any inclination.

On February 20, 1938, Hitler delivered an insolent and threatening speech before the Reichstag. On the same day Chamberlain parted company with Eden, who had remained till then in the Cabinet as the champion of collective security even though his initiative had been extremely circumscribed. In order to dispel any doubts as to his true sentiments and the direction of his policy, Chamberlain in a speech in the House two days later deliberately rejected "the imposition of sanctions and the use of force," and, sounding the knell of collective security, warned the little states clearly not to count any longer on the League.

Almost at once came Germany's invasion and annexation of Austria, whose independence had been guaranteed by the League. When Britain and France failed to offer any resistance, terror and confusion overtook the League's smaller members. On April 16 Chamberlain went a step further by signing the Anglo-Italian agreement and exchanging cordial messages with Mussolini.

The policy of appeasement and reconciliation with the totalitarian Powers appeared to observers in the smaller states of Europe as a mixture of egoism and weakness. Thenceforward the idea of neutrality made rapid and steady progress in Scandinavia, The Netherlands and Belgium. In May, the Swiss (on special grounds, to be sure) decided to resume their full and unconditional neutrality. A burst of energy shown by Britain and France at a moment of crisis in Czechoslovakia in May was not followed up. In July, Chamberlain reaffirmed his intention of pursuing the "policy of appeasement," condemned anew the system of sanctions, and preached the transformation of the League into a union of nations devoted to "consultation and conciliation." Enlightened beyond all peradventure as to Chamberlain's intentions, the states in the "Oslo group" met in July and agreed to demand of the next League Assembly that it state authoritatively the discretionary character of sanctions. "This," gloated the *Giornale d'Italia*, "means the end of collective security. . . . Henceforth the powerful armaments of the democracies cannot be excused on the ground that they are for the use of the League of Nations."

This brings us down to August 1938. By that date Hitler's intentions toward Czechoslovakia were no longer a mystery to anyone. Everybody therefore expected that the French Gov-

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ernment, bound by a treaty of assistance to the Czech Government, would shortly be seeking to induce the League Council to declare that a German aggression had been committed against Czechoslovakia, a member of the League, and would demand that sanctions be applied. The Franco-Soviet Pact, like the Franco-Czech Pact, could come into force only within the framework of the League.

The League Assembly met on September 12 in an atmosphere heavy with anxiety. The totalitarian states had of course exerted every possible effort to frighten the smaller League members and obviate the danger of sanctions. Would France and Britain stand firm, reassuring the anxious ones, rallying the laggards and restoring cohesion by determined leadership? Once more the fate of the Covenant, the very existence of the League, rested in the hands of Great Britain and France. But could the spirit of 1935 be reawakened? Could the coalition for peace be reëstablished?

On September 26 and 27 President Roosevelt sent his famous messages to Beneš and Hitler. A day later the League Assembly gave its support to President Roosevelt's lead. The following day the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of France — ignoring the initiative taken by Roosevelt and the Assembly, brushing aside the Covenant of the League of Nations and disregarding the Franco-Czech Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the German-Czech Convention of Conciliation and Arbitration — went to Munich, as Chamberlain had already gone to Berchtesgaden and Godesberg.

President Masaryk once said: "Jesus and not Cæsar, that is the essence of democracy." He might have added "and of the League of Nations." At Munich the British and French Governments deserted Jesus to make a sacrifice to Cæsar. On October 1 the Assembly broke up. Nothing was left of the League of Nations, either of its spirit or of its Covenant.

IV. THE NEED FOR A LEAGUE

Between the League of Nations, a free association of states determined to observe certain principles in their relations with one another and prepared to submit to certain rules, and the totalitarian states, which cannot and will not accept any limitation but that of force, conflict was inevitable. But the conflict need not have ended as it did.

In 1935 the League seemed headed for ultimate victory. But

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victory was denied it, and for this a large measure of the fault lies with the French Government and another large measure lies with the British Government. The final triumph of might over right and the collapse of the League in the general "save-yourself" flight of frightened peoples, stemmed directly from the conciliatory overtures made to the totalitarian states, now by Paris, now by London. Resistance to aggression by the dictators required the existence of an "international ideology" and the resolute will of those who accepted it to defend it. Such an ideology did, in fact, exist in the Covenant of the League. Around it men of good will, who regarded it as the highest expression of international right and justice so far achieved by man, should have gathered determinedly and confidently even in days of greatest stress.

After Munich the world was confronted with this dilemma: either to restore the reign of law among nations, which meant to revive the League, or to accept the life of slaves in a universe directed by primitive instincts and dominated by force.

Deceived and betrayed by Hitler and Mussolini, the British and French Governments decided to act. After having allowed the League, their best instrument for action, to be smashed under their very eyes, they began striving, at the price of countless difficulties and much haggling, to reëstablish a peace coalition, to reawaken the spirit of 1935, to revive an international conscience. Would it not have been better to have enforced the Covenant in the first place? Much would have been saved — much that was of value spiritually as well as much that was worth saving materially.

When our Western democracies have at last imposed peace on the totalitarian states, France and Britain will have before them the task of reawakening the good will, the confidence, and the support of other peoples, both in Europe and beyond the seas. They must revive that cult of liberty, equality, law, justice and honor which inspired those who prepared the Covenant of the League and gave it shape and life. When peace is restored, they must, this time let us hope with the help of the United States, reconstruct the world in accordance with the League's original principles. The League is dead. Long live the League!

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AMERICAN ISOLATION

Propaganda Pro and Con

By John Crosby Brown

AMERICAN isolationists, long in the saddle, are fighting to stave off the disaster, as they see it, of a swing in American public opinion back from the direction it began following in 1919. True, they won a major victory in preventing revision of the Neutrality Act at the last session of Congress. But on every hand they see evidences of a deep tide of American sympathy for the democracies and against the totalitarian Powers — a tide which might lead us to give moral and material support to the democracies, engaged in a life and death struggle, or even to our eventually becoming their partners.

The isolationists attribute this reversal of public opinion to "insidious propaganda." Scarcely a day has passed in recent years without a solemn warning from some senator, congressman, editor or business leader against that propaganda. It is alleged to have been devised abroad and fostered here by disloyal or merely credulous American "internationalists" in order to enlist the American people in another "crusade" — ostensibly to make the world safe for democracy but actually to pull British, French, Chinese, and various other chestnuts out of the fire.

Of course, the British, French, Chinese and others have wanted our support and have been doing their best to win it. Unquestionably they have used propaganda to persuade us to understand and sympathize with their point of view. Let us take the fact into full account. But it is only part of the picture. In order to understand fully what really is going on we must also have an accurate understanding of the nature and extent of the propaganda in favor of isolation. With a clear idea of the propagandist forces at work on both sides the ordinary citizen will have a better chance of discounting any improper influences of either and of making up his own mind on the merits of all the issues at stake.

First of all, exactly what is propaganda? The word means different things to different people. Mr. Herbert Hoover defined it at Colby College on November 8, 1937, as follows: "That special breed of cultivated untruth we call propaganda. This word at one time had a reputable and even sanctified meaning.

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. . . It is now a sinister word meaning half-truth or any other distortion of truth. It moves by tainting of news, by making synthetic news and opinions and canards. It promotes the emotions of hate, fear and dissension." This definition effectively expresses the current popular view that propaganda is inherently misleading. But it obviously is inadequate, for it does not cover a vast amount of activity which is universally recognized as entirely legitimate but for which no other descriptive term exists.

A very different idea of the real nature of propaganda was expressed in an editorial in the July 15 issue of the well-known Catholic weekly *America:* "Propaganda is nothing but the dissemination of views, principles and facts, and in itself is as innocent as wheat-growing." And the editorial pointedly continued: "It becomes evil when by forged processes it strives to distort the truth by deception."

About two years ago a distinguished group of educators and publicists representing a number of our leading universities organized the Institute for Propaganda Analysis "to help the intelligent citizen detect and analyze propaganda." Their approach has been scholarly and disinterested. They defined propaganda as the "expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions or other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends." This definition does not suggest that a propagandist necessarily distorts or falsifies, or even that his statements lack logic or accuracy. The definition would apply alike to Goebbels' anti-Semitic campaign and to the foreign missionary work of the Presbyterian Church; to Harvard University's appeal for contributions to its Tercentenary Fund and to the campaign for the Townsend Plan; to the Russian Pavilion at the World's Fair and to the current efforts of the United States Chamber of Commerce to win the public to a more favorable opinion of private enterprise. In short, it describes a well-nigh universal form of activity which in itself is neither good nor bad, but which has infinite potentialities in either direction.

By this definition, any person who becomes convinced of the merits of a given cause and devotes himself to persuading others to support it is a propagandist. For example, I myself have been a propagandist for the foreign policies of Secretary Hull, since I sincerely believe them to be best for our country and would like to persuade as many as possible of my countrymen to agree.

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II

In recent years in the United States people have become divided roughly into those who favor what is called isolation, those who believe in what is called collective action, and those who haven't made up their minds. Those who believe in one course or the other strongly enough have become propagandists for it. In a recent book,[1] one of the propagandists for isolation terms those on his side the "Peace Party" and calls those on the other side the "War Party." To show the extraordinary diversity of personalities on both sides a reviewer selected two lists from the names given.

The so-called "Peace Party" was said to include such strange bedfellows as Herbert Hoover, William Randolph Hearst, Charles A. Beard, Father Charles E. Coughlin, Norman Thomas, General George Van Horn Mosely, the German-American Bund and World Peaceways. The so-called "War Party" was said to include Franklin D. Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, Alfred M. Landon, Earl Browder, Nicholas Murray Butler, Thomas W. Lamont, Bishop William T. Manning, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the American League for Peace and Democracy.

The volume in question also included in the left wing of the "Peace Party" those redoubtable isolationists Senators Borah, Johnson, Nye and Lundeen. Representative Hamilton Fish was listed in that party, too, though his activities on his recent European peregrination seem a bit paradoxical for an isolationist. Among the publications said to represent the "Peace Party" were the *Chicago Tribune*, the New York *Daily News* and *The New Republic*. On the other side were put the *New York Times* and the *Daily Worker* (can the latter be left there after the Hitler-Stalin coup?). Ex-President Hoover's Secretary of State, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, was also mentioned in the "War Party." There were many others.

Plainly, any such line-up is bound to be artificial and to do an injustice to the intellectual equipment of many of the individuals mentioned. The very terms "Peace Party" and "War Party" are ridiculously exaggerated and seem to have been adopted chiefly for the purpose of attracting attention. Nuances of opinion are largely left out of account. For example, what of persons who

[1] "Blood Is Cheaper Than Water," by Quincy Howe. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1939.

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have not wished to bind the United States in advance to follow a set pattern of collective security but who are not isolationist in specific cases where international collaboration obviously becomes a matter of American self-interest? There also are many omissions. If ex-Secretary Stimson is mentioned in the so-called "War Party," why not mention in the so-called "Peace Party" his former Under-Secretary, William R. Castle? The rôle of the Republican *New York Herald Tribune* in the so-called "War Party" ranks is hardly mentioned; the editorial policies of the *Chicago Daily News* and the *Washington Post* are not mentioned at all, nor the activities of *The New World*, the enlightened organ of Cardinal Mundelein's Archdiocese of Chicago. On the other side, no mention is made of organs like *Social Justice* and the Brooklyn *Tablet*, which stand in sharp contrast to *The New World* and to a liberal Catholic weekly like *The Commonweal*. Such refinements and omissions aside, enough has been said to show how variegated is the line-up in the great debate over the proper international rôle of the United States. On both sides the leaders have been speaking boldly over their own names and the sincerity of their convictions need not be questioned.

But the propaganda of foreigners is not to be overlooked. Each side in the debate noted above receives powerful, though often unsolicited, help from foreign sources. Let us take the isolationist side first.

It is profoundly in the interest of the Nazi and Fascist Powers, and of Japan, that isolationist sentiment in the United States should prevail. They require that they be left free to carry through their programs of conquest and aggression without opposition or protest from the United States. They require that their opponents shall be cut off from the commercial contact with the United States which is habitual in time of peace and which is traditional and legal in time of war. Consequently Hitler and Goebbels and the agents of the Japanese Foreign Office and to a lesser extent the representatives of Mussolini and Ciano have left no stone unturned to see to it that the propaganda of the leading American isolationists receives the fullest possible support. What the rôle of Soviet Russia is to be following the destruction of the anti-Comintern front remains to be seen. In recent years its efforts were usually directed against American isolation. This activity is not, of course, to be confused with that of dissident Marxists, or rather anti-Stalinist Marxists, who

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while subscribing to an international ideal of their own stood fast against any collective action which they thought might strengthen Stalin's Russia.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis has reported the existence in the United States of some 800 organizations which could properly be called pro-Fascist or pro-Nazi, and which have been deluging the country with anti-Semitic, anti-democratic and isolationist propaganda. Ostensibly this propaganda has originated entirely from American sources. Actually this has not been the case. A great deal of the printed material, for example, has originated in Germany; it has been printed there in the English language and sent to Nazi organizations and sympathizers in the United States for distribution throughout the country. The Institute stated: "It might be reasonable to estimate that about one American in every three is being subjected to Fascist propaganda."

The *New York Post* of December 30, 1938, printed in parallel columns an anti-Semitic address made by Goebbels in Munich in 1935 and an article signed by Father Coughlin in *Social Justice* three years later. The latter had purported to be an original composition by the priest of the Shrine of the Little Flower, at Royal Oak, Michigan. But except for a scattering of insignificant verbal changes which in no way affected the meaning, the texts of the speech and the article were identical. In December 1938 the Brooklyn *Tablet* printed an attack on President Roosevelt containing phrases later shown to have been used previously in a Nazi paper in Stuttgart.

The varied, widespread and effective activity of Nazi propagandists all through our country was brought to light by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a part of the evidence used to convict three Nazi spies in November 1938 in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The Fuehrer himself has contributed to elucidating the thesis of certain American isolationists. Dorothy Thompson wrote as follows of the sections of his speech of April 28, 1939, in which he replied to President Roosevelt's suggestions for maintaining peace: "The part of the speech devoted to answering the President of the United States was prepared by the German Embassy in Washington. . . . The arguments which he marshalled were carefully aimed at the anti-Roosevelt forces in this country and were designed to play upon the isolationist sentiment. . . . The

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rebuke to American interference in European affairs . . . was couched in almost the language used by many of our own critics of the State Department's foreign policy. . . . The German Embassy in Washington did a good job and so did he."

For those inclined to discount Miss Thompson's statement because of her anti-Nazi convictions, here is the opinion of Paul Mallon, of the violently pro-isolationist Hearst Press, on May 1: "No German conceived Hitler's reply to Roosevelt, certainly not Hitler. . . . In conception the speech was distinctly an American political campaign speech, designed to appeal to mid-Western sentiment and anti-Roosevelt Americans. Its shrewd knowledge of inner politics here could not come from a distant Nazi mind. Its arguments and appeals were based accurately on a studied background of American history which is utterly foreign to dictatorial methods of thinking and ideals. . . . The ghosting was so obvious that some of the isolationist Senators at lunch next day agreed the White House would no doubt get around to charging them with having done the job."

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis has stated that in 1938 the Japanese Diet appropriated $2,000,000 for propaganda in the United States. The Institute concluded that, with the money spent here by Japanese business men, "Japan's propaganda machine here" is "the biggest, the most impressive and by far the most expensive of any foreign Power." The objectives of this propaganda, it said, are to persuade the United States "to keep hands off the war, to buy Japanese goods, and to invest money in Manchukuo and Japanese-dominated China;" also, to persuade the United States not "to build up its fleet" and not "to revamp its foreign policy to provide for boycotting aggressor nations as suggested (at times) by the President."

Presumably these intensive and expensive efforts of foreign propagandas have played some rôle in strengthening American sentiment for isolation.

Mention should also be made of the foreign language press in the United States and the foreign language broadcasts. Within 30 miles of Times Square live almost twice as many Italians as are in Rome, and the German-speaking populations of New York and other cities are very considerable. The views and comments of almost all the Italian papers and broadcasters, and of many German ones, have naturally tended to appeal to the isolationist sentiment existing here.

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Now, what of the foreign propaganda on the other side?

In April of this year, Senator Gerald Nye, of North Dakota, placed in the *Congressional Record* extracts from a book by a British author, Sidney Rogerson, called "Propaganda in the Next War," issued last fall as one of a series edited by Captain Liddell Hart, a noted English military expert. Senator Nye quoted as follows from a section of the book dealing with the propaganda course which Great Britain should pursue towards neutral states: "In the next war, as in the last, the result will probably depend upon the way in which the United States acts, and her attitude will reflect the reaction of her public to propaganda properly applied." In another place the book says: "Since on paper our case towards neutrals appears to lack a mainspring, it will behoove us to manufacture what we can and press it everywhere we can — a task of making bricks with little straw at which we showed ourselves to excel in the last war." To accomplish his purpose, Mr. Rogerson recommends: sending "leading literary lights and other men with names well known in the United States to put our point of view over the dinner table;" arranging facilities at the front for American newspaper correspondents and newsreel cameramen so they can obtain horror scenes; capitalizing American sympathy for the oppressed; helping involve Japan in the war; decorating Americans serving in the forces of Great Britain and her Allies.

The British publisher was afterwards reported to have withdrawn this book from circulation. This is not surprising. Though the volume represented a private English view (Captain Liddell Hart has been a severe critic of the present British Government), one nevertheless cannot but sympathize with Senator Nye when he said: "It amazes me that men could be so brazen in laying down the plans which are to entrap us. . . ."

Most British propaganda is more subtle. It reaches us in the form of visits from leading British personalities who present a point of view about life congenial to our own. Mr. Hearst's New York *Journal-American* commented on this sort of thing last winter in its usual staccato style:

"Captain Eden raced here to tell us all about the greatness of the democratic form of government — something we had to fight for against the armed opposition of Captain Eden's ancestors.

"The Cavalcade marches on to the designed CONQUEST OF AMERICA BY THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

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"The climax will come next Spring when their Majesties, King George and Queen Elizabeth, will visit us 'to see the President and the World's Fair.'"

In the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Government retained a prominent American public relations counsel to disseminate propaganda for their cause. After a few months they discontinued his services. Prominent French citizens, in association with a group of well-known Americans, maintain the French Information Center, Inc., in New York. The organization emphasizes that it confines itself to answering questions, giving "facts, not propaganda." But facts, as already noted, can be the most powerful propaganda in the broad sense of that term.

The influence of the Communist movement on American public opinion is difficult to estimate. In national elections the Communist Party has proved itself negligible. Communist influence in certain labor units, however, has been strong, and Communist ideology, as differentiated from much Communist practice in Russia, doubtless carries an appeal to many Americans. In so far as Communist propaganda works in the political field, its influence in this country has probably been most often on the side of collective action; though what it will be in future Stalin has not yet indicated as these lines are written.

Another source of propaganda against isolation must be mentioned — the refugees driven out of Europe by dictatorial intolerance and persecution. Outstanding individuals like Albert Einstein, Eduard Beneš and Thomas Mann are representative of hundreds of scientists, scholars, churchmen, artists, business leaders and craftsmen who have been exiled because of their race or their democratic inclinations and who carry the torch of their liberalism with them. The main influence of this group, obviously, lies not in any direct pleas which they may make individually for or against American isolation, but rather in the eloquent testimony which the mere fact of their presence in this country provides as to the reality of the Nazi and Fascist menace to our type of civilization.

III

I have given what can be taken at least as a rough approximation of the line-up pro and con American isolation — sincere American citizens on both sides, and on both sides certain foreign

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influences. The volume of propaganda on both sides is immense. It is my thesis that in neither case is the propaganda wholly evil or wholly good and that it ought all to be turned to useful account. The task of American citizens trying to make up their minds on the basic issues is not to disregard these propagandas but to try to sift the wheat from the chaff in them, to judge what is true and what is false, and to balance the two truths.

We Americans cannot justly criticize foreign nations for trying to gain our good will when we ourselves are engaged in doing the very same thing in Latin America. We consider it quite proper that Latin American nations should coöperate with us in preventing European and Asiatic Powers from gaining a territorial foothold in any of the territories to the south. We consider it self-evident that the interest of the South American countries and our own are identical in this regard. That is the essence of the Monroe Doctrine. And in order to make the Latin Americans see our point of view we have tried to improve and intensify our propagandist activities in their countries.

Similarly Great Britain and France may quite sincerely regard themselves as fighting our battles as well as their own in so far as they are able to interpose military barriers to further Nazi, Fascist or Japanese aggression, because by doing so they prevent the totalitarian Powers from conquering strategic territories which the latter might use as bases for naval or aërial attacks on American shipping or even on American cities in some future war. There is plenty of technically competent confirmation of this point of view. Rear Admiral Yates Stirling and Major George Fielding Eliot, for example, have both pointed out the military importance to the United States of having the various Atlantic and Pacific islands in friendly hands. The Azores, for instance, happen to belong to Portugal, long an ally of Great Britain. In the event of a conquest of Portugal (including, of course, the Azores) by a Spanish Fascist Government, aided by Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, or if Portugal herself moved into that camp, Major Eliot believes that the result would be of grave concern to the United States and he raises the question whether we might not have to take active counter-measures.[2]

The question, then, for thoughtful Americans to decide is not whether or not we are being subjected to propaganda by all the

[2] See also "The Frontiers of the United States," by A. Lawrence Lowell, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1939.

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various nations which would like our favor or dread our opposition. We know this is the case. Our task as Americans is to examine critically just how far our national interests coincide with the lines suggested by this or that particular foreign propaganda and how far they differ. In doing this we might be helped by having certain standards of judgment: (1) Is the propagandist's advocacy of his cause open and aboveboard? (2) Are his facts accurate? (3) Does he attempt to suppress, distort or conceal any facts relevant to the argument? (4) Does he distinguish between statements of fact capable of proof and expressions of opinion?

Much propaganda which we read and hear conforms to these standards. It is propaganda not because it is inaccurate or insidious but because it is disseminated for the purpose of persuading us to favor a certain course. If the present crisis in American foreign policy did not exist, exactly the same material would pass as purely educational in character. "The distinction between education and propaganda," writes Professor Carl Joachim Friedrich of Harvard, "is often so complex and obscure that those engaged in one of these activities are honestly unable to say which it is. The distinction cannot be lightly dismissed as one between sincerity and insincerity or between ability and the lack of it. There is sincerity on both sides and ability too."

On the other hand, we should constantly be on guard against propagandist attempts to fool us by getting us to form favorable or unfavorable opinions of individuals or causes without a cool examination of the evidence. The mere cry that an opponent is a "propagandist" is often a useful tool in propaganda. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis has analyzed some of the commoner devices of the propagandist who endeavors to exploit our emotions. He calls his opponents names. He tries by repetition to associate his own program in our minds with noble words like "liberty," "honor," "progress," "democracy," "justice." He "transfers" the authority and prestige of symbols which we respect and revere, like the Cross or the Flag, to some cause which he would like to have us accept. He secures high-sounding testimonials which impress us. He says "everybody is doing it," *i.e.* "get on the bandwagon with my candidate and my cause." Finally he lies, distorts and falsifies; he resorts to over-emphasis and under-emphasis; he dodges issues and raises smoke screens; in short, he stacks the cards in favor of his cause by every art of chicanery and deceit.

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With these standards and devices in mind, the thoughtful citizen would do well to scrutinize critically all propaganda both for and against isolation, and to figure out for himself how much of it is grounded in reason and sound principle, how much is out-and-out falsification, how much consists of purely emotional appeals to prejudice, hate and fear.

But are the American people capable of discriminating between the various sorts and qualities of propaganda? Wasn't Adolf Hitler right when he said that "by clever, constant propaganda a people can be convinced that heaven is hell or that a miserable life is paradise?" I agree that Hitler may be right as to the infinite capacity of propaganda to mislead where no opposing opinions are permitted. But where conflicting propagandas are allowed free play, as in the United States, I think he is wrong. Proof of this is afforded by our experience during the World War and during the world crisis of the last two years.

IV

The recent situation in the United States has been similar at many points to the situation during the World War. No sooner had the war begun in Europe in 1914 than Americans began to be subjected to conflicting propagandas which lasted throughout the whole period of our neutrality. There was violent anti-Allied propaganda by pro-Germans, there was anti-British propaganda from American sympathizers with Irish nationalism, and there was pacifist propaganda pure and simple. There was also pro-Allied propaganda, some materialistic, some moral and intellectual.

Those who have propagandized for isolation have not paid any attention, in looking back at 1914–1917, to any propaganda except that which was conducted by the British and the French Governments. We were betrayed into the World War, they say, by the clever propaganda of the Allies, who concealed and distorted the truth and appealed fictitiously and cunningly to our crusading instincts, and by international bankers and business men who made fortunes by financing the Allied cause. The slogan "to make the world safe for democracy" was never anything but a fake. In reality, the Great War was a struggle between two groups of nations for obscure and selfish purposes with which the United States had no concern. Whether the Allies or the Central Powers won meant nothing to us. We gained nothing from

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the victory. We were taken for a ride and robbed of our shirts. We are today in imminent danger (the isolationists conclude) of being victimized again.

Let us subject this highly colored picture to a little sober analysis. I hold that not merely is it unreasonable to believe, as do isolationists who argue thus, that our whole wartime generation of Americans, including our elected leaders, were half-wits and dupes, but that a review of the course of subsequent events confirms the opposite conclusion.

During the decade before the World War, Germany attained the peak of her prestige. Not only was she rich, strong and respected; she was the mecca of scholars, artists, music lovers and friendly tourists from other countries. Every year tens of thousands of Americans from all parts of our country travelled, lived, and studied in Germany. I happen to have been one of these. Through my father, who was a post-graduate student under the great theologian, Harnack, a close friend of the Kaiser, I came to know the noble and *gemütlich* Germany which we would have liked to think was the only real Germany. But it was impossible to live in Germany without coming upon not a few evidences of a condition which had no counterpart in other more democratic states, including our own. In particular, there was a powerful and increasingly arrogant military caste which was treated by even the most eminent civilians with a subservience amazing and disturbing to any open American mind. I remember the impression produced on me by seeing young Prussian officers striding down the sidewalks while the civilians tumbled out of their way with obsequious salaams. I speak of my experience as of interest only because it must have been typical of that of many young Americans. For a year I attended the Hohenzollern Gymnasium at Berlin, where I received continual reminders of the hostility of my classmates to all "Englanders." This puzzled me until I learned that they were only repeating what was being systematically drilled into them by their professors, parents and friends — that the English were a nation of shopkeepers, gross and cowardly, and that it was Germany's destiny one day to teach them their place.

This sort of first-hand knowledge of German militarism was unquestionably one of the factors which influenced American opinion at the start of the war. It can be said that such a judgment was prejudiced or wrong, but not that it was based on anybody's

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propagandist activities. It was based on observation of Germans. And it was not contradicted by subsequent German military actions in Belgium or on the high seas. Indeed, it is a tenable hypothesis — I hold it myself — that the steadily rising tide of pro-Ally feeling from 1914 to 1917, which was what led the United States to its most deliberate decision to enter the war, was influenced to only a negligible degree by conflicting propagandas, and arose out of the impact of actual events on the minds of the broad masses of our people. My own particular evolution on the issues involved in the war took account of the following factors: my personal prewar knowledge of Germany; a comparison of the officially authorized case for Germany with the officially authorized case for Britain and France; the German invasion of Belgium; the sinking of the *Lusitania;* the German militaristic philosophy that "might makes right," categorically expressed by eminent scholars, artists and professors and exemplified in such actions as the sack of Louvain, the deportation of Belgian laborers and the introduction of poison gas; the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare.

In regard to none of the wartime purposes of the German Government have the researches of the past twenty years brought to light any evidence substantially at variance with what we knew at the time. There was propaganda about those purposes. It was mostly beside the point. The facts spoke for themselves. Germany's invasion of Belgium was the precursor of similar treaty breaches on the part of Japan in Manchukuo, by Mussolini in the case of Ethiopia, and by Hitler in the invasion of the Rhineland, the rape of Czecho-Slovakia and his attack on Poland. The doctrine of military necessity as translated into action by Germany at the opening of the World War and as frankly defended by Bethmann-Hollweg, is precisely the doctrine which has again alarmed some of our country's most thoughtful spirits and has strongly reënforced the natural bent of the sympathies of the majority of our people toward Great Britain and France.

The American people believed a great many things about the general origins and particular incidents of the World War which subsequent historical research has proved to be mistaken. They later learned that the origins of the war were not simple but were confused, that responsibility for the war was not Germany's or Austria-Hungary's alone but was divided among the Powers, and that the assertion written into the Treaty of Versailles that the

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Central Powers were solely guilty was unjust. But the strongest belief they had — the one primarily responsible for our entry into the war — was that the victory of Germany in the war would be not only a catastrophe to Europe but a permanent menace to free nations. They believed that although the militarist philosophy of "might makes right" had its adherents everywhere, its stronghold was in Germany. This conviction has since been abundantly confirmed. From 1919 onwards we read a host of "debunking" writers about the origins of the war. The Nazis have debunked the debunkers.

No blockades have shut off the American public from what the Nazis want to say about themselves. Yet by Nazi word and Nazi act, from the pages of Hitler's "Mein Kampf" and from his actions in one after another domestic and international situation, we have been getting openly, violently, brazenly, the proclamation of the very issue over which Americans were willing to fight in the World War.

V

Recently the development of the Gallup, *Fortune* and other polls has begun to give us a more dependable yardstick than we ever had before for measuring the factors governing American public opinion. It is illuminating to study the changing course of public opinion in matters of foreign policy as revealed by successive Gallup polls within the past two years, and to connect those changes with specific events abroad.

Just two weeks before Chamberlain and Daladier met with Hitler and Mussolini at Munich, the Institute of Public Opinion found 57 percent of Americans willing to sell food supplies to Britain or France in the event of war, but only 34 percent willing to sell war materials. After Munich, a small majority swung over to favoring sending war materials, while a much larger majority favored the sale of food supplies. The figures became 76 percent in favor of food and 55 percent in favor of war materials. Intensification of persecution of the Jews followed. It swung all classes of Americans still further from Germany. Finally, with Hitler's annexation of Czecho-Slovakia the vote in favor of aiding the French and English became as follows:

Favoring the sale of food supplies ..... 82 percent
Favoring the sale of war materials ..... 57 percent

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"These events," wrote Mr. Gallup in the *New York Times*, on April 30, 1939, "have caused Americans to see danger for 'the other democracies' and even to fear that the United States might be attacked by the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis if England and France were defeated. A sizable majority (62 percent) feel that the totalitarian powers would represent an immediate menace to America in case they won."

Similarly, when Hitler suddenly began to make clear that he was preparing to risk a European war by seizing Danzig and attempting to partition Poland, only 14 percent of those who replied to a Gallup inquiry were found to say that Hitler's claims were justified, against 86 percent who said they were unjustified. What effect the German attack on Poland will have on American willingness or unwillingness to sell food supplies and war materials to the British and French who have gone to Poland's aid will have become more clear by the time this article is published.

The sequence throughout has been that of cause and effect. Actions, not words, seem to shape the thought of Americans more than isolation propagandists like to think. Hitler's persecution of the Jews and his successive cynical acts of bad faith culminating in the rape of Czecho-Slovakia and the attack on Poland were not the figment of British and French propaganda; they were facts. They were more potent than all the propaganda that could be issued from now to doomsday in convincing Americans that the Nazis stand *against* their way of life and all they cherish most and that relatively the British and French stand *for* that way of life.

Also significant was the gradual development of American sentiment in connection with the Spanish war and the Sino-Japanese war.

Successive Gallup polls revealed a swing of American sympathy towards the Spanish Loyalist Government as people realized that it was the legally elected Government of Spain and as evidence accumulated that Hitler and Mussolini were heavily supporting Franco behind the fiction of "non-intervention." In February 1937 the Gallup poll showed that 65 percent of those voting were in favor of the Loyalists; in February 1938 the figure was 75 percent; in December 1938 it was 76 percent. Even among Catholic voters, about one third of those questioned said they were not for either side, and of those who gave definite answers only six out of ten were for Franco.

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In September 1937 a Gallup poll indicated that 51 percent of Americans had sympathies neither for China nor Japan. By June of 1939 the same question elicited the information that only 24 percent of those polled still had a neutral outlook. The number of those sympathizing with China had increased from 47 percent in September 1937 to 74 percent in 1939. The number of those who indicated that they would translate their sympathy into action by stopping buying goods made in Japan increased from 37 percent in October 1937 to 66 percent in June of this year. Was this change in sentiment due to intensified Chinese propaganda in the United States? Obviously not. The Japanese propaganda has been enormously more extensive and very much more heavily financed than the Chinese propaganda. What was responsible for the change of sentiment was simply the actions of the Japanese Government during the intervening period.

We may conclude from the course of public opinion during the World War and more recently that the philosophy of life roughly expressed in our American Bill of Rights has a profound hold on American thought. In the main, we like and prefer to do business with people who share the respect for the dignity of the individual to which the Bill of Rights gives expression. When we see human rights brutally stamped upon and deliberately rejected, as a matter of principle, by the powerful individuals who control great nations, we do not stay neutral in thought forever. We construe as a menace to ourselves the rising power of those who flaunt the principles we believe in, both in private relationships and in the relations of peoples. As experience has shown, not propaganda, but the free circulation of news is the enemy which American isolationists have most to fear.

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120,000 AMERICAN AMBASSADORS

By Walter Wanger

LONG before an American motion picture finishes its exhibition life at home it begins voyaging among the 50,025 theaters wired for sound outside the United States. Not just one print, but an average of 200 prints of each film eventually makes a vast circular tour from Vladivostok to Patagonia, from Land's End to Yokohama. The tour takes a long time; American films many years old still give pleasure and arouse wonder in far places. Let us assume, though, allowing for pictures without foreign appeal and for other trade exigencies, that only the equivalent of one year's American output is talking to the world at a given moment. This would mean 600 pictures. Two hundred prints of each would mean a total of 120,000 prints currently travelling abroad.

These pictures do not present the American as a perfect being. Yet, though they show gangsters, they also show the gangsters' punishment. They show frivolity, over-luxury; but they also show the triumph of the poor boy. Everything is jumbled, like life. There is no preachment: "We are a godlike race. Look on us. Be like us." And because of this very unpremeditated approach, 150,000,000 theatergoers accept American pictures with the instinctive, subconscious comment: "These people are merely trying to entertain us, not proselytize us." Here is a fact worth pondering. No one forces these pictures on any public. Weary feet carry patrons to the box offices. Millions of hands of every hue extend clutched earnings. Every tongue — outdoing Babel — says for American pictures, "Two tickets, please."

Put aside for a moment considerations of American trade advantage and concentrate on the fact that these 120,000 travelling prints are America's most direct ambassadors to the masses of the world. The common people of other lands do not often hear our radio and never see our newspapers. They do not know, or care, what Mr. Kennedy says at Downing Street or Mr. Bullitt at the Quai d'Orsay. Only one reminder remains, for millions upon millions, that there still exists a way of life in which the individual counts, in which hatred and regimentation do not comprise the sole motive and method of existence. This reminder is the American motion picture. Along with the gangster and the racketeer,

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the gun-toting westerner and the city slicker, the American screen play presents a perpetual epic of the ordinary unregimented individual. This individual chooses a profession, travels at will, loves whom he pleases, outguesses the boss and wisecracks the government. At evening he returns to his home without terror; when he is abed no knock at the door freezes his heart. Surely it is not flag-waving to believe that this simple miracle, the routine of freedom, which we accept as our simple right, may bring cheer and thought to peoples less fortunate. In no other way can they receive the message.

Trade jealousies, special barriers erected against the "insinuating influence" of American films and a rash of censorship among the "Most High" types of government have latterly curtailed the circulation of our 120,000 ambassadors. To win that circulation back is important. But it is much more important that we win nothing and keep nothing if this can be done only at the expense of restrictions on what the American screen shall show and say. Indeed, a vital factor in world relations may be the determination, on the part of some motion picture producers, to increase the present scope of the subject matter with which they deal.

At home, the screen has never been free in the same sense that the press is free. There were no motion pictures when the Founding Fathers wrote the constitutional provision for free speech. In silent picture days, high courts held that that provision did not apply to the screen. No Supreme Court decision, as yet, has brought the sound picture under the protection of the free speech guarantee. Consequently, the American screen not only operates under seven separate state censorships and some two hundred municipal censors; it lives in mortal fear that the yea-ers and nay-ers may increase in number, whim and power, and even that the Federal Government may assume final, idea-chilling authority.

This shadow of increasing censorship has bred a fear complex. It has fostered the belief among producers that everybody must be pleased, at any cost. For example, Hollywood shows little discrimination between legitimate journalists who are there to procure and distribute news and the hangers-on who scarcely trouble to conceal their essential character as not-so-polite blackmailers. "We must offend no one," the picture business tells itself every day. Commercially-sponsored radio commentators brazenly offer malicious gossip — ninety-five percent sheer invention —

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about stars whose brief day of livelihood (and super-tax-paying ability) depends on a friendly public. Sections of the industry's own trade press would make the Augean stable feel respectable. Hollywood takes it.

The creed that the motion picture industry must offend no one, must arouse no one's animosity, produces all sorts of inhibitions.[1] When some bar association protests against the presence of a crooked lawyer in a screen plot, the producers don't reply: "You are very fortunate that we don't make a picture entirely devoted to the indefensible practices that have grown up in the law, and which extend into the judiciary." (Incidentally, *why not* make such a picture? It would hurt no lawyers but the crooked ones. A free press has cleared the way for most major governmental, professional and business reforms. Has the screen no parallel right and duty to ventilate evils that need ventilating?) What the industry actually does in effect say to protesting lawyers is: "Pardon us for existing. Excuse drama for needing crooks. Forgive our using such a case as the daily paper often reports. In the future we will be very careful, when a lawyer transgresses in a film plot, to explain in words of two syllables that all lawyers are not like that." What absurdity! Did the newspapers have to explain that all wholesale druggists were not brothers to the one who committed suicide in Connecticut?

Policy and practice in matters like this at home are important, for they tend to establish the mood and the technique for surrenders abroad. A classic example of foreign sensitivity to the American screen occurred when, in an old Will Rogers picture, some comedy character used the simile, "as thick as flies in a Greek restaurant." Sixteen top-hatted gentlemen, representing the American Society of Greek Restaurateurs, called on the Hays office to protest. Almost as farfetched, in the old days, was the inevitable Hays office visit from a Balkan diplomat whenever a company produced a "mythical kingdom" story. The flag looked vaguely like the Budoslovakian flag or the queen in the picture had a blonde sister just like the Rumalbian queen's. Why not apologize, change the flag, and ask "props" for a brunette wig?

The perspective would not be correct and my account would not be complete if I did not mention that reactionary influences

[1] Distinction here is necessary between the work of the motion picture's own Production Code Administration — which, theoretically at least, is an agency of independent men working together to discharge a community responsibility — and a general tendency to let outsiders dictate screen content.

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within the picture industry itself have operated at times to restrict the freedom of the screen. My pocketbook got hurt when, in 1934, I produced "The President Vanishes." This picture imagined a group of munitions manufacturers taking desperate measures to protect their interests; and the plot went so far as to suggest that behind munitioneers sometimes are bankers. The Production Code Administration warned me throughout that all sorts of censorship trouble might be expected, and I was given to understand that a really sensible fellow would drop the whole idea. I didn't. There were script conferences, script changes, the usual give-and-take between my studio and the office of Mr. Breen, Director of the P. C. A. Director Breen finally approved the picture verbally. But the official P. C. A. seal did not arrive. Mr. Breen told me that New York was holding it up "for industry policy reasons." I promptly had my attorneys serve written notice that if we did not get the seal at once we would apply for a mandatory injunction. We received the seal. And here mystery thickens. Paramount was releasing the picture for me. Someone talked to someone in New York (the chairman of Paramount's board at that time was Mr. Charles D. Hilles) and Paramount cut the film brutally before delivering it to exhibitors. The entertainment value, in my opinion, was hopelessly impaired by these cuts. The version that was left was choppy, incomplete and in some parts unintelligible. Many exhibitors cancelled the booking. Those who showed the picture lost money. I lost money — on a low-cost picture that raised the honest question as to whether or not some men put war profits above patriotism.[2]

Despite the fate of "The President Vanishes," a liberal commentator who assigned the basic blame for the motion picture industry's cowardice about ideas to "wicked Wall Street" would be superficial and wrong. There is ample liberal thought and talent in Hollywood to conceive and execute films based on ideas of social justice and international honesty and peace. There are ways to release them. (I didn't stay with Paramount, which, by the way, has a different management now.) The fundamental canker in motion picture production is ordinary fear — fear lest livelihood, property, the means of self-preservation, be taken away.

Bills repeatedly have been introduced in Congress looking toward the establishment of a national commission to control motion pictures. Some pretend to aim at business reform, some

[2] It is only fair to say that foreign censors contributed generously to assuring a red-ink balance.

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enlist "moral" forces. Most move slyly toward the same goal — political control of what goes on the screen. Any showman knows what would be the result: reduction of the screen to the status of a government pamphlet and the end of the screen as an entertainment industry. Such governmental control would incidentally mean the end of artistic development on the screen, as has happened in every nation which has tried it.

So it is that the screen has become obsequious, full of inhibitions, afraid of offending anyone and everyone. It has catered to individuals, to groups, to associations, to politicians, to nations. "Be our friend," it has pleaded on every hand. "Help us keep destruction off our necks."

Before you condemn this faintheartedness too severely, as entirely money-grubbing or perhaps even as venal, imagine yourself a newspaper editor in a situation like the one which confronts the motion picture producer. In that imaginary circumstance the City Council would have the right to send a representative into your editorial offices and to determine, finally and without appeal, what you could print in your paper tomorrow and every day thereafter. Would you, as an editor in that position, crusade against the Council? Would you, or would you not, try to make the Chamber of Commerce, the church groups, any and all other groups, friendly to you, and keep them that way? Would you not be tempted so to modify your utterances that *all* rights to utter *anything* without supervision would not be taken away from you at any minute? It hardly becomes the man with *guaranteed* freedom to say of someone who actually finds himself in the situation I have described: "Ho! What shame to be a slave!"

In the difference between the inviolable freedom of the press, established by long and unvarying court decisions, and the situation of the screen, not yet (mark the word) held by the courts to have any rights whatever under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution, lies the explanation of the motion picture industry's fear to speak out. And the habit of bowing to every domestic critic prepared it to be subservient abroad whenever a foreign market seemed threatened. The degree to which this subservience has now come to be expected was exampled recently when a foreign government told an American producing company what it might and might not show on the screen *in the United States.*

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II

The relationship of the American motion picture industry to foreign markets and to foreign governments has had two other interesting characteristics: (a) Foreign governments have strongly resisted what they consider a trade invasion as well as an invasion of ideas. (b) The American Government has failed to give support, or at least has given ineffectual support, against foreign discriminations and trade barriers set up especially to restrict or estop the distribution of American films. This is a natural extension into the foreign field of the industry's domestic policy of surrendering to almost any sort of objection, criticism or threat.

Trade follows the film. American automobile sales increase when foreign communities see some favorite American star riding around in an attractive new model car. Back in silent picture days a wholesale appliance house in Athens, Greece, cabled for thirty barber chairs "like the one in the picture." The stimulus sometimes has an almost "revolutionary" result. A strike of Paris stenographers once was laid to the influence of films which showed how much better equipment, sanitation, light and air were enjoyed as a matter of course by office-workers in this country.

The industry directly employs 282,000 individuals. Multiply that by three to include their dependents. Add to the purchases of these persons those made by persons supported indirectly by the movies in nearly three hundred allied industries: silver and cotton used in making the raw film; lighting; construction of studios and theaters, including seats (a bigger item than you think); costumes, of ushers as well as actors; transportation. The 25,000 miles of film which Will Hays says are delivered every day to American theaters represent a triple industry — the creation of that film, its distribution, its exhibition. Now think of the taxes which the industry contributes to national, state and local government. Miss Carole Lombard has stated that out of the $455,000 which she received in a recent year she paid $397,575 in direct taxes. The theaters paid the Federal Government $20,800,000 in admissions tax in 1937–38. The two items will serve to give a rough idea of the part the moving picture industry plays in helping finance the Government. (This might be a good place to remark parenthetically that all these material benefits — buying power, employment, tax reservoir — depend on the excellence and consequent saleability of the producer's work.)

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Viewing the successes of the American film industry, foreign nations have cried: "Mama, buy me one too!" The happy companion thought has been: "Make the Americans pay for it." The result has been the quota system, which amounts to securing subsidies for foreign film industries by forcing American motion picture companies to participate in the financing. A quota law says that for every *x* number of American pictures shown in a certain country, the American companies must finance the production there of *y* number of pictures. Neat? It transfers a slice of buying power, employment, and taxes from the United States to hungry economies abroad. Virtually all the European countries now have quota laws, generally on an ascending scale, designed in a few years to achieve the happy result of forcing American firms to use American money to finance at least one so-called "home picture" for every two pictures shipped from the United States. This is in addition, of course, to special taxes. And some countries impound American film receipts and insist that they be reëxpended in large part within their own borders. Germany and Italy specialize in the latter device.

Foreign countries would undoubtedly have barred American films *in toto* except for the embarrassing fact that the Hollywood product is better — *i.e.* has a higher entertainment content — than any other. When the French Government once sought virtually to bar American pictures, French theater owners threatened to strike; they knew that application of any such order would mean closed doors and ruin. This admitted excellence of the American product is not contradicted by the recent high praise given "The Citadel," "Goodbye, Mr. Chips" and other "British" films. Critics who have hastened to cry "Hollywood ought to learn" ought to learn themselves. What happened was this. For a long time American producers met quota requirements by producing "quickies" with American money abroad — just grade B pictures for use in the particular country involved, with no thought of American market. Then Loew's Incorporated, controlling Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, decided that if they had to make pictures abroad, they would make great ones, for both markets. That is why Metro, after three years' preparation, produced "The Citadel" and "Goodbye, Mr. Chips" in London. There also are examples outside quota-picture ranks. The current, highly popular technicolor version of "The Mikado" was directed by Victor Schertzinger, famous in Hollywood since he elevated Miss Grace

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Moore to transient screen heights in "One Night of Love," and its star is our Ken Baker. As for "Pygmalion," Leslie Howard received credit as co-director on that one. If Mr. Howard hadn't absorbed Hollywood methods during all his years by the Pacific, he wouldn't be the intelligent and sensitive artist we know he is.

This excellence of the Hollywood product is very pertinent to the subject I am discussing, for it means that the American industry possesses a powerful weapon indeed when at last the fight is made against unfair restrictions, censorships and threats of embargo. It also can help promote the peaceful penetration of ideas. Anglo-American film coöperation may have been forced by shrewd British business legislation; but the actual result of the experiment by Metro and other companies abroad, and of our manufacture of films sympathetic to Britain (since "David Copperfield," and earlier still), has been a growing and reciprocal *idea toleration* between the British and ourselves. My picture "Blockade," which was meant as a preachment against war but which won me a citation as a "Communist" from every Fascist, was passed in Britain, in contrast to Germany, Italy, Peru, Salvador, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Guatemala, Portugal, Latvia, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Czech verdict, under date of April 25, 1939, reads tragically: "Rejected by the German Propaganda Office." (General Franco rose in his might and notified United Artists that "Blockade" must "be withdrawn at once everywhere in the world," or Spain would accept no more United Artists releases.) Warner Brothers has just had a pleasant surprise in England. It was generally admitted on the Warner lot that England might as well be wiped off the books so far as "Confessions of a Nazi Spy" was concerned. Yet the British censor passed that documentary masterpiece. I understand that, at the moment, Charles Chaplin is under friendly warning from the British that no motion picture "ridiculing the head of any government" has ever passed the British censor. Yet I venture that Mr. Chaplin will make a strong film in "The Great Dictator" and that Britons will view it.

I believe real international coöperation in the making and distributing of motion pictures, including the interchange of men and ideas as well as product, could be a magic instrument in cultural understanding and hence to world peace. But we are occupied in the present discussion with less Utopian matters. They none the less are grand enough. My object here is to make clear

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the present world situation of the American motion picture industry, to show that freedom of speech on the American screen is an important factor in that situation, and to suggest definite ways to win and keep it. With free speech assured, and with its messages distributed regularly by 120,000 ambassadors, the American motion picture will have secured its proper world influence, and that influence will very definitely be for the good.

III

It seems to me a reasonable contention that the United States Government has given inadequate, or at least ineffectual, support to the motion picture industry in its fight against the discriminations and trade barriers set up by foreign governments against American films. Official representations have of course been made against the practices from time to time. But they must have been fairly mild, because the foreign market has continued to shrink in spite of them; the barriers have increased and the censorships have become more arrogant. Is there any evidence that abandonment of economic discrimination against American films has ever been made a *sine qua non* of a reciprocal trade treaty, or that any foreign government has ever been told: "We won't grant you such and such a consideration in such and such a field unless you agree to admit American films as we do yours, subject only to normal import duty on the film stock"? But any criticism of the State Department for lack of persistence in this matter does not really reflect on the Department's officials. Why should they conceive it their duty to defend vigorously abroad an industry toward which the Government at home has shown itself continuously harassing?

Every important foreign nation has sought, by subsidies and by special penalties against incoming American films, to establish a motion picture industry comparable to ours. At the same time some executives and legislators in the United States have been busy making our own possession ($2,000,000,000 in investment; $100,000,000 paid annually in direct taxes; several billions of annual business turnover in production, distribution and exhibition; an important contribution to foreign trade stimulus) a political football and a scapegoat in popular "clean-up" gestures.

Early in its complicated history, our business evolved an internal arbitration system that for several years worked successfully and was held by distinguished authorities to be a model of

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its kind. In 1929, Judge Thomas D. Thacher, sitting in the United States Court, Southern District of New York, found both the machinery and the practice eminently fair to all concerned and at the same time ordered their abandonment. The Government had evoked law made in the stereopticon age to cripple the democratic operation of the picture industry in a movement-sound-technicolor era. Almost everyone familiar with the disputes involved in the distribution and exhibition of motion pictures believes that all the practices which are now questioned in the Government's perennial anti-trust suits against the business might have been avoided had the agreed method of settling internal differences been permitted to continue.

This is not the place to review the various "motion picture control" bills introduced in each Congress. The industry has never had a year free from some preposterous threat. The present Neely Bill, under consideration as I write, deserves a book to itself. I mention one provision: the script of every motion picture must be delivered to all exhibitors before production is begun, and any deviation whatsoever from the advance script becomes a federal offense, punishable by heavy fine and (or) imprisonment. That would be the end of improvement in motion pictures, since great pictures become great in the process of filming. Moreover, it would be a step toward censorship of ideas, because pressures could be brought to bear and censors excited before a producer even began to shoot. To all the existing forms of censorship in this country would be added censorship by specific threat.

What happens when censors get *carte blanche* has been demonstrated in action taken against American films abroad. Browbeaten at home, lacking equal protection with other mediums of expression in the courts, without the support of the liberal organs that should be the friends of legitimate screen freedom, the American film industry has become accustomed to scurry off before all criticism or remonstrance, to yield to any minority which is vocal or threatens to be vocal, to bow to any official or semi-official ukase about what the screen ought or ought not to say. Foreign nations, each holding a slice of market like a raised club, quickly sensed this softness, this spirit of defeatism. As a result, not merely have Americans been forced to see on the screen *the least common denominator of what the least broad-minded groups at home will approve*, but in recent years what is left after the political panics, power ambitions and internal terrors of a dozen foreign na-

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tions have done their work. Foreign nations have been dictating American screen policy and stifling what free speech had been left after the incursions of domestic pressure groups and censors.

Foreign censorship has shown itself illogical, contradictory, stupid, in the last analysis absurd. I shall cite just one example of censorship in the "moral" field. In "Sergeant Murphy," Warner Brothers used some actual shots of steeplechase horses falling. These were taken from newsreels of the Grand National. The censors for the United Kingdom ordered these scenes out. Just ten miles from their offices, steeplechases were currently in progress and similar falls were actually happening. The instinctive order of all censors seems to be: "Do not publish the truth."

Motion pictures which touch the subject of revolution, no matter how faithfully in the historic sense nor how romantically if merely incidental to some love story, have always encountered difficulties abroad. "The Informer," screen classic of the Irish Revolution, was rejected in Peru, British Malaya, Hungary, Guatemala and Palestine; in Ontario and England it was cut heavily. "Tale of Two Cities," Dickens' famous love story of the French Revolution, was cut in Venezuela, Peru and Japan and was rejected outright in Hungary, Lithuania, Italy, Portugal and Rumania. Similar wide rejections attended "The Plough and the Stars" and "Beloved Enemy." Anti-militaristic pictures, such as "The Man Who Reclaimed His Head," "Road to Glory," "The Road Back" and "Four Men and A Prayer" have paid heavily for being opposed to war. I have already detailed what happened to one of my contributions, "Blockade."

One would not think that after the Production Code Administration, wary of our own state censorships, had finished with an American script, much Communism would be left in any finished picture. Yet here are a few barred by foreign censors on that ground: "Red Salute," "Fighting Youth," "The Road Back," "Soak the Rich," "Winterset," "Midnight Court," "Three Comrades," and, of course, again "Blockade." Individual cuts in order to avoid suggesting class struggle are common in all countries. The prize goes to Poland which eliminated from "Ol' Man River" the following verse:

> *"Darkies all work on de Mississippi,*
> *Darkies all work while de white folks play,*
> *Pullin' dem boats from dawn to sunset,*
> *Getting no rest till de Judgment Day."*

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With the rise of dictatorships in many countries, and the rise of fear of them in others, nervousness and confusion seized the censors. Almost anything except a moonlight kiss was liable to cause cuts or outright rejection. China killed "The Road Back" "at the request of the German Consul-General." Poor China! "Zola," a great picture, was rejected in Italy and in Quebec, presumably because Zola's writings are on the Index Expurgatorius. But Japan rejected it "because of corruption in court scenes and intrigue in the general staff" and Poland "because of scenes considered detrimental to military honor." Because of Turkish threats to ban all the films of one company, "Forty Days of Musa Dagh" was shelved. At least one deferment of "It Can't Happen Here" (a deferment wrongly blamed on the Hays office) was due to the conviction of the company's foreign manager that if the story were produced, a general buying rebellion against all the company's films would ensue. Each time the American industry yielded the foreign demands grew bolder. One of the few considerable foreign markets left, France, recently informed Warner Brothers that if it did not withdraw "Devil's Island" from distribution, *everywhere*, no more Warner Brothers pictures would be admitted to France.

The oppressive effect of all this on the expression of ideas in American films can be understood when I say that at one time 54 percent of the gross revenue of one of our large companies came from abroad. To touch on any one of a whole series of subjects in which Americans have every reason to be interested meant a severe loss. Yet I venture to think that today a new mood is on the whole industry. There is a distinct tendency to say: "Well, write the foreign market off. It's nearly gone, anyway. Let's just make the best pictures we can and see what happens. Maybe we'll at least regain our peak domestic market, which has disappeared in the fog of wispy stories filmed with the impossible aim of pleasing everybody." Warners took a gallant lead in the right direction with "Juarez" and "Confessions of a Nazi Spy." I, for one, am going ahead to make as good a picture as I can out of Vincent Sheean's controversy-breeding book, "Personal History."

I suggest more. Having thrown the foreign incubus off our mental backs, I propose that with the help of liberal persons and organizations, the general press and the Government, we try to win a position where there shall be permanent and inviolable free-

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dom of speech on the American screen — the right to advocate social reforms, to portray the results of international injustice, to plead for peace, to expound, emphasize and proclaim the virtues of the true American Way.

IV

The first and most important step toward winning freedom for the American screen will be to establish legally its right to protection under that section of the Bill of Rights forbidding laws "abridging freedom of speech." The whole fear complex of the industry originates in the long-held belief that almost any legislative or police authority has the power to muffle the screen. I question that arbitrary power. Because of the intensive psychological effect of visual motion, high courts held in the days of silent pictures that the interests of the community justified censorship of what is *seen* in motion pictures. It seems possible that the legality of the actions taken on that premise have been insufficiently explored. Might it not be held that the same obscenity laws which govern newspapers, magazines and books *after* publication would be sufficient to protect the public interest in the case of motion pictures also? In any event, however, here is an interesting phenomenon: since the advent of sound pictures — the birth of *speech* on the screen — no test case in regard to motion picture censorship has been carried to the United States Supreme Court. Perhaps the censors have the right to regulate costume, posture, visual suggestion on the screen. But I believe that what is *spoken* therewith has in all essential respects the same status as what is spoken from the pulpit, on the lecture platform or on the stage. In other words, speech is speech, and the Constitution protects it.

"Ah!" say the timid — and the insincere. "But if you open the screen to propaganda, *whose* propaganda will we have?" The answer to that is simple. What does it matter? If someone makes a motion picture based on error, let someone else make a better one based on truth. I believe that the best way of helping truth to prevail is to give opinions free play. The method has worked in the case of books; indeed, error even has its positive uses. Is it not better for Americans to read and understand "Mein Kampf" than for the book to be banned? Did not the reluctance of the author to permit its publication in full in translation in foreign languages indicate his realization of the harm that might be done

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him by free and frank discussion of his tenets in a democratic atmosphere? Victory for democracy, understanding and peace is bound up with freedom *for every medium of expression*. The 120,000 ambassadors of the American motion picture have proved their ability of great service to mankind. Why not equip them with a richer portfolio of documents and argument?

The first step I recommend, then, is that the organized picture industry carry the issue of free speech on the screen to the Supreme Court of the United States. If that august body should rule that in this case speech is not speech, then there should begin an immediate campaign for a Constitutional amendment specifically freeing the screen and giving it the same rights and duties as other mediums of expression.

In this procedure we need the understanding and interest and support of enlightened individuals and of the general press. This is a period of many and varied attacks on free speech. There have been hints in Congress of efforts to abridge the freedom of the press. Recent rulings of the Federal Communications Commission have aroused at least one author of the bill which created that commission, a bill that sought honestly to protect free speech on the radio. Is not the best way to resist encroachments in one field to abolish encroachments which already exist in an allied field? I suggest, then, that the elevation of the American screen to a place among the world's voices ought to be a prime plank in the platform of all liberals, and especially of all who are connected with any form of expression that depends for its value on being untramelled and free. Editors: the fire in your neighbor's wheatfield may well spread to your own grain. Help us put it out!

The third necessity if we are to achieve a free screen in this country is for some of our own government officials to do a right-about-face. I have already touched this situation. The changes needed are two: (a) abandonment of harassing legislation at home; (b) wholehearted support abroad of the rights and interests of what is in itself one of our country's biggest businesses and also one of its biggest business-getters.

The fourth necessity is for courageous counsel and action on the part of the industry's leaders. If I have seemed to speak of them critically perhaps it will carry all the more weight when I say that the history of no other industry offers a group of men more able, more resourceful or more nearly indispensable to

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continuing growth than the hardy executive survivors of early motion picture days. They have known how to survive such crises as the incredibly swift and complex change from silent pictures to sound; the 1932–37 depression; the new one; the various onslaughts of reform bodies; and the advent of technicolor.

But Hollywood leadership, due to its tremendous preoccupation in actual picture-making, has retreated too far before the winds, and imagined winds, of public opinion. The time has come to say to pressure-group minorities: "Go fuss at someone else. We are going to make strong pictures, and let the *public* judge them and us." In regard to foreign markets, the firm policy toward each nation should be: "We do not challenge your undoubted right to censor an individual picture within your own borders, no matter how silly some of the results may strike us as being. But we will take no dictation as to what we show in other countries or at home, and we will fight boycott with boycott." The country which boycotts any American company should be met by the immediate and concerted withdrawal of all American film service. That will hurt the offending nation's business revenue from theaters and government revenue from taxes worse than it will hurt us. (Don't we face the involuntary loss of foreign sales anyway, and aren't we surviving?) We shall win respect by such a firm policy; films not nurtured in timidity will have fresh and added entertainment value; and in the long run the industry as well as the American public will profit.

Let the American motion picture industry take the finest motto possible for any medium of expression: "If a man has something to say, let him speak."

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PACIFIC AIRWAYS

By D

PROGRESS in establishing air services across the Pacific has been slow. Except for a few enthusiasts, those interested in civilian aviation after the World War, both here and abroad, did not feel the same urge to explore the Pacific as they had to experiment with trans-Atlantic flights. The younger generation, in whose hands lay the development of civil aviation, conceived of foreign relations primarily in terms of intercourse between America and Europe. And there were no Northcliffes or Orteigs to offer prizes for flights across the Pacific. In 1921 air mail service had been put into operation between New York and San Francisco, and in 1929 the Dutch had opened a mail line from Amsterdam to the East Indies. But only in 1935 did a regular air service span the great 10,000 mile gap between. Even now, the aërial development of the Pacific area as a whole is still in a tentative stage.

Until recently American interest in the Pacific was largely confined to the Army and Navy. They had long been concerned with the strategy of that ocean and with the balance of power in China. Both evinced a desire to operate aircraft in the Pacific area at an early date, but were frustrated by the enormous distances and by the airplane's limited technical capacity. The problem of Pacific flying was, and remains, the problem of finding a route.

The first trans-Pacific route to be flown was a detour. After the World War the late General William Mitchell began to urge the possibility of skirting both the Pacific and the Atlantic by their Arctic fringes, and to proclaim the dangers of an aërial invasion of America by those routes, especially by the Arctic stepping-stones from the Orient. A desire to test these Arctic routes played a large part in the Army's plans for its flight around the world in 1924. The successful completion of this flight served to show that the Pacific *could* be flown with no single jump of more than 800 miles in length; but the weather conditions in the Aleutian area and north of Japan were so appalling, even in summer, as to give little encouragement for the establishment of regular operations there.

The respective rôles of the Army and Navy in the aërial defense

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of American coastal areas were at that time ill-defined. Indeed, this is still the case to some extent. The rivalry between the two services made each eager to be first to fly from the mainland to Honolulu. The Navy's bid was made in the late summer of 1925, when the late Commander John Rodgers and a crew of four took off in a flying boat from San Francisco. But they ran out of fuel short of their destination, were forced to alight on the water, and only managed to reach the island of Kauai, by drifting and improvised sailing, nine days after they had been given up for lost. The Army's attempt was made in June 1927, and succeeded. In a three-engined landplane, Lieutenants Maitland and Hegenberger flew from San Francisco to the Army field near Honolulu.

This feat, duplicated three times by the end of August 1927, excited great public interest; but it had no immediate commercial results, for the airplane was not yet ready to cross either the Atlantic or the Pacific with reasonable regularity in both directions. All the early flights — which were *from* the continent *to* Hawaii — were made on the down-hill slope, meteorologically speaking, since they had the trade winds on their tail; the planes never returned to the mainland under their own power. The first trans-Pacific flight directly suggestive of commercial possibilities drew upon the immensely longer cruising range of the rigid airship: when Dr. Eckener took the *Graf Zeppelin* around the world in 1929, he flew non-stop from Tokyo to Los Angeles.

There is no practicable North Pacific air route that does not include a stop in the Hawaiian Islands. The distance from Honolulu to San Francisco is 2,400 statute miles. From Hilo, on the volcano-island of Hawaii, it is a little less; but the harbor facilities at Hilo are unsatisfactory for the departure of heavily-loaded seaplanes. The distance from Honolulu to the mainland is within the commercial capacity of existing seaplanes, but it leaves little reserve for extra range or for payload. The present Pan American Clippers, with a gross weight of over 80,000 pounds, carry a maximum of 25 passengers and 1,000 pounds of mail between California and Hawaii; on the shorter hops to the west of Honolulu they can handle much larger loads. Thus the Hawaiian Islands have an importance in oceanic air transport hardly equalled by any other single spot upon the earth's surface.

The North Atlantic can be crossed from Canada to the British Isles without stopping on non-British territory; it can also be crossed from the United States to France or Portugal, either by

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way of the Azores or direct, without touching British soil. The South Atlantic permits non-stop passage from Brazil to the African possessions of at least three European Powers. But in crossing the North Pacific by plane no feasible way to avoid Hawaii has been found except at the price of dealing with the Arctic climate, difficult at all seasons and a virtually impassable barrier at some. Even so, a plane could avoid American territory only by flying from Canada to Russia either to the south of the Aleutian Islands or to the north of Alaska — almost impossible projects by reason both of distance and of weather. Further south, however, there is an alternative route which so far has been left entirely undeveloped. It would be possible to fly from a point on the Pacific coast of Mexico or Central America to Clipperton Island. Clipperton is an atoll under French sovereignty 780 miles from Mexico and 2,000 miles due west of the Panama Canal. It is separated from the Marquesas group (also French) by a distance almost exactly equalling that from Honolulu to San Francisco.

To the west of Honolulu (or of the Marquesas) the selection of landing places would present no problem if the question of nationality could be disregarded. Reefs, atolls and volcanic rocks rise in unnumbered thousands along a broad arc sweeping from the Japanese Islands southward and eastward to the Tuamotus. A circle drawn with Honolulu as the center and with a radius of 2,350 miles touches no land to the east or north. To the south and west, however, it encloses a large number of islands — half a dozen between Kingman Reef and Jarvis, the entire Phoenix group, scattered islands of the Ratak chain in the Marshall Islands, Wake Island and the outlying members of the Hawaiian group out to Midway.

Considered from the aviation point of view, the innumerable islands of the Southern and Western Pacific fall into three classes. There are atolls that offer a reasonably sheltered lagoon for seaplane operations; there are "solid" islands of sufficiently firm and level surface to allow the preparation of runways for landplanes; and there are rocks too precipitous and reefs too open to the sea, or enclosing lagoons too small or too thickly strewn with coral heads, to be of any aëronautical use. Islands large enough to have genuine harbors permitting a seaplane take-off are quite exceptional. Though a number of them have harbors of a sort, they all — with the exception of Pearl Harbor on Oahu — are too open in one direction and too small to be really satisfactory

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

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for seaplane purposes. They would be even worse were it not for the almost perfect constancy of the trade winds and for the fact that most of the harbors lie to leeward.

The time will no doubt come when the perfection of aircraft engineering and aërial navigation will render it practicable to fly across 2,000 miles, and more, of open water in machines capable of making a safe landing only on solid ground. One school of aëronautical opinion holds that this time has already come. But the majority of the experts maintain that passenger-carrying oceanic operations by landplane still lie some years ahead. The first true trans-Pacific flight made in temperate latitudes in a landplane was that by Sir Charles Kingsford-Smith, who in 1928 flew from California to Australia by way of the Hawaiian and Fiji Islands. This route is still available, with an alternative stopping place on Howland Island. Miss Earhart was to have been the first pilot to land on Howland: the runways which were prepared for her still await the first aërial voyager.

Quite aside from questions of safety, in the Pacific the advantage remains with the seaplane. The harbors there do not have the ice problem which vexes operations in the North Atlantic, and the atolls are well distributed. On the central Pacific route now followed by the Pan American Clippers the seaplane is indispensable. On this route either Midway or Wake must be used if flight from the United States to Japan or the Philippines is to be reasonably direct and at the same time keep to the south of the Aleutians. On Midway it might not be impossible to build a landplane runway a mile in length. On Wake, however, the construction of a runway to face the prevailing and virtually omnipresent wind is absolutely out of the question. Since the distance from Midway to Guam, without a stop at Wake, is slightly longer than that from San Francisco to Honolulu, the difficulties of landplane operations on this route are readily seen. On the other hand, both Midway and Wake are almost ideally designed by nature for seaplane activity. Also feasible for seaplane bases, though not ideal, are Kingman Reef, 1,100 miles south of Honolulu, Christmas Island near Kingman, and most of the Phoenix Islands, 500 miles farther on to the south and west.

For the moment, the central route is the only one in full commercial exploitation. Each week the seaplanes of Pan American Airways depart from San Francisco for Honolulu, Midway,

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Wake, Guam, Manila, Macao and Hong Kong. At Hong Kong they make connection with British and French lines running to Singapore and to Indo-China, respectively, where they join lines from Europe. Connections are also made at Hong Kong with lines going into the interior of China — to Chungking and other points under the control of Chiang Kai-shek. Flying into the interior is done at night, and both schedule and route are constantly changed in order to avoid Japanese pursuit planes.

Pan American's service from Honolulu to New Zealand by way of Kingman Reef and American Samoa, which was experimentally operated more than a year ago, was kept from commercial exploitation only by a shortage of suitable seaplane equipment. That company's present project for operations to New Zealand contemplates a different route. Kingman Reef and Samoa having been found somewhat unsatisfactory technically, the new plan is to use Canton Island and French New Caledonia as the intermediate fueling points. The *California Clipper* completed its survey flight via Canton Island August 30 of this year; and Pan American has requested an appropriation to enable it to carry the mails regularly by that route, putting Auckland within four days of San Francisco.

From a commercial and technological point of view the line across the center of the Pacific might be supplemented by a right-angle spur from Guam to Tokyo. But flights along that route would pass over the Marianas and Bonin archipelagoes from which Japan tries rigorously to exclude foreigners. For purely commercial reasons we also might reasonably expect to see operations opened from the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China and Japan to the Philippines.

Two historical facts have an important bearing on the present outlook for trans-Pacific aviation. The first is the extraordinary prescience shown by various American naval officers and by officials at Washington. They acted forty years ago as though they foresaw not only the coming of the airplane, but its present technical limitations. The second is the bland indifference assumed by officials in many foreign countries towards possible repercussions of aviation in the Pacific up until five years ago, when the sudden appearance of commercial airplanes over that ocean stirred up a furious burst of claim and counterclaim.

The United States owes to the farsightedness of its officials,

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before and during the Spanish-American War, its present ability to operate a trans-Pacific airline without touching any non-American soil this side of the quasi-American Philippine Commonwealth. Had it not been for the readiness of the American people to acquire overseas territories at the turn of the century, and had it not been for the watchfulness of the American Navy at an even earlier date, it would have been impossible for Pan American Airways, by a few swift strokes, to convert deserted strips of coral into flourishing ports of call. The inauguration of trans-Pacific air services would have been held up by the same sort of protracted and cautious international negotiation that so delayed the development of trans-Atlantic air transport. Midway was acquired in 1867, the Hawaiian group and Guam in 1898, and Wake in 1899. In each case the motive for annexation may be described as naval. However, only Hawaii and Guam were ever endowed with real naval establishments; the attempt to locate a base at Midway was abortive, while Wake lay almost entirely neglected, receiving visits from naval vessels only very casually and at intervals of several years.

In 1935 came a sudden awakening of interest in the aërial possibilities of islands which theretofore were regarded merely as menaces to navigation. This interest served to draw attention to the very slender basis for the claims to sovereignty over many of these islands. In many cases, sovereignty by one Power had been allowed to acquire the sanction of time merely through the failure of other Powers to push counterclaims. Attention was drawn in particular to the tenuous nature of certain claims to whole archipelagoes in which islands often were separated from one another by a hundred miles or more and lacked formal occupation or government of any sort.

Take, for example, the recently celebrated cases of Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Canton and Enderbury Islands. The classic study on American geographical discoveries in the Pacific by Mr. Boggs of the Department of State[1] lists all of those islands except Canton as having been explored by Americans before 1876. Further, these islands, then collectively known as American Polynesia, were in some cases supplied with American governors and in general were recognized as American territory in European atlases. However, the guano operations that took the first settlers

[1] S. Whittemore Boggs: "American Contributions to Geographical Knowledge of the Central Pacific," *Geographical Review*, April 1938, p. 177–192.

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there were later abandoned and the islands themselves were vacated. In the course of time whatever recognition British official opinion had once given to American possession was forgotten and British maps began to show the islands as British territory. Consequently, the announcement of actual American colonization in 1935 occasioned indignation in the British press and caused questions to be asked in Parliament. Though there has been no formal surrender of claim by Britain, she seems at least tacitly to have accepted exclusive American rights to Howland, Baker and Jarvis, all islands of the "solid" type. On the other hand, Canton and Enderbury, the former an atoll well suited for seaplanes, are now jointly occupied by British and American parties. A recent executive order of the President of the United States placed both islands under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior; at the same time the British Government has given inquirers assurance that British rights will be fully protected. An exact determination of the respective rights of each nation obviously remains for later negotiation. It should be mentioned that there are also islands where the British claim to unqualified sovereignty, though not formally challenged, is nevertheless not fully conceded by American opinion. Hull Island, close to Canton and Enderbury, is one such case, and Christmas Island is another. The cordiality of Anglo-American relations insures an amiable composition of these differences, and we are probably safe in predicting that the claims will be settled so that one will offset another. In some cases a genuine condominium may possibly be set up.

It is a generally accepted principle that the airlines of one country can enter or pass over the territory of another country only after obtaining the latter's consent. However, the Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation — ratified by the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Panama — is equally explicit in granting to air commerce the free right of passage from one nation to another. Article 21 reads: "The aircraft of a contracting state engaged in international air commerce shall be permitted to discharge passengers and a part of its cargo at one of the airports designated as a port of entry of any other contracting state, and to proceed to any other airport or airports in such State for the purpose of discharging the remaining passengers and portions of such cargo . . . provided that they comply with the legal requirements of the country over which they fly,

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which legal requirements shall be the same for native and foreign aircraft engaged in international traffic."

In any event, the United States will for the next six years be able to operate across the Pacific at least as far as the Philippines without seeking anyone's permission. After 1945 the Philippine Commonwealth will presumably be in full control of its own foreign relations and therefore able to decide for itself what foreign airlines are to operate over its territory. Up to now no foreign airline has entered the Philippines, and though there have been periodic reports that the Royal Dutch Air Lines were on the point of extending their services from the East Indies north to Manila, it appears that thus far no formal action has been taken upon any official request for permission to operate such a line.

To enter China, Pan American Airways found it necessary to deal with several foreign governments. Before the current war, operations into ports under Chinese sovereignty were hindered by China's disinclination to admit Japanese airlines to Chinese territory and by Japan's unwillingness to see other Powers get into China ahead of her. Only the foreign-controlled ports in South China were available; Pan American hence made private agreements with the Portuguese and British for admission to Macao and Hong Kong. Being of a private nature, and thus not binding on the United States Government, these agreements obviously could contain no provision for reciprocity. In Macao this fact has so far been of little importance, since the Portuguese have announced no plans for organizing intercontinental air transport under their own flag. But in Hong Kong the question is more serious, and the agreement concerning that colony consequently contains safeguarding provisions which allow cancellation under certain conditions. It is under another of these privately negotiated contracts that the line to New Zealand was launched a year ago. Though New Zealand's action occasioned some indignation in London, the Dominion Government has shown no disposition to subordinate its own interests to the wish of the British authorities.

The scope of British intentions in the eastern Pacific is not yet clear. The interest of the British in Canton and Enderbury Islands at least suggests that they do not intend to leave the trans-Pacific route to exclusively American exploitation. In that case, the key to their problem would seem to be the right to enter Honolulu. And unless the United States overcomes its aversion to foreign operation in an area of such military importance, there

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will be no alternatives except the very roundabout Marquesas-Clipperton route or a non-stop flight of 4,000 miles from Christmas Island to San Diego. On neither of these routes would the British give any real competition to Pan American's much more direct service.

At least theoretically, the French possess a better opportunity to operate a Pacific airline under their own sovereignty than do the British. If a French line used Clipperton, the only non-French soil on which it would have to stop between the Asiatic and American mainlands would be New Guinea (Dutch or British). However, such a line would run well to the south of the Equator and would thus have to depend upon the use of one of the tiny French islands lying just west of Samoa (*e.g.*, Wallis or Futuna) where there are no facilities for seaplane bases. In any event, the French have so far shown little interest in extending their air routes from Indo-China to French Polynesia, and still less to the coast of America.

Among the European nations, The Netherlands makes the most purely commercial approach to air transportation. Yet although the Dutch are less concerned than many with imperial motives, even they have laid out their major line from Amsterdam to Borneo. After several years of negotiation they now operate a service to Australia. Their aspirations certainly include lines to the Philippines, though they do not, so far as can now be seen, extend beyond 150 East.

There remain the Japanese. Though Japan is a party to the International Convention for Air Navigation, she has so far made no agreements with any of the other signatories. Japanese-controlled airlines have been limited to Japanese territory, which in recent years has come to include Manchukuo and more lately northern China. The Japanese have lines to Formosa, to Korea, and now to Peiping; and they would no doubt like to enter the Philippines. But the full extent to which they have developed airlines outside the home islands is not known. There have been constant rumors that an operating base has been set up on Saipan, 120 miles north of Guam. A Japanese report to the Mandates Commission in November 1936 announced that an air service to cover the islands under Japanese mandate would soon be put into operation. Yet, after three years, the status of this project is still shrouded in mystery.

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THE PRAIRIE PROVINCES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

By George V. Ferguson

THOUGH Canada's three Prairie Provinces are great in size — eight times as large as the United Kingdom — they have fewer inhabitants than the state of Kentucky. Measured by their accumulated wealth and annual income, they are insignificant compared with any two states in the American Middle West. Why, then, should one take an interest in their problems or inquire into their sentiments on imperial and international affairs?

The answer can be given in one word — wheat. When growing conditions are ideal, the Canadian Prairies are capable of raising enough wheat to supply, on the basis of present demand, the import needs of almost the entire world. Western Canadian wheat is the finest on earth, being superior in flavor, keeping quality and protein content to any other. It is rivalled only by Russian wheat, from which indeed the best Canadian strains have been derived. Small wonder, then, that these seemingly insignificant Prairies have a world importance all their own.

In terms of British imperial strategy the Prairies are of particular importance, for without their wheat no British war effort could probably be sustained. Britain fighting for her life would be hard pressed indeed if ample wheat were not available across the narrow and easily protected North Atlantic. British experience in the last war clearly demonstrated that Australia and the Argentine are too far away — freight rates are prohibitive and the danger of attack from enemy raiders and submarines is greater on the unprotected long-distance hauls. North America, and more particularly Canada, is Britain's only reliable source. Between 1915 and 1919, under the joint stimulus of very high prices and the Government's appeals to agrarian patriotism, the Prairie wheat acreage doubled. It rose from ten to about twenty million acres; it stands today at about twenty-four million acres.

The people who hold this key position in world strategy and world economics are a mixed lot: heterogeneous, polyglot, by no means completely melted in the crucible of Canadian citizenship. Even Prairie dwellers find it hard, when gazing at the traditional atlas-red of Canada, to realize that only 275,000 of their total

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number of 2,400,000 were actually born in Britain, that only 49 percent of them are of Anglo-Saxon stock, and that of the latter many were born in the United States. A remark made by one of these during the Czechoslovak crisis a year ago has its significance. A group of Canadians were discussing the possibility of war, and one of them, a Britisher by birth, remarked that he became more and more conscious of the traditional bonds of blood and family as the prospect of war increased. The American-born Canadian smiled, and observed that he had never felt that tug. "You see," he said, "I never heard of the British Empire until I was 18 years old." That was the year when, as a youth from north Texas, he crossed the international boundary to find himself in the midst of a British country at war. Such an experience is not an uncommon one on the Prairies. Not only do less than half the inhabitants have British blood, but 330,000 of them were actually born on the Continent of Europe and such strains as German, Ukrainian and Scandinavian make up almost 30 percent of the Prairie total. Such facts necessarily condition the thinking of the people, even though, as elsewhere in Canada, Anglo-Saxon blood predominates in positions of power and influence upon public opinion.

It should not be thought, however, because of these mixed strains and because of the relatively late arrival of these people on Canada's shores, that the Prairie population is lacking in Canadianism or in loyalty. The Prairie people take part in all national movements with the same zeal and intelligence as the people in other parts of Canada. At elections they vote — the majority of them — for one of the great national political parties. Their political divergences are due, not to their origin and background, but rather to the economic conditions under which they live. Whenever the Liberal and Conservative Parties depart too far from a middle course of compromise, maverick political groups arise in the West, very similar in their way to the protest movements which have marked the political history of such states as Kansas and North Dakota. The Granger movement and the Non-Partisan League have had their counterparts on the Canadian Prairies where, twenty years or so ago, the Progressive Party found its greatest support.

In Alberta, most westerly of the three Provinces, progressivism in its local form was overthrown by the demagoguery of the Social Credit Party which, after four years in power, has given up

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trying to put its weird monetary cult into practice and has become what Prairie political revolts always become, a protest party devoted to the removal of those things that farmers hate most — debt, high interest rates, buying in a protected national market and selling the product of their labor on an unprotected world market. For this reason the Coöperative Commonwealth Federation, the Canadian socialist movement, has attracted more support on the Prairie homesteads than among the industrial workers in the cities of Eastern Canada. Its agrarian program was designed to meet the most urgent necessities of the farm people, and laid little stress upon the need for the socialization of the land. It has attempted not only to right agrarian wrongs but to obtain satisfaction for the demands of that sturdy individualism which, in the main, still marks the Canadian farmer who left Europe in order to become his own boss and who therefore fights hard against tendencies which might throw him back into a peasant status.

Up until ten years ago the course of events in Western Canada encouraged him to believe that such an elevation in his status was possible. The Prairie people are perhaps the last of those frontier groups that opened up virgin country during the closing years of the greatest period of expansion the world has ever seen, the period ending with the World War. Year after year, hundreds of thousands of men and women poured into the Prairies and spread out over 300,000 square miles of land through which lines of railway were being hurriedly thrown. It is apparent today that mistakes were then made which could have been avoided. Some sections of the Prairies should not have been opened to settlement. Others should have been maintained as the short-grass range country nature intended them to be. Some of the railway lines should never have been built. It may well be that, with some scientific check upon the exuberance of the lavish pioneer spirit, much of the debt contracted would not have been created; there would have been less carelessness about accepting the burden of high interest rates; there would have been a more just appraisal of the ultimate earning capacity of the land. But, in the heyday of that development, no one gave a thought to such limitation upon the vision of the hour. Had not the country's Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, declared that the twentieth century belonged to Canada, and was not the West the greatest treasure in Canada's inheritance?

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The Canadian Hansard throws a flood of light upon the minds of the men who built Canada. There was, in their eyes, no limit to the possibilities of the West. Speaking in the House of Commons in 1884, Sir Charles Tupper, one of the Fathers of Confederation, had this to say about the Prairies: ". . . let me just ask the attention of the House for a single moment to a few figures which will indicate what the capabilities of that country are in regard to the production of wheat. One hundred thousand farmers, each farmer cultivating 320 acres of wheat land — has any hon. member made the calculation of what they would produce?" Sir Richard Cartwright: "Yes." Sir Charles Tupper: "I am glad the hon. gentleman has done so. I am glad his attention has been drawn to the fact that 100,000 farmers cultivating 320 acres each, or 200,000 farmers cultivating half that quantity each, and taking the product at only 20 bushels to the acre, instead of 27 or 30, which is the average in the North West in favourable years, would give 640,000,000 bushels of wheat, or 50 percent. more wheat than the whole United States produces today . . . and when you remember we have six belts running through that fertile country that would each give 320 acres each to 100,000 farmers, you can understand to some degree what a magnificent future awaits us in the development of that great country."

Men believed this. They honestly thought that the Canadian Prairies could easily produce 3,840,000,000 bushels of wheat a year. In 1938, when the world's population was much larger than it was in 1882, the whole world (excluding Russia and China, for which accurate statistics are not available) produced only 4,400,000,000 bushels. This means that Sir Charles, and most Canadians besides, believed the Prairies capable of producing enough wheat to feed the whole world. The idea that there might be trouble selling it never appears to have crossed their minds. It need hardly be said that Canada has not approached Sir Charles' estimate. In 1928 the Prairies produced their biggest crop, about 530,000,000 bushels. Canadians used about 125,000,000 bushels and had a great deal of trouble selling the rest of it.

This is not the place to embark upon a discussion of the world wheat problem. But it is important to understand that the Fathers of Canadian Confederation and the men who came after them thought in terms of a world of constantly expanding trade and population. What they lived in, and what they thought they saw ahead was (though they did not use the term) an interna-

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tional world: a world in which, broadly speaking, there was freedom and security of trade, security of investment, assurance of prosperity and limitless markets. They did not interpret that world in terms of internationalism, but in terms of British imperialism, and they were not far wrong in doing so. Looking back at that golden age, we see that the greatest single factor in maintaining that free trading world was Great Britain and its Empire, with its own fiscal example, its own world-wide responsibilities, its own world-wide trade. The British Empire was the greatest single guarantor of the world's freedom to trade, and the great instrument of that guarantee was the British Navy. Under its sheltering protection Sir Charles Tupper and his contemporaries were entitled to imagine to themselves those six belts of fertile prairie land, each with its 100,000 farmers, each of them tilling his 320 acres, all jointly producing that colossal total of three and a half billion bushels of wheat which the world would greedily buy each year.

It does not matter much, looking back at this noble vision, that Sir Charles Tupper did not know the hard facts now available to us as the result of soil surveys and experience. He did not appreciate that there would be cycles of dry years when the fertile plains would become almost a desert. He did not realize that much of the soil was unsuited to wheat or to any other cereal. He could not know that the 24 million acres now seeded in wheat represent about the maximum amount possible of cultivation and that some of it is indifferent, inferior land. Nor could he, or anyone else for that matter, have foreseen the ultimate consequences of an agonizing and ruinous four-year World War. What has mattered is that the Canadian Prairies, built to one set of specifications, have been forced to embark on a reconstruction the end of which they could not see; and what has hurt them most has been the realization that many of their troubles derived from the same thing that formerly insured their security — the policy of Great Britain.

British foreign policy, for two centuries at least, has been the reflection of the domestic needs of a great world-trading state. It was to suit those needs that Britain fought to maintain the Narrow Seas; that the Low Countries became a British "vital interest;" that more than once Britain valiantly fought to preserve the Continent of Europe from falling under the hegemony of a single Power. This devotion to the preservation of her trade

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was the secret of Britain's might; and its preservation for so long was due largely to the wisdom with which she permitted not only the expansion of British trade, but fostered the vast commercial development of the whole world which characterized the nineteenth century. Had it not been for British dominance, the course of that century would have been far different; had it not been for Britain's commercial trusteeship there might well have been great delay in developing the Canadian Northwest. Either the Prairies trade with the world or they perish. The Western farmer knows that there is no future for him if world markets are closed.

Thus it was that the people of the Prairies hailed with satisfaction the creation of the League of Nations. They knew that Britain's power had been threatened and that other Great Powers were challenging the place she had held so long. They interpreted the League, correctly if too simply, as an attempt by Britain to pass over her trusteeship to a committee which would be charged to preserve those conditions of freedom and security that had brought about the halcyon age of the Prairies' growth. The farmers were Canada's best internationalists, adapted to the rôle both by their vocations and by their mixed racial origins. They foresaw that the League, and only the League, could preserve the conditions of their way of life.

It was for this reason that thoughtful Westerners regarded the events of the year 1931 as an ominous and terrible portent for the future. The autumn of that year saw two events of significance to the whole world, but nowhere did they have greater significance than for the Prairie wheatgrowers. The League of Nations began to break down under the impact of the Japanese attack on Manchuria; and almost at the same time Great Britain abandoned her historic policy of free trade by adopting a protective tariff. The report of these two events in Western Canada had all the doleful significance of the tolling of a bell. Where did the Prairies belong in a world where the attempt to maintain collective security had collapsed and where Great Britain had withdrawn behind a tariff wall? It was not long before the meaning of both events was driven home to the Prairies. The postwar world had fallen to pieces, and there appeared to be no readiness on the part of Great Britain to try to shoulder once more the responsibilities she had carried up to 1914. There was no illusion on the Prairies about the meaning of tariffs. The farmers were aware that high Canadian duties were making it still harder for their goods

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to reach a market. It was with something like horror that the wiser of them saw the tariff walls go up around their biggest customer, the United Kingdom. A closed economic system was being created, and they knew it.

The year 1932 was little better, for it saw the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa. The pageantry of Empire which surrounded that conclave could not conceal the shortsighted, selfish bargaining that disfigured the proceedings. A half dozen protectionist governments haggled together in an attempt to get something for themselves without giving anything in return. The economic results in themselves were not actually of great importance, as was revealed by the fact that a very minor diversion of trade occurred in the following years. But the effect upon the world at large was disastrous from the point of view of the Prairies. Canada's wheat customers assumed, and perhaps properly enough, that if the Empire was determined to concentrate its trade within itself, the Empire should assume the purchase of all the Empire's wheat. Yet the principal offset that the Prairies received was the imposition of a duty of six cents per bushel on non-Empire wheat entering Britain. The value of this concession may be estimated from the fact that, when the Anglo-American trade treaty forced the removal of that duty in 1938, no important Prairie voice was raised in protest. It had been worthless.

Meanwhile, international affairs continued to follow a discouraging course. "Appeasement" had begun. From Manchuria to Munich there was not a single step taken that could bring any cheer to the hard-pressed farmers of the Canadian Prairies. Instead they saw a world slowly but steadily closing in on itself, ever removing itself further and further from the only kind of life in which 2,400,000 people, landlocked in a sea of wheat, could make a decent living. Naturally those people commenced to ask themselves most disquieting questions, which even the startling metamorphosis of British foreign policy that began last March failed to silence.

The wiser of them saw clearly that if certain conditions becoming visible in Britain should persist, that country must radically change its economic life. Obviously, a self-contained Britain could no longer be a clearing house for world trade. The Prairies would then either have to stop growing wheat, or develop new connections — possibly with Britain's successor in world power — through which they could reach the world's markets.

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The first of these alternatives was thoroughly canvassed. The conclusion reached after a careful survey found expression in a statement by Mr. J. G. Taggart, Minister of Agriculture for Saskatchewan, the largest wheat-growing province in Canada. He said: "The first and most persistent drive of the Western farmers and of all the people of Canada ought to be to sell more wheat rather than to accept the proposition that wheat sales should be permanently reduced." The principal reason for the prevalence of this view is easily explained. The most feasible alternative to wheat farming would be cattle production. But cattle raising does not occupy as large a population as wheat cultivation. Turning to cattle would therefore drive many thousands of people out of the area, destroy towns and villages, and disrupt the economic life of the Prairies in general.

The Dominion Government, working in conjunction with the three Provinces, has had a major plan under way designed to assist distressed farmers to become more self-sustaining on their farms. The Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act has been making large expenditures to conserve the scanty Prairie moisture by building thousands of small dams and fills which will make it possible for many wheat farmers to maintain a few head of cattle and some hogs and sheep. Water will also be available for truck gardens. In addition, community pastures are being organized on which stock can be raised, and to which cattle can be driven when drought afflicts the farms. However, though these measures are important and useful they have left the major problem untouched. The common sense of Mr. Taggart's conclusion is irresistible if ever there is again to be a sane, international trading world.

The fact that Great Britain could no longer be relied on to provide Canada with a sheet anchor to windward naturally gave rise to new currents of political as well as economic thought. Their net tendency was to emphasize a North American as opposed to a British attitude towards the world. The process was slow, and such events as the royal visit of course worked in the other direction. On that occasion the Prairie Provinces displayed an ardent loyalty unsurpassed by any other part of the Dominion, a passionate devotion to the Crown that surprised most observers. Nor was there doubt, in the light of that experience, that if a major war broke out in the near future the Prairie people would plunge wholeheartedly into the struggle.

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This, however, is only a short-run consequence. Times change and royal visits and wars do not occur every year. It is, besides, impossible to imagine that the whole of the Prairies' demonstration last spring was based on affection for the British Empire. Much of it undoubtedly was the expression of a pure Canadianism which ordinarily finds few enough outlets. The Prairie farmers, standing in the night hours at lonely crossings just to watch the lights of the royal train sweep past, were surely feeling an identity with their fellow citizens which Canadians, deeply cursed by sectionalism, rarely feel. The king they saw was the King of Canada. The patriotism they felt was nationalist rather than imperialist.

Some measure of proof for this suggestion was found last spring in the Western support accorded to the bill introduced into the House of Commons with the object of establishing Canada's autonomous position on the vital question of war and peace. The bill, introduced by a Western private member, Mr. J. T. Thorson, an Icelandic Canadian and a Rhodes scholar, attempted to clarify an obscure constitutional position by setting forth that Canada would be at war only by the action of the King on the advice of his Canadian ministers. The bill died on the order paper; but it received substantial support on the Prairies from isolationists who had persuaded themselves, in the face of obvious facts, that Canada could remain neutral in the event of a British war, and from disappointed supporters of the League of Nations who had come to the belief that Munich spelled the end of all hope for collective security. Support for this bill also came from those who believed that such a bill, if enacted, would in the long run stimulate national unity; and that, in certain eventualities, a Canadian war effort might be longer and better sustained if the Dominion had entered it fully responsible and autonomous. Events have, of course, crowded this view out of the picture.

In any future world in which Great Britain had abdicated from many of her former responsibilities, and in which no system of collective security had been set up, a lonely Canada would be bound to seek entry into some new alignment. How closely she could develop her policies in conjunction with those of the United States, whether the identity of interest would ever approach political union, is impossible to guess. Very powerful obstacles, among them the special privileges accorded by the present constitution to the Roman Catholic French Canadian population, would bar the way. But, union or no union, the two countries would inevita-

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bly draw closer and closer together. Identic aims, the vast coöperation of American capital in Canadian business, the need of a common policy of continental defense, all would combine to suggest a happy and intimate collaboration in progress towards the same goal. It is not difficult to imagine the American and Canadian peoples, a century hence, as the joint bearers of the great tradition of Anglo-Saxon political ideals and government.

This is all speculation as to a future which in moments like these seems to lie very far ahead. Those in the Canadian West who still looked hopefully to Britain for leadership in a movement to restore those conditions of freedom which alone make life possible for areas where the population depends on the export of wheat, have not found her wanting today.

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AMERICAN LABOR IN ANOTHER WAR

By Leo Wolman

ANY attempt to predict the economic and political organization of a country engaged in a major war under modern conditions must necessarily contain a large element of conjecture. The extent of the country's participation in the conflict and the duration of the conflict are both problematical. We cannot prejudge the temper of the people. Economic conditions are now changing so rapidly and so radically that it is more than ever hazardous to venture anything but a guess as to the future trend. The relations of government to economic policy are likewise undergoing such unprecedented transformations that before long we may accept, as normal and satisfactory, forms of economic organization now deemed alien and unworkable. In these circumstances, to formulate a practical wartime labor policy for the United States obviously requires consideration of prevailing trends in labor relations and policy, some estimate of the military and industrial requirements of a great war, and some appreciation of the effect on us of the ideas and practices now common in other countries.

In no country are labor problems isolated phenomena. They are affected by, as they themselves powerfully affect, general economic conditions, and consequently must be considered in connection with them. Among the most important of these conditions is a country's fiscal position. This is particularly true in time of war. One of the most difficult problems in any war is how to finance it. For this reason many observers give a high rating to England's capacity to wage a prolonged war. Of the military and industrial power of France they were in doubt until the Daladier Government began taking steps to bring its income and expenditures under control. And they still claim to see in the fiscal policies and position of Germany and Italy the most vulnerable spots in the armor of those two states. Moreover, during the last twenty-five years all of the countries named increased their burdens of taxation and public debt so tremendously that the added costs of a new war would in all likelihood force them to resort to direct inflation or capital levies, or both.

However much we may allow for our superior wealth and resources, the case of the United States is essentially the same.

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Since 1914 the debt of the Federal Government has multiplied forty-fold — in round numbers, from one to forty billions of dollars. During the last ten years this debt has been steadily mounting, and there is no sound reason either to expect the present trend in expenditures to reverse itself in the near future or to anticipate a radical rise in the Government's income from taxation. On the contrary, the probabilities are great that the next years will see the continuance of large annual deficits and a further substantial increase in the amount of the public debt. If, therefore, our Government should be called upon greatly to raise its present rate of spending because of a war, it would soon be exposed to severe and unusual financial strains and would be forced to weigh carefully the costs of its various undertakings.

Labor costs are, of course, a large and indispensable item in the expenditures required by war, as they are in the normal expenses of business. But how far and under what conditions improving standards of labor conditions can be said to increase the cost of doing business and of producing goods is a complex question, for there are often compensating factors which tend to offset a rise in the rate of wages, a reduction in the hours of work, or other direct and indirect charges on the payroll. It is clear enough, however, that the advances in the living standards of American labor during recent decades, and particularly since 1930, and the forces that now determine their direction, will, taken together, materially increase the Government's expenditures.

In the quarter century since 1914 labor standards in the United States show the greatest advance ever recorded for a period of that length. From 1914 to 1938 the money rates of wages (hourly earnings) of four important classes of labor — manufacturing, railroads, bituminous coal mining and building — nearly tripled. The hourly earnings of factory labor in 1938 were 189 percent greater than in 1914; of railroad labor, 193 percent; of soft coal miners, 180 percent; and of union labor in the building trades, 169 percent. Taking the period as a whole, the cost of living has lagged far behind money wages, so that real wage rates, or the purchasing power of hourly earnings, just about doubled in these twenty-five years. A large part of this advance was made between 1929 and 1938, when the real hourly earnings of factory labor rose 45 percent; of railroad labor, 38 percent; of coal miners, 50 percent; and of union building labor, 28 percent. During the World War money wages likewise advanced enor-

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mously, though for many groups of labor they barely kept pace with the cost of living.

These changes in wages fail to measure the total increase in the wage bill. Recent legislation and the growth of collective bargaining since 1933 have been sources for added charges. The Federal Social Security Act imposes taxes on the employer, now amounting to 4 percent of the payroll, for financing unemployment compensation and old age insurance, not to speak of the other taxes required to finance the various grants-in-aid provided for in this law. The very considerable expansion in trade unionism in recent years and in collective agreements has also added more expenses. The most important and most general of these have arisen out of the various concessions necessarily made in the process of recognizing a union and making a contract with it. Such concessions have been granted widely and cover a great variety of conditions, but it is impossible to estimate their aggregate cost. Yet it is fair to say that the rise in the price of labor and the various restrictions on output which invariably accompany collective bargaining contribute most heavily to lifting the costs of doing business.

Meanwhile, the forces most vitally affecting the American labor market, now and in the predictable future, will probably raise present wage levels and other labor standards even higher. The federal Fair Labor Standards Act is one of these. This law (adopted in 1938), together with the increasing number of state minimum wage laws, is gradually but materially lifting the general wage level by fixing minimum rates substantially higher than those now in effect for the lowest-paid classes of labor. While these directly touch only a small fraction of the total working population, it rarely is possible in practice to raise minimum rates without adjusting the differentials of the higher paid employees at the same time. The growth of unions is at present an even more potent force in lifting rates of wages. The expansion in American trade unionism since 1935 has surpassed the spectacular growth of the labor movement from 1914 to 1920, and present union membership exceeds that of 1920 by more than 1,000,000, perhaps 2,000,000. Not only has there been this increase in aggregate numbers, but the labor movement of 1939 includes many groups of employees hitherto wholly unorganized, so that the area of rising wages is constantly spreading. Most unions, moreover, continue their organizing campaigns, all the time gather new

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members, and thus add to their strength. Since the most popular of union policies is to raise wage rates whenever possible, as well as to defend existing rates against all efforts to reduce them, it may be expected that the present upward trend in wages will persist for some time to come. Once established, rates of wages in unionized industries are extraordinarily difficult to revise, as the long experience of the building trades eloquently testifies.

It should be noted also in this connection that this extraordinary movement in wages since 1933 has taken place in the face of conditions of business and employment wholly unfavorable to rising wages and improved standards of work. Throughout the period, as everyone knows, there has been a large standing army of unemployed, averaging perhaps some 15 percent of the employable population, and rising in some years to 30 percent. A spell of good business, brisk enough to require the employment of a large fraction of the unemployed, would therefore quickly set in motion forces tending to bid up the price of labor still further. If we remember how swiftly the war of 1914 made itself felt in American markets, we will see — particularly in view of present wage levels — how important rises in wages and prices would become under like conditions in the future.

There are compensating factors which may tend, in time, to offset rising wages and labor costs. The most obvious of these is the saving in relief expenditures which would probably attend a war boom with its reëmployment of the unemployed. Germany's "solution" of the unemployment problem — not to mention her much advertised shortage of labor — derives from the reintroduction of conscription and the expansion of war industries. Similarly in Great Britain the acceleration of the rearmament program was followed by a substantial reduction in the number of unemployed (although the rate of unemployment is still much higher than before the World War). In the United States, those who had been thrown out of employment by the depression of 1914 were, not long after the outbreak of the World War, reabsorbed into gainful employment by the flood of war orders from abroad. The repetition of this sequence of events would no doubt materially lighten the fiscal burdens of our Government, as anyone familiar with current relief expenditures must admit; but economies from this source could hardly suffice to convert a deficit into a surplus or even wholly to offset the added expense of several of our labor policies. Many of our existing social services,

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including various forms of relief, the cost of which is being increasingly assumed by the Government, are reform measures aimed at raising standards of living and as such may be expected to remain in force even during a war boom.

The behavior of a second compensating factor — the efficiency of labor — is easier to describe under peacetime than under war conditions. Experience has taught that increasing wages and other charges on the payroll, associated with progress in living standards, have usually been absorbed by advances in the efficiency and productivity of industry. But, if the rise in wages and labor costs is uncommonly steep and swift, and if surrounding conditions are not altogether propitious, the period of absorption may be quite long and for a considerable period costs may fail to decline. In wartime many influences are at work to reduce the efficiency of industry and labor. The expansion of the new war industries requires considerable labor shifts, many of them into new and unfamiliar jobs. More active business promotes a more rapid turnover of labor. The relative shortage of young men leads to the employment in their place of women and older men, and this for a time at least reduces efficiency and raises costs. The very intensity and speed of wartime industrial operations impair the physical vitality of the labor force and soon lead to diminished effort and output.

The chances of a general shortage of labor would seem to be greater now than they were in 1917. One of the principal reasons for this is the drastic reduction in the length of the work-week, made since 1933. The average full-time week of factory labor has been cut by roughly 8 hours, or one whole working day, during the last five years. In the bituminous and anthracite coal industries the work-week has been reduced from 48 to 35, or by 13 hours. From 1914 to 1920 the full-time week of factory employees declined 5 hours, from 55 to 50 a week. But a large portion of this reduction took place during the first postwar inflationary boom of 1919–1920.

While it would seem absurd, in the face of unemployment which even at the peak of business in 1937 amounted to more than 5 millions, to speak of a labor shortage, it is not too much to say that a war which drew heavily upon the resources of American industry would soon tax our available labor supply. This conclusion should not be surprising when it is recalled how severely the general introduction of the 40-hour week by the

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Blum Government crippled the productivity of French industry. Furthermore, the average prevailing hours in Great Britain in the summer of 1939 were 47 a week; and, whatever they were in Germany, they were longer than they used to be and were constantly being increased.

It also ought not to be surprising if, in addition to a general shortage of labor, there should develop critical shortages in the classes of highly skilled and specialized workmen. Because of the depression and the unusual persistence of large-scale unemployment, the training of apprentices has virtually been suspended in this country during the last ten years. At the same time an increasing number of men with skill and experience have grown older or have lost their skills through unemployment. In many industries the opinion prevails that it would be impossible to recruit adequately trained and qualified labor for any great expansion of production. As long as apprenticeship regulations are conceived in terms of an overcrowded labor market and a permanent unemployment of from five to ten million persons, proper planning for a future supply of skilled workmen will be difficult.

It is hardly necessary to say that the means for the preservation of peace in labor relations is an essential element in any plans this country may make in order to insure the most effective use of its resources in time of war. During the World War, in spite of haste and inexperience, the Government managed to achieve the efficient mobilization of its industrial resources. Considering the magnitude of the enterprise, the labor problems were on the whole handled expeditiously and fairly. There was close coöperation between organized labor and public agencies. In the main, organized labor acted as a unit. The sole important jurisdictional dispute between two rival unions was limited to one industry, and that not a crucial one. Even the rivalry between the trade unions and company unions failed to arouse bitter antagonism. The boards of labor policy and adjustment, created to deal with both general problems and specific disputes, made a notable contribution to the methods of industrial peace. All things considered, the formulæ applied to situations involving the relations between unorganized men and their employers worked remarkably well. Although there were strikes and lockouts, the number of persons involved in labor disputes was not excessively large in 1917 and 1918, and in each of these years was materially lower than in 1916. There were signs of deep unrest only in 1919 when

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the number of strikers climbed to a new peak in this country. The Government's success in carrying out its program was attained — by and large — without the general use of threats or force.

But if we were to gauge the outlook for peace in labor relations in terms of present conditions, the prospects would seem far from bright. First of all, the labor movement itself is divided into two rival organizations — the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations — each of them powerful and bitter towards the other. A difference which began as a relatively minor and limited dispute in 1935 has since grown into a major conflict, involving not only the parent bodies but more than fifty constituent unions. The inter-union disputes affect the country's most basic industries, such as coal and metal mining, electrical appliance, automobile and machinery manufacturing, and the lumber, petroleum, shipbuilding, and electric light and power industries. All efforts to bring the two organizations together have failed, and they now seem farther apart than ever. It has become a common practice of each organization to raid the other's membership and territory. The fears which this conflict has engendered and the lengths to which warring unions will go are illustrated in the accusations made against the National Labor Relations Board by the A. F. of L. and by the recent countrywide strike of coal miners. The latter was merely one phase of the fight being carried on by the United Mine Workers, the leading union of the C. I. O., against the Progressive Miners, a relatively new union affiliated with the A. F. of L. Any substantial improvement in business is likely to bring on new strikes by rival organizations against each other. Neither Presidential intervention nor the policies of the Government's labor agencies have so far been effective in settling disputes. The secret elections held under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Board in order to enable the men in the shop to choose which union they prefer seem only to have exacerbated existing differences. In a crisis it would therefore be impossible to assure any plants that its workers would not go out on strike. The nearest approach in intensity to this conflict is the split which occurred between the Communist and anti-Communist factions of German labor under the Weimar Republic.

There are numerous indications that American labor is greatly dissatisfied with the way in which industrial relations are being handled. This attitude is partly a reaction to the increasing power

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of organized labor in this country. As we have already remarked, in the past several years American unions have experienced one of the most successful periods of expansion in their history. Some of the most famous non-union industries have been unionized and have entered into contractual relations with labor organizations. Others, covering a large segment of American industry, have sought to remain non-union and have thus been the object of successive organizing campaigns. Because of the vigor of these organizing activities and the efforts of the unions to win recognition, violent strikes and lockouts, some of long duration, have become quite common. In view of the large number of these conflicts and the widespread bitterness which they have engendered, the efficacy of our governmental machinery for the settlement of labor disputes has been called into serious question.

Since 1933 we have had an unprecedented expansion in the number and size of agencies empowered to handle labor relations; nevertheless, their various functions have been so strictly defined, either by the law or by the agencies themselves, that many serious disturbances in recent years apparently fell outside the jurisdiction of any of them. Thus the National Labor Relations Board, the most powerful of the federal labor boards, restricts itself to hearing certain types of complaints against employers and to enforcing the law with respect to them. Consequently, in the settlement of the major strikes of this period, such as the General Motors strike, as well as in proposed suggestions for composing the differences between the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L., the National Labor Relations Board has so far played little or no part. No provision has been made for the creation of an agency with equal prestige and with the function of winning the confidence of all parties concerned — employers, employees, unions, and the public — and of exerting its influence to prevent strikes or at least to settle them promptly.

Without such an agency, endowed with authority to intervene in all labor disputes and, more important still, composed of experienced and impartial members, the present trend in labor relations, and particularly the virulence of inter-union conflicts, may well lead to increasingly bitter struggles. And the bitterness of these struggles is likely to be aggravated under the crisis conditions of wartime. For in critical times a powerful labor movement, accustomed to having its own way, spurred on to more extreme measures by the competition of rival factions within its own

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ranks, and impatient of discipline, may find difficulty in maintaining satisfactory relations with the Government in submitting to the requirements of a war economy. A condition of this sort cannot be resolved easily and quickly. The most effective way to handle it would be through public agencies whose aims are conciliatory and whose temper and methods enlist public support as well as the confidence of the interested parties. If we plan to set up such machinery, we ought to do so at the earliest possible moment, however radical a departure from our present labor policy such a step might be.

None of these problems would materialize unless a war imposed extraordinary strains on our economy. But such strains seem inevitable. Within less than two years after the beginning of the World War, and before our own military preparations had materially expanded, American factory production had increased 45 percent, largely as a result of the purchase in this country of military supplies and essential commodities by European governments. By any standard this was an extraordinary achievement in production. American participation in another war would make even more formidable demands upon our productive resources. Moreover, the tremendous damage which modern weapons can inflict on European centers of supply will undoubtedly still further increase the demand for American goods.

It follows, then, that all the problems involved in the mobilization of industry and labor — the control of prices and wages, the allocation of capital and labor among competing industries, the retention of efficiency, the maintenance of industrial peace, and the protection of labor standards — are bound to arise in the early stages of our participation in another war and to grow more complex the longer the war continues. For the handling of several of these problems, the United States is better prepared than it was in 1917. As part of our system of unemployment insurance a national network of employment exchanges has been created. These exchanges are already an important factor in the organization of our labor market, and in time of war they might serve as the foundation of machinery for shifting labor from nonessential to essential industries as well as for facilitating the movement of labor generally. Our elaborate relief and public works undertakings have been the source of numerous inquiries concerning the occupational histories of a large segment of the American population. No one knows how precise the resulting records are, but

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they certainly afford more information than we have ever had in the past. At the same time both employers and labor have been acquiring experience with public administrative boards engaged in fixing the wage rates of important classes of labor under the authority of the Walsh-Healey and Fair Labor Standards Acts and of numerous state minimum wage laws. While these laws have encountered some opposition, they have on the whole been easily enforced and violations have been unusual. But like much of our other labor legislation, these measures have been aimed at raising wages and working standards. There is no assurance that control of wages and working conditions, the object of which was to prevent wage increases (or even to lower wages and lengthen the work-week), would be so willingly accepted.

Organized facilities for rehabilitating unemployed skilled workers as well as for training new entrants into industry, except such as are used by industry itself in the normal course of business, hardly exist in this country. Continued unemployment has acted to restrict training and apprenticeship and has, thereby, reduced the supply of specialized and skilled labor. We might wisely have used a portion of our relief moneys for this purpose; and it may now be sound policy to set up training centers similar to those established by the British Government, although these have not been used nearly so generally as was hoped. Perhaps the most effective means of recruiting skilled labor of the types required is to encourage industry to resume training and to persuade labor to withdraw its opposition — not an easy task so long as many millions remain out of work.

At bottom, however, the handling of these problems is less a matter of machinery than of fundamental policy. Our participation in another war in Europe would presumably entail the full utilization of our economic resources at the highest possible levels of efficiency. In this case, by what authority could labor be transferred from one industry to another? Who would fix wages, hours, and standards of output? And how would the multitude of disputes common to an industry working at capacity be settled? These are questions which strike at the heart of war labor policy. In Germany they have been answered by what amounts to the conscription of all labor, the government arbitrarily assigning men and women to their appointed posts in industry, fixing wages and hours, and prohibiting strikes. In France during the past summer, under the exigencies of a pressing munitions program,

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the government undertook to lengthen the work-week by executive mandate and in the process was forced to break a general strike.

Under present conditions the solution of these questions would inevitably prove more urgent and more stubborn than it did in the last war. The example of the totalitarian countries has already made a deep impression throughout the world. Their policies and methods of organization are widely supposed to have reached an unparalleled degree of efficiency, at least for the waging of war. Many informed people in Great Britain, France and the United States hold that, in fighting the totalitarian Powers, the democratic states must inevitably resort to the use of totalitarian measures also.

Every major war inevitably produces arbitrary actions by the government — restrictions on the normal activities of the civilian population and limitations on the freedom of industry and labor. We had experience to this effect during the last war. But it is a far cry from such mild and temporary measures as we knew then to the thoroughgoing regimentation of all life which already in the summer of 1939 prevailed in large sections of Europe. We have in the United States at the present time a gainfully occupied population of some 55 million souls. In wartime all but the unemployables can reasonably be expected to be fully employed. It is inconceivable that American workers would voluntarily surrender their traditional rights and modes of work to any central authority in the making of whose policy they failed to retain a voice and the right of protest. Nor would authoritarian policies and methods operate to sustain the morale or efficiency of American labor. It is worth recalling that, despite the achievements of regimented German industry, Britain's recovery from 1932 to 1937 — in aggregate increase of industrial production and in growth of employment — substantially exceeded that of Germany during the same period.

If we are to plan our wartime labor policy and administration in democratic terms we must act today to put our labor relations on a more harmonious basis, and we must realize more clearly than at present the magnitude of the economic burdens imposed by modern warfare. These are not intrinsically war measures, but they are necessary preliminaries if we are to achieve peaceful labor relations and efficient production in another war.

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CÁRDENAS OF MEXICO

By Waldo Frank

IF THE American press is full of doubts about the value and wisdom of Lázaro Cárdenas, we need scarcely blame ourselves; the President of Mexico has a worse press in his own country. In middle-class circles, there, even those that are well-intentioned, one seldom hears him praised except faintly or with solemn reservations. It is true that the peasants (who don't read) love him, and the industrial workers follow him. But your average Mexican intellectual thinks he knows better. Fascist-minded journalists explain at great length that Cárdenas is one of the clever servants of the "international-Communist-Jews." Sincere revolutionary-minded pamphleteers, like the great painter Alfaro Siqueiros, try to show how the "innocent" Cárdenas plays into the hands of the Fascists and runs the risk of becoming a second Madero.[1] It is a common paradox that the articulate classes of any age rarely understand the man — prophet or poet — who profoundly expresses it. Surface and depth seem to be forever in dialectical opposition. And most politicians, like most writers, articulate the surface.

Not often is the deepest nature of a people expressed in a statesman. The love of the Americans today for Lincoln, so much more intimate than what we feel for the more brilliant leaders of our Revolution, suggests that he was of this kind: a politician who articulated qualities of our ethos more usually voiced in a country's arts and folklore. Recently, the Europeans have produced political leaders who expressed, not their creative spirit, but their pathologies — Hitler, for instance, who incarnates the morbidity of a Germany that has been consistently maltreated since the Thirty Years' War, or Mussolini who denotes the Italian vices that Cicero in another crisis flayed in Cataline, and that Cicero's sounder contemporaries knew how to cleanse away. The Bolshevik October threw up great men; but no one who understands the profundities of the race of Tolstoi, Dostoievski, Kropotkin, Moussorgski, could insist that either Lenin or Stalin incarnated more than temporary urgencies of Russia's genius. Today, only two political leaders appear worthy to stand with some approxi-

[1] The gentle inspirer of the Revolution of 1910 who became President and was murdered by the reactionary Victoriano Huerta in 1913.

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mate fullness for the source and dynamic aim of their race. One is Gandhi of India; the second is the far less understood Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico. Both these men have applied for the first time to the peculiar problem of their people a method inherent in its peculiar culture. Both are fashioners of independence for nations still far from independence. Both are practical politicians whose work, being profound, is poorly reflected in surface measures and must be appraised in terms of ethic and of culture.

Mexico has had other eminent men of action. There were the leaders of the War of Independence against Spain: Hidalgo, Morelos, Guerrero, etc. There was the full-blooded Zapotec Indian who became President Benito Juárez and who planned the "Reforma" by which the economic hold of the Church was to be broken. There were the varied leaders of 1910 and after: Madero, the liberal, naïve idealist; Zapata, the bloody agrarian; Carranza, Obregón, Vasconcelos. Some of these men were Mexican in ideology (not Juárez); none expressed more than a fragmentary need of the people, and none evolved a method peculiarly and deeply Mexican. I suspect the same could be said of the statesmen before Gandhi in that chaos of races and religions called India. Mexico also has been a chaos. But it promises a cultural synthesis profoundly original and of supreme importance to the political destiny of Latin America and in our American relations.

The point that I must make is that no man — no epoch — of Mexico's past can be said wholly to represent Mexico. In Mexico, there have been great cultural expressions. The Maya of Yucatán and its environs north and south, the Zapotec and Mixtec of Tehuantepec and Oaxaca, the Toltec of the bleak Mexican *Mesa*, produced noble buildings, great sculptures, reached high into the mysteries of mathematics, astronomy, religion. The Aztec failed to synthesize these into a Mexican culture; rather, they weakened, corrupted and decomposed, and were themselves on the decline when Cortés took advantage of the civil strife to overcome them. Mexico proper begins with Cortés — with the symbolic act of his marriage to the Indian Malintzin — but begins with the trauma and convulsion that the Spanish Conquest produced in the Mexican soul. Four centuries have not cured it. Before 1600, buildings and carvings from Chihuahua's desert to Chiapas' jungle, unlike any in Spain or in Spain's other colonies, revealed that the Mexican plastic genius was again at work. Yet this colonial culture rested

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on a wounded, somnambulistic folk; it was Mexican in root, in telluric influence, not in flower.

The War of Independence (1810) merely released chaos to the surface. In their revolt against Spain, the *hacendados* (relying of course on their peons to fight their battles) sketched a republic on French-American lines that had no contact with Mexico's economy or culture. A disastrous period it was, because un-Mexican: its symbol was the loss of nearly half the nation's territory to the United States, who with its simpler ethnic problem and its greater political talents (inherited from England) knew what it wanted and how to go about getting it. Spain has never showed capacity for social organization (hence its age-long need of Catholic Rome); its genius has worked in other realms. And of all the Amerindian peoples only the Quechua-Kolya of Peru and Bolivia produced a great political structure. (Their dominion under the Incas was comparable in efficiency with Rome's, and in high ethic with Judea.) The Mexican nations created nothing of this kind. Two distinct humanities, both culturally strong but both weak in the techniques of social justice, married in Mexico and created chaos. Even Juárez knew no better cure for this chaos than the rationalist ideas imported from France. Porfirio Díaz stratified the chaos by clamping down on it a military dictatorship which bought peace by mortgaging the country's wealth at low rates to foreign capital.

The revolution which began in 1910 was really a return to the War of Independence: a return to a fresh and right start. Even now, the process is confused; the right line remains intuitive, lacking the final form that consciousness brings. But there are reasons to believe that the beginning is organic. Mexico's artistic genius is reborn with a vitality and scope that it has never had: witness its painters, musicians, architects and poets. The Public School has become an evangel, passionately brought to the parched folk (whom the Church left in indigence and ignorance) by 70,000 apostolic teachers. And now appears the political leader to express the enormous needs of this chaotic, enormously gifted people through a method that is a Mexican way of life.

In Cárdenas, ethos and political action come together. I do not mean that now, as in the fairy tale, Mexico "will live happily ever after." Dark times are ahead; times of threat to the little tragically gained, a time of pause at best. But there is a beginning in Mexican life of a new, an organically Mexican tradition.

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"My work," Cárdenas said to me — and I hope he will forgive this indiscretion, for he is modest, subtle, reticent, like his Tarascan forbears — "my work is primarily to create a new tradition."

II

Let us look at the man. The last time I saw Lázaro Cárdenas in action was recently in Sonora, the arid northwesternmost state which dams, now in construction or projected, will make immensely rich (its soil is said to be better than California's). We drove from Vicam, southeast of Guaymas, through waves of dust hot as red cinders, to Jori, one of eight Yaqui villages.

The Yaquis, a folk poor in the arts and without music, all of whose strength seems to have gone into resistance, have never been truly pacified. The Aztecs failed to make them give tribute. The Spaniards drove them into the metal mountains and stratified their rebellion which has lived four hundred years. Díaz tried to devirilize them by shipping their soldiers — whole regiments — into the south. But each newborn son became a new warrior against the Federals. Now, the method is to win them with kindness. Their immemorial valley villages, taken by Spaniards and retained by *hacendados*, are again theirs — although many families still sulk in the high hills. The local governments are recognized. Schools are established; irrigation and new agricultural methods are introduced for the communal holdings. The Yaquis are growing wheat now, instead of only corn. (I saw the women pound the delicate paste into tortillas and press them white and transparent on their honey-brown arms.) The result is that for ten years the Yaquis, with more bread and fewer dead children, have made no raid against the "Mexicans." But resentment, distrust, wild love of independence, are carved into their stony faces.

It had all been carefully arranged: the eight governors of the eight Yaqui villages were to gather and confer with the President of Mexico in Jori. An event unheard of! Yaqui warfare consists of surprise attacks on unprotected villages and ranches. Men are castrated and shot; pregnant women are disembowelled, houses are razed. Thus, bitterness talks back. President Cárdenas arrived in a cloud of dust without a guard; his normal military aides remained in Vicam. The Yaquis looked out from their 'dobe thatch-roofed huts, silent. On the porch of the "big house" a drum tattooed a laconic welcome. The President was only an hour

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and a half late — tantamount to arriving a bit ahead of schedule. The "contact" chief, Pluma Blanca, two guns at his belt, came forward and gruffly saluted the visitor. His gnarled face allowed no softness, but in contrast to the face of the real chief who was not present and whom I met later, it seemed soft. Only a couple of the governors had arrived, he explained, in halting Spanish. Twice, while Cárdenas stood at ease with us in the shade of a wide *aquahuete*, the drum repeated the tattoo: two more governors had arrived. The meaning was clear: one president of 20,000,000 Mexicans equals one governor of less than a thousand Yaquis.

While the sun swung from perpendicular noon into the west, the President waited and discussed phonetics with his friends (only Pluma Blanca, as official host, had joined the group). Finally, he explained that the men on the porch of the "big house" included four of the eight governors, and the others were not coming. The other four refused to travel to Jori. It was too far; it was beneath their dignity.

"Well, we're here," said Cárdenas. "Let's have talk with those who have come." He strode to the house. The Yaquis shook hands silently, the President murmured the equivalent of "Glad to meet you." They all sat down on the porch, the President facing the men.

In a wise but conventional statesman it would have been possible to detect the effort to avoid — perhaps successfully — any sign of irritation or condescension. It would have been possible to feel, subtly, some such process as this: "I am the head of a nation of 20,000,000. I could wipe out or ignore this remnant reduced by stubbornness to a bare 6,000. Instead, I give them water, villages, wheat. I come to see them, and they have the impudence to try to snub me! *Noblesse oblige*. No sign of what I'm thinking!" In Cárdenas, no such effort of disguise existed. The man felt the Yaqui disease because he was within the Yaqui heart. Intuitively. As representative of a government with a long record of oppression, he owed the Yaquis everything; and if they took *anything*, he would thank them.

He spoke. He had come to learn the needs of the Yaqui nation: water, land, tools, education, doctoring; and to discuss with the Yaqui chiefs the problems they chose to present. The interpreter at his side translated this into Yaqui; and the replies into Spanish. The men voted: almost inarticulate assents, and longer, sung "no's." Soon, the snag came: *this* and *that*, they could not decide

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without the full eight villages. Cárdenas, casually, almost imperceptibly, made his suggestion. "Why don't we all meet tomorrow at eleven?" He named the major village of the absent four. The proud governors assented. Less by not preaching, not exhorting, not subtly hinting with a veiled threat, than by his utter aloofness from the mood of these, he had won. The Yaqui's rigid pride was annulled by his lack of it.

Now this scene, since it is archetypical, reveals a paradox. Cárdenas runs Mexico; in fact, he has begun to transform it. And Mexico's twenty millions — so diverse its peoples and its climates, so hostile most of its lands, so intricate its economic and psychologic problems after six hundred years of exploitation (the Aztec, the Spaniard, the Church, the Capitalist — and the endemic politician), must be a mighty hard land to run, much less transform. Yet Cárdenas has spent over half his fifty-four months in office outside the capital, attending to details — a twenty-hour day, a seven-day week without fatigue, without impatience — details even more "trivial" than the pride problems of the relic Yaquis. How does he find time for the big jobs? Does he let his secretaries do them? Or perhaps his Ministers? [2]

Let's postpone the answer. I went with him once on a ten-day "campaign" into the Sierra de Oaxaca — the bleak, indigent land where the folk starve while the corn roots touch enormous wealth. We abandoned the motor trucks at the top of the road and took to horse. We tramped to more than one village after an hour's trail too tough for horses. We slept and froze, wrapped in ponchos, in mud huts ten thousand feet in the air. (One night the village was Gelatao, where Benito Juárez, Zapotec shepherd boy, was born. He never returned to honor his home; Cárdenas did it for him.) This is an ingrown land with petty chiefs feuding. Day after day, the President of the Republic listened to the men, the mothers, even the children, the teachers — always the teachers. Detail after detail. And day after day, his visit cut a swath of clarity and good feeling through the emotional débris. Detail after detail: a new school, a new irrigation ditch, a new political alliance. But the life of the whole Sierra changing!

I recall a day at a collective farm in the Laguna. This is a rich valley astride two states, Durango and Coahuila, that grows good cotton and wheat. It used to belong to a handful of *latifundistas;* now forty thousand former peons own and work it. A new dam,

[2] At least one spent his three years in office plotting a rebellion.

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El Palmito, will be ready in 1940 to catch the rainy season flood of the river Nazas and turn the region into another Egypt. Cárdenas loves that dam: when he rode out to observe its progress, his sensitive hands stirred as if he longed to caress it. But he had endless hours for the humble collective farms, to hear the women tell their petty troubles; to watch the men — most of them veterans of Pancho Villa — raise useless clouds of dust as they deployed before him on their horses, brandishing old guns.

Details. The patience of a ward politician, the passion of a fishwife, for details. As he discusses a school, a ditch, a tractor, an individual injustice, it is Mexico that changes!

He overworks his secretaries by outworking them — eighteen hours a day. I once heard his former adjutant, Colonel Ignacio Beteta (the brother of the brilliant Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Ramón Beteta), sigh: "If only we had a good-sized rebellion! Putting it down would be comparative peace." He lives in a perpetual campaign; he is a president on a war footing trying to win peace for his people. That deploying of the veterans of the Revolution in the dust of their horses is symbolic. By moving up and down the land, Cárdenas has brought back the Revolution, made it a "perpetual revolution," in terms of better bread and water — and better music.

III

What kind of worker exhausts his attention, seemingly, on detail — and when the work is done, all the materials have been transmuted, the whole speaks? I have named the artist. Mexico from immemorial times has been a land of artists. Now Mexico has produced a statesman whose method is the artist's. More than once, watching Cárdenas at work, I have thought of the sculptor lovingly modelling the clay. The artist has a vision; he knows more or less what he's after, even though his final product is sure to differ from his precise preconception. But in the process of work, his vision seems to die: point by point, he must serve the particular problems humbly, must impregnate unconsciously the individual part with the universal. Cárdenas knows something of what he's about; he can talk to his friends intelligently to prove it. But deeper than his telling is his knowledge of Mexico. Deeper than his knowing is his intuition of Mexico's destiny. And more immediate than either his knowledge or his intuition is his absorption in the particular event before him. No President has ever

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known so many regions of Mexico so well. No President has seemingly so engulfed his time and his attention for five years in the details of events. *Yet Mexico changes.*

The most famous act of his administration, of course, has been his ousting of the foreign oil interests from the soil which, by constitutional law, was always and forever Mexican. To Cárdenas and to Mexico this was a detail in the larger battle: a forced action, undesirable at the moment but necessary and now permanently organized (with less than anticipated trouble) within the political whole. The true center of the President's reconstruction is the building of the collective farm, the *ejido*. He has increased to a serious pitch the expropriation of large lands, which dawdled and dwindled during the régimes of his predecessors. (To the owners always remains a *lote* sufficiently large to sustain them at a higher standard of living than the *ejidatarios*.) He has enormously pushed the improvement of these lands by the building of dams, canals, irrigation webs, roads, sugar refineries, etc. The millions of dispossessed men and women, now restored to their own earth in organized, autonomous communities served by federal banks, constitute for Cárdenas the sun of Mexico's system. About the *ejido*, like planets, all other classes of productive and functional labor are supposed to revolve. Their gravitational orbits are set by the sun — the *ejido*. The constellated life of the Republic, by economic law and by national psychology, must obey the "natural law" of the *ejido*.[3]

This is why Cárdenas was not afraid of the oil boycott; why he will face, if he must, the loss of the silver market; why he is not afraid of private industries and, far from intending to expropriate the mines, is ready to welcome into Mexico new large industrial colonies of Spaniards or Jews, backed by foreign money. The

[3] The great majority of Mexicans live on the land. But they have been a horribly submerged majority, their productive power low because of low agricultural standards and poor water, their consuming powers almost negligible. Therefore, they have subsisted in an isolated, archaic economy while the minority of industrial labor and middle class have established whatever international and modern economy Mexico possessed — supplying all the taxes and determining the national budget. The plan to lift up this agrarian majority into large producers and into great industrial consumers is, therefore, sound. Mexico, more than any other country of Latin America except Brazil — more than Argentina — can establish its economy (like that of the United States, Russia and France) on a system of major self-adequacy (this is not autarchy, of course). Mexico will even be able to construct steel, though its coal deposits are poor, when the oil-iron process has been perfected. To get a real start on this plan, Mexico needs investment capital. If the United States will help to stabilize the present liberal revolution, by refusing to let the oil interests indirectly shape its policy and public opinion; if it will abandon the old standards of "grab" which the oil interests exemplified, in favor of a new method of legitimate coöperation and small profit, a new era between the countries can begin. Its effects on the rest of Latin America will be enormous.

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ejido, he is confident, exists. It has already, he believes, established a gravitational field strong enough to absorb legitimate enterprise and to resist the sullen, plotting foe. His soothing addresses to the Chambers of Commerce are sincere. But on the other hand, where the logic of events has already nationalized industries, like oil and the railroads, he will not go back, and he welcomes the Labor propaganda which has taught that there shall be no retreat. Cárdenas favors autonomy wherever possible; and frequently where it proves unwise. Thus, the administration of the *Petromex* is working well; the railways are working at least not worse than they did under Díaz. But the autonomous University of Mexico has fallen into the hands of middle-class boys with sterile and dangerous Fascist tendencies. The Army, which he has begun to rebuild from the bottom as a popular movement; the public schools; the ministry of communications; the unions of lawyers, doctors, engineers; small business; even the *Casa de España* whose duty it is to place Spain's exiled intellectuals in the schools of the Republic — these, to his mind, are typical entities fit to run themselves, for better or for worse, within the gravitational "sun" of the *ejido*. Cárdenas knows that forces within and without the nation are plotting counterrevolution. He knows that many of the old generals hate him and his work. He has faith in the intuition of his people; but he has confidence in the *ejido*. Perhaps, if Spain's Republic had really partitioned the lands. . . . Time will tell.

But it should at least be clear how far this man and this nation stand from the prevalent collectivisms of Europe. Communism is as remote from this loose liberal system in which state-owned and private industries, and many parties, are made to move together within a constellation, as is Fascism. Every value, every act of Cárdenas' Mexico, cries against the Fascists to whom reluctantly oil is sold, because there are few other markets.[4] Mexico in political faith is a militant democracy. Its constitutional law prevents the reëlection of the President, and that statute has an almost religious sanction. In economics, Mexico does not tend toward the state capitalism of the totalitarian nations, but toward a loose-formed agrarian syndicalism spiritualized by values of the Mexican ethos with its Indian and Christian depths: depths which no anarchosyndicalist or socialist school possesses.

This is the essence of the matter: the ethical motivation of

[4] A beginning has been made of a market in South America, notably Brazil.

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Lázaro Cárdenas which begins to articulate — gropingly, hazardously — the spirit of his people. Cárdenas left the cornfield of his mother at sixteen, to join the Revolution. He became a cavalry general. His whole life has been spent with military men, and he has surrounded himself with the best of the Army. Nevertheless, violence is alien to him. Since he became President, he is said to have shown anger once: when he learned that Cedillo had been shot. That rebellious General had been in his cabinet for three years. Since we all knew he was plotting, and since Cárdenas is no fool, presumably Cárdenas knew it too. He did not remove him from office. He let Cedillo's plot ripen until Cedillo removed himself. But he did not want him to die — not even, as he did die, in open battle against the Republic. The "new tradition" is against bloodshed, even when it is justified.

The same distrust of violence, even of the violence of isolated "reason," guides Cárdenas in all his ways. The press of Mexico is violently against him. Every week articles appear in the capital that would not shame *Der Stuermer* for violence. Cárdenas suppresses no sheet, big or small. He answers the dangerous attacks with works. He has lifted the violent embargo on the churches. He prefers that the law be broken, and that an illegal number of priests officiate in the cathedrals. Even his attitude toward his own mistakes is that of least resistance. Many of his appointments have not been good; but he prefers to let the wrong men gradually remove themselves from office. He prizes the mood of stability, it seems, more than immediate efficiency. Whether this is a profound gauge of what Mexico needs, or a fatal error, the years will tell. An organic sense of Mexico's growth, not in simple "progress" but in the intricate dialectic of life, appears to control him — often against the obvious precept of reason.

Thus, his extraordinary attitude toward the Presidential succession. Although the present term does not close until December 1940, the fight is on. Cárdenas weighs the danger of not actively supporting some candidate of his own — a man like General Francisco Múgica, who as Minister of Communications has helped him faithfully. If he does not, a man like General Almazán might be brought into power by the disgruntled middle class, the Callistas, and the conservative and Fascist generals. Cárdenas weighs this danger against the resolve in no way to influence the succession to the Presidency; and chooses the latter course.

He said to me: "I trust the people's intuition." He said further:

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"Because our people have always known that their chiefs were imposed on them from above, resentment, cynicism about government, corruption and violence, have lived on in every village." Mexico is to have at last a First Magistrate who does not impose his successor. This outweighs the political advantages for Mexico if Cárdenas kept control at this dangerous moment. He is creating a tradition; within it politics is to be transformed.

These qualities of the man have their defects and their dangers. I have said that the method of Cárdenas is very like the artist's. He governs, as the sculptor models, by intimate touch. But good administration is largely *delegation*. Often it seems that Cárdenas finds too few good men to fulfill his work, to found his "new tradition." Many a friend of Mexico doubts whether the administrative organization that Cárdenas has built will be strong enough to resist the reaction — or the pause — that world events imply for Mexico. There are many good young men in the government: men like Ramón Beteta, Gabino Vázquez, Chavez Orozco, etc. But among their older chiefs, who normally will carry on, many are inferior, even alien to the Revolution. The chief defect of Cárdenas' régime is, perhaps, that he has not inspired enough passionate leaders among the intellectuals who must bring consciousness to the mass devotion he has aroused. Intuition without such conscious leadership can go astray.

Another danger. The artist works with a medium and within an environment that he can, more or less, delimit. Cárdenas works with a country full of subversive forces, and within a hostile world to which his country is dangerously exposed. Reaction at home is geared to reaction abroad. Can the man's shrewd sense of what is Mexico compensate for his helplessness before world forces, and guide the frail young life? An immediate pause, even a temporary reversal, will not necessarily prove the case against him. Perhaps his method, which has appealed to the latent dignity of his people, and strengthened it, will in the end prove the wisest politics because it does in fact create a new tradition. Perhaps his refusal to force his beneficent program against natural inertia will prove the shrewdest insurance against the violent counterblow which the "straight-line" revolutionary tactics of Múgica might provoke.

It is a dangerous course Cárdenas has taken. But it is a dangerous world he lives in. And although his values are of peace, Cárdenas is not a stranger to the strategies of battle.

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CZECHS AND SLOVAKS SINCE MUNICH

By Josef Hanč

THE Czecho-Slovak Republic left by the Munich settlement of September 29, 1938, was destined from the start to be short-lived. At Munich one third of the country's territory and population was amputated and forty percent of its national wealth. Its frontiers were drawn without regard for economics and in a way to make it helpless strategically. It had a chance of becoming a viable state only if it received substantial financial assistance from the Western Powers and if its neighbors refrained from interference for a long period. The Western Powers promised financial help but gave little. Germany never for a moment made more than a pretense of keeping hands off.

After Munich, a new government was formed at Prague under the leadership of Rudolf Beran, the Germanophile head of the dominant Agrarian Party. In foreign policy the Beran government aimed at neutrality and coöperation with Berlin. At home it went a long way to meet most of the National Socialist demands. All anti-Nazi tendencies were suppressed and the Third Reich was given permission to build a highway, with extraterritorial privileges, through the heart of the country. Yet the more the Government of Czecho-Slovakia (after Munich this spelling replaced the old "Czechoslovakia") strove to accommodate itself to the new situation the clearer it became that Berlin intended to impose a more "integral" solution. Over a hundred German ultimata were delivered to the Foreign Minister in Prague in the space of a few months.

The Munich arrangement had left less than 400,000 German-speaking persons scattered among the solid mass of the new Czecho-Slovakia's nine million Slavs. It soon became clear that the German enclaves were entrusted with "a special mission" and also that the Nazis were seeking to break up the new federal union. The Vienna radio station incessantly broadcast anti-Czech propaganda inciting the Slovaks to secede, despite the fact that Slovakia's free status in the federal union met all the important demands of the Slovak autonomists. Prior to Munich, the Republic was a unified state with a National Assembly elected by proportional representation and universal suffrage. The President, chosen by the upper and lower chambers of Parliament in

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joint session, held office for seven years. The Cabinet was responsible to the legislature. The government of the day always depended upon a coalition of five to eight political parties and in the course of the country's twenty years of independence all the major parties had taken part in the government, including the representatives of the Slovaks and the German minority. Only the Communists and the German Nazis had been excluded. Each of the four provinces — Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine — had its own governor and diet, partly elected and partly appointed, and each possessed limited administrative jurisdiction in provincial matters. On October 6, 1938 — little more than a week after Munich — the Slovaks decided to demand autonomy. Czecho-Slovakia was therefore reconstituted as a federal union of three Slavonic peoples — the Czechs, the Slovaks and the Carpatho-Ukrainians. Each was to rule itself according to a new constitution of its own choosing. Only foreign policy, the army and a specified number of economic matters were to fall within federal jurisdiction.

The Reich sought at all costs, however, to prevent the consolidation of any sort of Czecho-Slovak state, and it became only a question of time before another "crisis" was manufactured. To prepare for it the Nazis endeavored to create the impression that Czecho-Slovakia was collapsing from within and that the German Government had been asked to protect the victims of Czech "brutalities" and of "plundering Hussite mobs." They naturally encouraged whatever centrifugal movements could be found in the new federal union, and where these were lacking tried to create them. For several years past the Nazis had been cultivating a small but vociferous group of Slovak separatists — Durčanský, Mach, Murgaš and a few other "new men" hitherto little known to most of the Slovak people. These men, encouraged by the German minority and supported by the Reich, now began to agitate for a sovereign Slovakia, independent of the "second Republic." Obviously this secession would automatically bring about the fall of Czecho-Slovakia by cutting it into three parts.

The first attempt to proclaim the separation of Slovakia was made on March 10. It failed when the federal Government at Prague, with the coöperation of Vice-Premier Sidor (a Slovak, generally regarded as the heir to the patriotic tradition of Father Hlinka), deposed Dr. Tiso, the Catholic priest who was Premier of the Slovak province and who either had acquiesced in the

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separatist movement or had been too weak to resist it. The central Government replaced the Tiso Cabinet with a new one, likewise exclusively Slovak in composition. Finance Minister Teplansky, speaking for the new provincial government, declared that "whoever tries to separate Slovakia from the rest of the country commits high treason against his own people." Berlin was obviously displeased at the bloodless liquidation of what it had hoped would be a revolt. The Nazis ordered Tiso to visit Hitler. They also

asked the President of the Republic to convoke the Slovak Provincial Parliament on Dr. Tiso's return from Germany, in order for it to take decisions concerning the future status of Slovakia. On March 14 the Provincial Parliament duly met at Bratislava in private and protracted session. After three polls the members voted for complete separation from the Czechs. They made the decision only after being told quite plainly that no other decision was acceptable to Germany, and that if they did not agree Germany would divide Slovakia with Hungary, who always had been

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eager to recover Slovak territory lost in 1918. When the news of Slovakia's secession reached Prague, an official farewell message was broadcast over the local station, saying that "the Czechs cherish no hatred or enmity towards their Slovak brothers and from the bottom of their hearts wish them happiness and economic prosperity in independence."

The creation of a separate Slovak state isolated the Ruthenians of Carpathian Ukraine (known under the old Republic as Sub-Carpathian Russia) from the Czechs; consequently the provincial government at Chust had no alternative but to proclaim its independence also. Never has a people declared itself "free" so reluctantly as did the half million Ruthenes of this tiny province. Only two days earlier its spokesman, Economics Minister Klocurak, had declared that "we are going to maintain unity within Czecho-Slovakia in close coöperation with our Czech and Slovak brothers." Now, in pathetic words, their government assured the world that "it wishes to live in peace and harmony with all its neighbors." Premier Volosin thanked the Czechs "for their twenty years of support which helped us to strengthen our national consciousness and cultural progress." The independence of this little state was as short-lived as almost any on record — it lasted only 24 hours. At once Hungarian troops invaded its territory, putting the clock back twenty years, back to where it stood when the Carpatho-Ukrainians appealed to Masaryk to free them from the Magyar yoke and incorporate them in the newly-formed Republic of the Czechs and Slovaks. Today they belong to Hungary. They have been given a vague promise of local autonomy, but since other and more powerful minorities exist in Hungary without autonomous rights, it seems unlikely that the Carpatho-Ukrainians will secure any special privileged position.

There remained Bohemia and Moravia, the most thickly populated provinces of the old Republic, the most advanced culturally and economically, and the most firmly rooted in the democratic tradition. They accounted for 85–90 percent of its productive capacity. Especially in the production of steel and in heavy industry the Czech regions occupied a leading place in Europe. The Slovak and Carpatho-Russian provinces together had only 10 percent of the total bank deposits; their per capita taxes amounted to only 198 crowns, against 564 crowns in Bohemia and Moravia; and of their populations only 13 and 1.1 percent respectively were employed in industry.

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Whatever hopes the Czechs might have clung to that they would be permitted to continue as an independent state, with even nominal independence like that of the new Slovakia, were dashed when the results of President Emil Hacha's "visit" to Berlin became known. Hacha — 67 years old, a devout Roman Catholic, an expert on public law, and former head of the Administrative High Court — had become President after the resignation of Dr. Beneš. President Hacha was summoned to meet Chancellor Hitler on March 14. Accompanied by his daughter and Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky, he was received "with the honors befitting a sovereign head of a state." The external honors having been duly rendered, he was put under terrific pressure during most of the night. Of course no public report was made of his five hours of nocturnal conversation with Hitler and his ministers and generals. But it is said that when President Hacha first heard of what was demanded of him he fainted and had to be revived by a doctor. During the conversations he fainted repeatedly. The decisive factor in compelling him to accept the extinction of the Republic over which he nominally presided was alleged to be the threat that otherwise at 5 A.M. German bombers would appear without warning over Prague and other large centers and kill large numbers of helpless civilians. At 4:30 in the morning on March 15 President Hacha signed the document creating "the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" and placing "the destiny of the Czech people and lands trustfully in the hands of the Fuehrer." Already German motorized troops had crossed the frontiers near the town of Moravská Ostrava, and within a short time seven Reich army units were sweeping across Bohemia and Moravia. When Hacha arrived back in Prague, he was met by the new German military commander of the capital. Swiftly in the footsteps of the invading army followed the Gestapo, who rounded up all "undesirables" (whose names figured on lists previously prepared) and took over all local key positions. Later that same day Hitler arrived at Hradčany Castle, where the Czecho-Slovak flag had been replaced by the swastika. The following day, March 16, the decree creating the Protectorate was officially promulgated.

The thirteen paragraphs of the decree, together with the additional ordinances issued subsequently, determine the new status of Bohemia and Moravia. Though drawn up only 22 hours after the "agreement" between Hitler and Hacha at Berlin, its

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terms were such as a conqueror imposes upon a defeated enemy. It was a unilateral document, signed by Chancellor Hitler, Minister of the Interior Frick, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Herr Lammers. It bore no Czech signatures.

The first paragraph declares that "The territories of the former Czecho-Slovak State occupied by the German troops in March 1939, belong henceforth to the territory of the Great German Reich, and enter under its protection as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia." Although "the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and administers itself," a Reich Protector, appointed by Berlin, is the guardian of the Reich's interests, confirms the members of the Protectorate cabinet, can withdraw confirmation, can veto laws, decrees, administrative measures and legal judgments, can issue orders of his own. Under the terms of this decree the Reich may take over parts of the Protectorate administration and substitute Reich authorities. The Reich may also maintain garrisons and military establishments within the Protectorate. It directly supervises communications and transportation, postal, telegraph and telephone services; it establishes the value of its legal tender, etc. Further, the Protectorate comes within the jurisdiction of the Reich customs authorities. In return, Bohemia and Moravia are given the right to accredit one representative to the Reich Government with the official title of "Minister" (*Gesandte*). According to a later ordinance, issued on June 27, "the Protector can change this decree and thereby the nature of the autonomous status of the provinces whenever common interests warrant. . . . He can also issue whatever orders he thinks necessary if there exists a danger of procrastination."

The Reich Protector's office in Prague is a vast and complex apparatus with 16 divisions. He is assisted by 19 councillors placed in strategic positions throughout Bohemia and Moravia. His activity is supported (and at the same time controlled) by other Reich organs, including military attachés, the Schutzpolizei and the Gestapo. It was imagined at first that the Protector would act as adviser to the autonomous Czech Government and as a friendly coördinator between Prague and Berlin. But this was not the idea of Nazis, who bit by bit have relentlessly extended the scope of German control. The Protector became in practice the exclusive source of legislative and administrative power in the Protectorate. There is little if anything for

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the "autonomous" Government to do. True, the President has his own cabinet, properly cleansed, of course, of all relics of the "old spirit." But he has no voice in important matters; he is a mere helpless bystander. On the other hand, leaders of the old Sudeten Party have been given high offices and wide responsibilities: Konrad Henlein is head of the civil administration and his former aid, K. H. Frank, has been promoted to the rank of State Secretary and entrusted with the duties of chief of police for the Protectorate. Worse choices, from the point of view of preserving tolerable relations between the Czechs and Germans, can hardly be imagined.

Theoretically there are two parallel administrative systems: one for the "autonomous" Czech Government and one for the Protector. In practice, however, the Protector's jurisdiction is omnipotent. The autonomous administration cannot adopt any measure until it has been approved by the Protector's office. The civil administration, police and judiciary of the Reich are superimposed upon the Czech governmental structure, which lives a hand-to-mouth existence on the Protector's sufferance.

According to the decree setting up the Protectorate, "German inhabitants . . . become German nationals [*Staatsangehörige*] and, in accordance with the Reich Citizenship Law of September 15, 1935, Reich citizens [*Reichsbürger*]. The regulations for the protection of German blood and German honor therefore hold valid for them." All the German-speaking inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia are thus under the jurisdiction of Reich laws, whereas the non-Germanic inhabitants are subjects of the Protectorate. Whenever a German is involved in a court action the case comes before one of the judges imported from the Reich. This is especially important in commercial and financial cases, since most business enterprises, particularly the larger ones, are taking on a mixed Czech-German character as a result of the enforced inclusion of German members on their boards of directors and managerial staffs. Moreover, the extension of German laws for the defense of the Reich to the entire territory of the Protectorate makes National Socialist legislation practically supreme. The régime of capitulations, now abolished in Africa and the Near East, has thus been introduced into the heart of Europe and imposed upon a people whose traditions of jurisprudence go back to the thirteenth century.

In municipal matters the Czechs do not fare better. Communal

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government has always been one of their particular prides, and since there is hardly a town with a German majority, municipal administration should by right have been left in Czech hands. Yet the government of cities such as Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Olomouc, Jihlava and České Budějovice has been placed under German officials, depriving over 400,000 citizens of a voice in the government of their municipalities.

The Protector's right to issue decrees as he sees fit makes it simple for him to colonize the Czech provinces and to Germanize their political and economic structure. And while it is not easy to convert a Czech democrat into a German National Socialist, the institutional pattern of Czech social and economic organization can be honeycombed with strategically placed cells from which Nazi pressure can spread under the protective hand of the German authorities. That is why the Germanic inhabitants were given a privileged position. Little concern is shown for the fact that Bohemia and Moravia do not need German colonization, since the density of the population there is appreciably greater per square kilometer than it is in the Reich. A professed Nazi aim is the creation of a great empire in Germany's *Lebensraum*. The subject peoples in this area are expected to rearrange their economic life and accept a new social status to facilitate their integration with German production and consumption. In particular the "feminine" Slavs are to be the toilers while the "masculine" Germans take care of the management. By including the Czechs and the Slovaks within the Reich the Nazis have taken a long step towards realizing this imperial dream.

A good example of how the Nazi domination actually works in the Protectorate is the manner in which the Jewish question has been handled. When the Czech Government, exercising its autonomous rights, refused to introduce the Nuremberg laws, the Protector's office took the matter into its own hands. According to its decree, a business corporation is classified as Jewish even if only one of its members is a Jew. Under this ruling, a third of the textile industry, for instance, became Jewish and subject to expropriation. In the Sudetenland, Jewish property has been transferred to Germans. The fear is that property in the Protectorate taken from Czechs who have fled to refuge abroad or from Jews will be given to Germans rather than to Czechs, for it is not the "autonomous" Czech Government but a Reich office which approves all such transfers.

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The liquidation of Jewish holdings is, in fact, but a part of a much larger process whereby the bigger industrial concerns in the Protectorate, whether all-Czech or mixed, are one after another coming under partial or complete German control and are being integrated within the German four-year self-sufficiency plan. Previously, one third of all Czecho-Slovak products found ready markets in foreign countries, where the trade-mark "Made in Czechoslovakia" enjoyed high repute. Since the Reich now controls the allocation of all foreign exchange for the purchase of raw materials abroad, it possesses a powerful weapon with which to eliminate "undesirable" businesses in the Protectorate. The workers thus thrown out of work are transported to Germany in order to reduce the labor shortage there. Over 100,000 Czechs and Slovaks, including women, were taken there last June.

There are other instances of the deliberate policy by which the material basis of Czech national life is being undermined. One is the recently announced undoing of the land reform. According to a statement made by Konrad Henlein on July 9 at Saaz, 150,000 hectares of land will be taken from the present Czech owners and "restituted" to the former proprietors. Further, all lands and properties formerly belonging to the Czecho-Slovak state and used for national defense are being sequestered. German law stipulates that such objects become the property of the Reich without compensation, except in special cases.

Germany's appropriation of the Czech gold reserves must also be mentioned. By an "agreement" made on March 6, 1939, the Czecho-Slovak National Bank redeemed the currency then in circulation in the Sudetenland (already ceded to Germany) to the extent of 466 million crowns, or 40 million marks. In May the National Bank of Switzerland was "instructed" from Prague to hand over to the Reichsbank gold valued at 50 million Swiss francs, deposited by Czecho-Slovakia for the purpose of supporting credits which had been liquidated in February. The largest part of the Czecho-Slovak gold reserve, however, had been deposited by the Prague National Bank with the Bank for International Settlements at Basel. This money, amounting to £10 million, had been placed in turn by the B.I.S. partly in Basel (4 million) and partly in London (6 million). During May and June it was surrendered to Berlin. Thus, out of the total amount of Prague's reserves (80,915,000 gold dollars) Germany received by these transfers the equivalent of $75,552,000, or 189 million

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marks — enough to cover her trade deficit, at its present rate, for five or six months.

The cultural life of the Czechs, a spontaneous and vigorous growth, has suffered eclipse along with their political and economic rights. Over 2,000 of their periodicals have had to suspend publication. There are at present some 35,000 jobless intellectuals. Czech newspapers may reproduce almost nothing but the official news from Berlin. And not only have the Czechs lost their freedom of press, speech and assembly but also their freedom of movement. The Protectorate is a vast beleaguered fortress which no one can enter or leave without the permission of the Gestapo.

The position of Slovakia differs from that of Bohemia and Moravia in that it does not form an integral part of the Reich, but retains nominal independence. On March 15 Prime Minister Tiso asked Chancellor Hitler to "assume the protection of the Slovak state." The request was granted in a brief telegram the following day. On March 18 a treaty, valid for 25 years, was negotiated at Vienna between the Nazi and Slovak Governments in which the latter received German "protection" and in exchange undertook "always to conduct its foreign policy in close understanding with the German Government." The Slovaks also gave the German armed forces "the right at all times to erect military plants within a zone lying west of the borders of the Slovak State and east of the general eastern ridge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern ridge of the White Carpathians and the eastern ridge of the Javornitz Mountains and to maintain them at a strength deemed necessary. . . ." On August 18 the area open for German military purposes was expanded by a supplementary treaty to cover the whole length of the Slovak-Polish border. During the night of August 28 the German army took complete possession of the whole of Slovakia, introduced Nazi martial law and thereby ended all pretext of Slovak independence. Consequently, the Tiso government was reduced to the status of a rubber stamp for the Reich.

As in the Protectorate, the German minority in Slovakia, numbering around 128,000, constitutes a vanguard for National Socialism in its march south and east. Karmasin, their Fuehrer, described their mission in a speech made at Bratislava in July: "We have declared that we are National Socialists and we must therefore follow the orders of Adolf Hitler and not ask why. It is our duty to respond to his call. He gave us the order to stay where

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we are and to preserve the German character of this land for all future time. It is our duty to be where he placed us and to march where he orders us to go."

A new Slovak constitution was adopted in July 1939. This document describes the country as a Christian National Republic and it permits the existence of only one party. This party, composed chiefly of the followers of the late Father Hlinka, is actually controlled by the former separatists. It has the character of a chartered corporation and is the instrument through which "the Slovak people participate in the government." Every citizen must belong to one of the five "corporations" (agriculture, industry, finance, liberal professions and public service) which have been organized along Fascist lines. The State Council replaces the Senate and is composed of the following: the representatives of the corporations, the delegates of the Hlinka People's Party and of nationality groups, the members of the Cabinet, and the delegates sent by Parliament. Through the different committees of the party the Government is able to exercise absolute control over political, economic and cultural life. The President of Slovakia is elected by Parliament for seven years and his powers resemble those of the head of an authoritarian state.

Slovakia is not a rich country. Of its 2,656,000 inhabitants, 56 percent are engaged in agriculture and forestry. Two thirds of its first budget cannot be met from regular taxes and there is a shortage of domestic capital for new investments. In the past, deficits in Slovakia could be met by drawing on the wealthier Czech provinces: in one form or another the Republic poured something like 17,000,000,000 crowns into Slovakia during its twenty years of existence. At present the only country to which the Slovaks can turn is Germany, thus giving the Nazis an added hold on them. The Slovak has an adaptive mind, an eye for the picturesque; probably he comes nearest to the old and genuine Slav type. He is industrious, but his soul is perpetually in revolt and he will not accept regimentation for long. Behind him lie ten centuries of oppression by the Magyars, twenty years of national growth within the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and only a few months of "independent" statehood under the most unfavorable of circumstances. We have not heard the last of him.

In the years following the World War the world was flooded with revisionist propaganda condemning the organization of Central and Eastern Europe as contrary to Wilson's principle of

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self-determination. At Munich the Nazis stated that they wanted to apply that principle to the Germans of Czecho-Slovakia and that they had no desire to absorb any non-Germans into the Reich. Let us see how the revisionists applied these principles once they were given a free hand. Czecho-Slovakia was arbitrarily dissected into seven parts, each of which was placed under alien rule. When Germany annexed the Sudetenland, she acquired, along with the German population, over 800,000 Czechs. The Vienna arbitral "award" by the Italian and the German Foreign Ministers on November 2, 1938, gave Hungary 272,000 Slovaks. Later Hungary took 102,000 more. When, in early October, Poland marched into the Teschen area in order to "liberate" 77,000 Poles, she also took 123,000 Czechs. On March 15, 1939, Germany forced her protectorate upon more than seven million Czechs, while Hungary absorbed over a half million Carpatho-Ukrainians. Hungary thereby became a country in which 22 percent of the population consists of non-Magyar minorities. In other words, the "liberation" of three and a half million non-Slavs from democratic, liberal Czecho-Slovakia resulted in the subjection of three times as many Slavs to the totalitarianism of the Third Reich or to the feudalism of the Magyar magnates. Neither of these "successor states" recognizes any obligation to protect its minorities. The National Socialist theory of nationalism evidently applies only to Germans.

The gulf dividing the German and Czech peoples is more than a difference in race. Their outlooks on life are diametrically opposed. The Czechs do not understand the Nazi spirit, and they dislike what they do understand; there is no reason to believe that they can be forced by intimidation to grasp it or like it. They think in terms of individual freedom and a bill of rights. They refuse to be looked upon as mere objects occupying space. They resent being constantly told that the space which they have been occupying since the seventh century is not theirs. They regard themselves as a nation with all the attributes of a nation. When President Hacha last spring asked them to join the movement of National Union without distinction of faith, occupation or previous party allegiance they supplied the fitting answer to those who doubted their solidarity — 99.25 percent of all Czechs over twenty years of age became members. Attempts are being made to break up the Union by disintegrating it from within. The Nazis have been flirting with the small group of Czech anti-Semite Fascists. How-

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ever, early this summer even General Gajda with his National Fascist Community entered the National Union and refused to work with these extremists.

The chief task of National Union, the chairman of which is named by the President, is to educate the masses to an understanding of their country's present situation, to preserve the spirit of nationalism, and to deepen the sense of solidarity among the different social classes. It opposes socialism and favors a corporative organization of society. Economic and cultural activities are divided among twelve committees. If it can hold together, it will constitute the most powerful bulwark against the disruptive forces set in motion by the Nazis.

On the whole the Czech people take a broad view of history. They have themselves suffered long periods of subjection, as well as periods of freedom and prosperity. They know that in politics nothing is eternal. They have watched empires rise and fall; they have seen conquerors come and go; they know that what has been done can be undone. Friends of a former day may become friends again. Enemies may weaken. In the meantime they are taking whatever steps are possible to preserve their national identity.

Sympathy has come to them from many directions. The Soviet Union refused to recognize the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia. In Washington, the Under Secretary of State spoke of Czecho-Slovakia's "temporary loss of independence" and described Germany's invasion as an act of "wanton lawlessness." On March 30 the French Chamber of Deputies in plenary session unanimously passed a resolution in which "remembering the noble and courageous protest of the diet of Bohemia against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, it salutes in pain and respect the Czech people, the victims of resurrected imperialism and of violence, and extends to them the expression of its sympathy. The people of Bohemia and Moravia will not perish. Injustice and violence do not last forever." Even Neville Chamberlain declared at Birmingham that his heart went out "in sympathy to the proud and brave people who have so suddenly been subjected to this invasion, whose liberties are curtailed, whose national independence has gone."

The diplomatic representatives of Czecho-Slovakia in the United States, Great Britain, France, Poland, the Soviet Union, Canada, Ireland, Egypt, Palestine, as well as in many other parts of the world, have refused to surrender their legations on the

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German demand. They maintain that the Czecho-Slovak Republic has not legally ceased to live. They claim the right and duty to continue to represent its moral and legal identity. The Government of the United States has not denied that right to the Czecho-Slovak Minister in Washington. And other great Powers have taken the same stand. Simultaneously with the announcement of the position adopted by the Czecho-Slovak diplomatic corps, and encouraged by the steadfastness of Dr. Beneš, the chief organizations of Czechs living abroad, and with them many Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians, have organized themselves into national councils and now are once again engaged in the struggle, the second within a generation, to free their country from a foreign yoke.

The watchword of the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia is to remain faithful to their national tradition, not to waste energy in futile dissensions, to stand firmly by whatever minimum rights are left to them, and to be prepared for any emergency. They are not unaware of the gravity of their situation. The Nazis will grind down and depopulate and exile and expropriate as the Hapsburgs never dreamed of doing. For the moment the Czechs and Slovaks cannot count on more than academic sympathy from abroad. Yet the world cannot forever be deaf to their cause. Until they are free again Europe will not know real peace. Meantime, while awaiting the new hour of national freedom, the Czech people takes solace in its centuries-old tradition of democratic self-discipline and finds protection in the imperviousness of its national spirit to foreign doctrines.

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AUSTRALIA'S DEFENSE PROBLEM

By Tyler Dennett

BECAUSE Australia and New Zealand belong to the British Empire they must always risk being involved in any disturbance of the international peace almost as much as England herself. And because numerically speaking they are small countries — New Zealand has only a million and one half population, and although Australia calls itself a continent it has less than seven millions — they must find difficulty in defending themselves against a determined major Power without very substantial help from the British Navy and British wealth. Both the spirit and the letter of the Covenant of the League of Nations suited Australia and New Zealand. They liked the ingenious scheme of the "C" Mandates, the prospect of disarmament, the faint hope for freer markets in which to sell their produce, and the comforting thought that any threat to their security would be a matter of international concern. They were on the receiving end of the benefits of the League of Nations. But the events of each recent year made the League shield less and less real.

Whether Australia and New Zealand have all the attributes of nationality is a point as hotly disputed as is the precise nature of their legal statehood under the Statute of Westminster of December 1931. Some persons resent the suggestion of nationality separate from "Home" as sharply as others defend it. Early this summer there was little public sentiment for joining forces, as in 1914, with Britain and sending several hundred thousands of troops to Europe; there was a notable absence of the famous "Anzac" enthusiasm which displayed itself so bravely at Gallipoli. Some of the older people predicted that if war should come there would be a revival of the old spirit. A statement by Prime Minister Menzies in the press of August 23 seemed to indicate that public sentiment was already turning in that direction. But the most that Australia and New Zealand had been contemplating, so far as one could judge from the official statements, was defense of their own territories.

Towards Europe the prevailing tone of public opinion has probably been even more isolationist than in America. On the other hand, neither Australia nor New Zealand has ever undertaken the full duties of statehood for neither has ever really faced the ques-

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tion of independent self-defense. Deficient both in wealth and in man power, intent on creating south of the Equator a new heaven and a new earth wherein will abide such social righteousness as elsewhere only prophets dream of, both countries have been well content to leave the direction of foreign policy to Downing Street and the responsibility for their protection to the British Admiralty (with the exception that Australia has for years maintained a small navy and New Zealand has made annual contributions for the expense of the British naval force in the South Pacific).

Recent years brought great public bewilderment in both countries. The vision of collective security passed; and in September 1938 there was not a single British battleship east of Suez (although Japan had nine). The foreign policy of Downing Street, which the public had viewed with vast unconcern so long as it was conciliatory toward Japan, a good customer, turned out to be a policy that might involve them in a war in which, for the first time in their history, they might have actually to face an invader. Such a war, too, would create a disturbance in overseas commerce which might cause them grave disasters. And a Japan dominant in the Pacific would be unlikely to remain content either with the immigration or the tariff laws of Australia and New Zealand.

Public opinion in Australia and New Zealand in the spring of 1939 was something as follows. Like other human beings, Australians and New Zealanders wanted to have it not merely both ways but all ways. They were determined to retain the mandated islands, and they were determined to maintain, even to lift, their standard of living. That standard has already so increased production costs that they have difficulty in disposing of their primary produce other than wool. They desired a protected market in Britain, access to loans, the protection of the British Navy. They also required friendly relations with Japan and China, both good customers, and they wanted to sell in the United States and Canada at least enough to pay for their American motor cars, which they prefer to British makes. They would like still better to make their own motor cars, but they cannot secure the advantages of mass production with their present limited domestic market. Proposals for increased immigration left them very cool, even though the population rate is stationary; for they cannot tolerate the thought of a possibly lower standard of living. As for the Empire, they were able to become very sentimental about it;

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but they wanted to be left with complete liberty to amplify their program of social experimentation in ways which would be far beyond their means if they were to take over anything like full responsibilities for self-defense. The Labor groups, which have been most opposed to the new defense measures, sneer habitually at British imperialism; but they demanded the protection of the British Navy both for themselves and also for the mandated islands.

Lacking the collective security promised by the Covenant, and uncertain of the degree of support which they may expect from the Admiralty, Australians and New Zealanders almost without exception have expected confidently that American naval forces would come to their defense in their possible day of need. Probably they have failed to realize that Australia and New Zealand have granted better tariff rates under reciprocity agreements to both Japan and to Germany than to the United States. Nor has there appeared to them any notable inconsistency in the fact that while they have been strongly opposed to conscription even for defense, the United States, if she were at war with Japan and came to their protection, would undoubtedly have to enforce the draft. For many years New Zealand and Australia have resembled the radical sons of wealthy parents. In both countries one heard the sort of petulant expressions that are associated with children who have been overindulged.

An important factor in the security of Australia and New Zealand both before and after the World War was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For obvious reasons, therefore, public opinion there did not receive the results of the Washington Conference with pleasure. Many were rather bitter about it even recently, regarding it not so much the symbol as the instrument of their political undoing. Relations with Japan continued friendly until British manufacturers reminded Australia of her Empire obligations, whereupon Australia quite unceremoniously so nearly excluded Japanese goods that Japan slapped an embargo on Australian wool to remind the Australians that they must also "buy Japanese" if they wished to continue cordial relations with Japan.

The full significance of the disintegration of the League system of security was only slowly apprehended. Whatever discontent may have existed had slight opportunity for expression. Public discussions of foreign policy are not particularly encouraged in

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either country. Until recently the newspapers generally have followed the lead from Downing Street. It has been asserted, and denied, that the Australian Government implored London not to impose sanctions on Japan in 1931–32. The prevailing opinion at the time was that the Japanese excursion into Manchuria might operate to confine Japanese ambitions to that area and thus provide a safeguard to the British possessions farther south. Certainly it was the desire of both Australia and New Zealand to conciliate rather than to antagonize Japan. Labor partisans were not particularly displeased then and later to see British imperialism humiliated on the China coast. In the successive stages of the League's decay public opinion was still reluctant to recognize that anything important was at stake for Australia and New Zealand.

Quite apart from the habit of leaving foreign policy questions to be settled in London, and apart from the traditional faith in the British Navy, there was, perhaps, a special reason why the governments were so reluctant to face the facts. Both countries were preoccupied, first with the depression and then with their ever-widening programs of social and economic reforms. The broad influence of the Russian Revolution and of the specific postwar social reforms in England are easily observable in the growing power of the Labor parties. Labor in power carried on with vigor and Labor out of power was still strong enough to ensure that the party in office would occupy itself with expensive programs of social benefits. In general, Labor has been antimilitaristic and therefore opposed to measures of military defense, the more so because money spent for that purpose would not be available for social purposes. Just how important is the hostility of Labor to military preparations is difficult to know; but certainly the governments now in power have been handling the proposed defense measures with great delicacy. Defense has been a thorny subject for a politician.

II

The Australians like to call their land a continent. It is about the size of the United States and somewhat similar in shape. Its large centers and most of its productive areas lie in a narrow belt along the eastern and southeastern seaboard. Brisbane, Newcastle, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth are, roughly, as Boston, Baltimore, Charleston, Key West, New Orleans and San Diego. Hobart, at the southern end of Tasmania, is an overnight

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voyage from Melbourne, the nearest city on the main continent. Port Darwin, an essential air base now being developed as a naval depôt, lies on the northern coast. About half the population is urban. Back of the relatively narrow strip having more or less adequate rainfall lie grazing lands which support one sheep to each two, five or ten acres, and desert which supports nothing at all. The northern part of Australia is within the tropics, which thus far the white man can hardly claim to have conquered. Internal communications, except by air, are poor. The roads around the coast are fair, but on the railways no less than four different gauges are in use. In general, the resulting defense problem is out of proportion to Australia's wealth, population, and present state of industrial development. There is an almost complete deficiency of oil, nitrates, aluminum, rubber, nickel, chromite, potash, phosphates and mercury. There is no dry dock adequate for the repair of battleships. However, Australia has two shipyards which have built merchant vessels up to 9,000 tons gross displacement and naval vessels of 6,000 tons. The government owns and operates two or three relatively small munitions factories.

The geographical factors in New Zealand are in some respects more favorable for defense but in general the task involved is equally out of proportion to the country's resources.[1] Lying 1,200 miles east of Australia, and in many ways of less importance to an enemy, New Zealand is not a likely object of attack at the outbreak of a war. The Dominion is composed of two large islands. The population is about half urban and lives mainly in and around four coastal cities — Auckland and Wellington in the north island, and Christchurch and Dunedin in the south. The first two ports face west and the other two east.

The value of the Singapore Base for the defense of Australia and New Zealand is at least open to debate. There are two schools of thought, the official Admiralty school which is accepted by the Australian and New Zealand governments in all public statements as to policy, and an unofficial Australian school which expresses itself chiefly in private. The official thesis is that Singapore is impregnable. But many doubt both its impregnability and its ability to offer efficient protection to the British domains in the South Pacific. A good deal of professional opinion in Australia seems to incline to this latter view, which also is held in

[1] There is to be considered also the defense of New Guinea and Western Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia, Nauru and British Borneo.

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private by at least some people in high official position. It is known that many British naval and military authorities disapproved of Singapore from the very beginning — Admiral Sir Percy Scott, Admiral Dewar, General Sir Ian Hamilton, Admiral Mark Kerr and Lord Strabolgi all criticized it more or less severely. The location was chosen by Admiral Jellicoe as part of a scheme in which a very large British fleet would be stationed permanently in the Indian-Pacific area. It was not intended as a base to which other forces could be diverted in case of need. In the original plan it would be adequately held by a fleet capable of getting command of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. Recently, critics assert, there has been no British fleet east of Suez capable of commanding the two oceans, and the changed political situation in the Mediterranean means that (until Simonstown in South Africa, is improved) there is no first class supporting base nearer than England.

In a word, the equation of defense has changed materially since the adoption of the Singapore plans. "The changes that have occurred make one wonder," remarked a distinguished Australian statesman who still holds important office, "whether the official British mind has made the necessary accommodation. In every way Singapore is an advanced base thrust far from supporting bases, far into alien territory, in an unhealthy climate; yet not near enough to British interests in the Pacific to protect them without a fleet adequate to fight and beat the Japanese fleet. The limited number of ships that could be detached would be tied to a defense rôle." Singapore is 1,577 nautical miles from Ceylon, 1,440 miles from Hong Kong and 1,902 miles from Port Darwin; it is 2,900 miles from Yokohama, 1,314 miles from Manila and 2,080 miles west of the line between Yokohama and Sydney.

The well-informed understand (although the facts have been withheld from the public generally) that in the event of a war in which England was engaged both in Europe and in the Far East, no battleships would be sent to Singapore until after the German pocket battleships had been disposed of. The official estimate appears to be that at least two months would elapse before adequate reinforcements could reach that base. Australia has never contributed a sixpence toward its expenses.

Accepting the theory that there certainly will be considerable delay after the outbreak of war in reënforcing Singapore, another well-informed civilian who has devoted much time to the study of

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the strategical problems of the Far East, and whose conclusions have the support of some naval opinion, argues that in the first stage of a war involving Japan, the latter would be at a disadvantage — a hostile China and a hostile Russia on one flank, a formidable American naval force with undisclosed intentions on the other. The Dutch forces in Borneo, Java and Sumatra certainly would not be friendly. On the high seas would be a large Japanese merchant fleet which would require protection. Russia has airplanes and submarines at Vladivostok; China could give an unmeasured amount of trouble. While the British naval forces east of Suez lack battleships, about half of the total tonnage of the British Navy is said to be in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This force includes a large number of submarines and many of the so-called Washington cruisers, ships of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns. In the early months of war Japan would be very fully occupied in protecting her merchant fleet and in safeguarding her communications with Korea, Manchuria, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Formosa and her mandated islands. Remembering how much tonnage was required during the World War to protect the Channel routes from England to France, imagine how much more would be needed to guard the communications from Yokohama and Kobe with China, Formosa and the other ports and submarine bases. Hong Kong is now merely an outpost; it will be defended as long as possible, after which Britain will retire to Singapore.

Now while it is true that under modern conditions of warfare Hong Kong cannot easily be held against a determined enemy in command of the sea, in possession of the surrounding mainland and attacking in force, nevertheless it cannot be taken in a day. And until it is in Japan's possession she will hardly be in a position to invest Singapore. It seems unlikely, then, that either Australia or New Zealand would be exposed to sudden invasion. It is equally unlikely that their coasts and ports would escape some bombing and that their external communications would remain unscathed. In these two respects both countries are highly vulnerable. Coastal defenses are meagre and inadequate and both countries are extremely dependent on their foreign commerce. Many essential wartime supplies they must secure entirely abroad.

III

Thus far we have attempted to select and examine certain salient facts in a speculative situation. Our reasonable conclusion

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is that the defense of Australia and New Zealand is difficult. Now let us see what the two countries are prepared to do for themselves.

On December 6, 1938, Brigadier G. A. Street, Australian Minister for Defense, expounded to the Commonwealth Parliament at Canberra the plans which, to use his language, had as their objective "to defend the Commonwealth against territorial aggression." It will be immediately observed that the objective as defined was narrow as compared with that in 1914. The actual military man power of Australia was estimated in 1933 at about 950,000 between the ages of 18 and 35. About two thirds of these are either unmarried or widowers without children. Another 972,000 are available between the ages of 35 and 60. Australia, like New Zealand, has a compulsory military training law but it was suspended many years ago and the Lyons Government in its election campaign, baited by the leader of the Labor Party, made a public pledge not to revive it. Australia has been depending on a voluntary militia which receives twelve days of camp training a year. Last year the militia stood at about 35,000. The new program called for an increase to 70,000, and in February an old-time recruiting campaign was inaugurated. It is understood that the military authorities asked for only 60,000, which was as many as could be trained and equipped at the moment. But the number of recruits set in the higher goal was obtained. This force is not available for use outside the country except as the enlisted men, individually, consent to go. In this connection it is presumed, though not expressly stated, that mandated New Guinea would be regarded as within Australian territory.

Mr. Street explained to Parliament that the basis of Australian land defense plans is "the presence at Singapore of a fleet adequate to give security to our sea communications. This fleet would provide a threat to the communications of the enemy from any part of the world bent upon the invasion of Australia, and either deter him from aggression, or be able to defeat him should he undertake such an operation." This is a fairly brave assumption.

The expanded program for land defense involved, roughly, a doubling of expenditures for three years, a considerable part of which is for rearmament — the accumulation of stores, the development of secondary industries, and the manufacture of small arms. Mr. Street was careful to point out that of the total defense budget only 18 percent was to be spent outside Australia. This

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was considered an important political consideration in meeting the opposition of the Labor Party. The air force is being expanded and, as with munitions, provision is being made for increased reserves for the local manufacture of aircraft. Some emergency purchases are being made in the United States. Eventually it is hoped that Australia will possess an aircraft industry able to supply New Zealand and other British territories in the Pacific. To what extent this is feasible remains to be seen.

In matters of naval defense Australia has in the past been less neglectful. Whether for that reason, or because the Labor Party opposed naval appropriations on the ground that they were likely to be used for the defense of British imperialism elsewhere, the new naval program, although revealing larger aggregate expenditures for the navy, involved proportionately smaller increases than for land defense. The naval force in 1938 consisted of two Washington cruisers, one light modern cruiser, one old light cruiser, one flotilla leader and four destroyers, two escort vessels and one seaplane carrier. To this is being added two more Washington cruisers purchased in England, more escort vessels, some modern torpedo boats and a surveying ship. Attention is also being given to harbor defenses. Australia would like at least one battleship but does not feel that she can afford it.

The cost of the total three-year program was estimated at 63,000,000 Australian pounds, a figure to be compared with the modest 3,200,000 pounds spent for defense in 1931–32. It is expected that the new program will be further expanded to bring the total up to at least 78,000,000 pounds. At that figure one year's expenditure will amount to about 26,000,000 pounds, or more than a quarter of the total budget of 93,136,000 pounds for the year 1938–39.

The bitter opposition to conscription, not confined exclusively to the Labor groups, expressed itself also in opposition to a compulsory national register. The value of a voluntary register is questionable, but the Government in February yielded to Labor pressure and voted to adopt it. Quite recently the Labor unions officially declined to have anything to do even with a voluntary register. Many think that the attitude of the Labor Party toward defense measures would be different if a Labor Government were in power, a not impossible contingency in the near future, for the Menzies Ministry, which came into office on

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the death of the lamented and loved Prime Minister, Mr. J. A. Lyons, is far from secure.

The New Zealand situation is somewhat different. As a Labor Government is in office, defense measures are in the hands of those who otherwise probably would oppose them. New Zealand has always depended on the British Admiralty for naval protection and has made annual contributions to it. As in Australia, compulsory military training was discontinued some years ago and there is no disposition to revive it. The new budget includes substantial increases for defense but the total is well below 10 percent of the entire budget. Even less than Australia has New Zealand relished the idea of providing troops for the defense of British interests outside her territorial boundaries. On the other hand, the New Zealanders did not respond to the idea put forward shortly before the Munich crisis that they might contribute to the appeasement policy by returning Western Samoa to Germany. In New Zealand the writer observed some discouragement, especially among the young men. To them defense appeared so far beyond their means that to attempt it seemed futile. Furthermore the Munich policy so failed to respond to the heroic sense natural to youth that they viewed the future with slight enthusiasm. In April a Pacific Defense Conference was held in Wellington, at which British and Australian representatives conferred with members of the New Zealand Government. The fact that the conference was held in such an off-center location indicated to some a British desire to bring the difficulties of the defense problem home to a government which has been much preoccupied with very radical and expensive social reforms.

Up until the startling announcement of the Soviet-Nazi agreement all defense measures in Australia and New Zealand had been predicated on two assumptions: one, that Japan would be the enemy; and, two, that she would be opposed to Britain either as an ally of the Axis Powers or at a time when Germany and Italy were so threatening Britain in Europe that the latter would be unable to move any considerable naval force to Asiatic waters. These assumptions account in part for the fact that in recent years there was no plan or intention in Australia or New Zealand to send an expeditionary force to Europe as was done in 1914. It was felt that whatever man power the Dominions possessed should be conserved for defense and not risked on a long ocean voyage with inadequate convoys. The Russian agreement

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with Germany promptly had its effect on Japanese policy. At the moment of writing it seems unlikely that Japan will take the side of the Axis Powers. On the other hand, remembering the bitter Anglo-Japanese conflict of the past few months in China, it seems unlikely that Japan, even detached from Germany and Italy, will free Australia and New Zealand of all grounds for apprehension.

Persons in government positions in Australia and New Zealand have been careful to refrain from any statements which would appear to imply that the United States has made any commitments in the Pacific. But in presenting his budget in December last the Minister for Defense declared: "The people of Australia have the fullest appreciation that British seapower is the essential basis of the security of the Empire. We look to Britain in an emergency to station at Singapore a fleet of sufficient strength to safeguard Empire interests in the Eastern Hemisphere." Then, after reasserting his faith that Britain's naval strength is satisfactory, he added: "If Britain is confronted with an alliance, there is no reason to believe that she would lack powerful allies." Mr. Street's statement, read against the background of such American news as reaches the Australian and New Zealand papers, was probably understood as a veiled reference to what is actually a confident popular hope. And he may be right.

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THE GERMANY OF TREITSCHKE

By Raymond J. Sontag

POLITIK. By Heinrich von Treitschke. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897–98, 2 v.

IT HAS been a persistent source of irritation to Englishmen, and on occasion to Americans, that the Germans have almost invariably deserted from the army of liberalism. True, for a brief moment in the middle of the last century — when Metternich was forced to flee for his life and the old absolutism was everywhere under attack — Anglo-Saxons thought that Germany might reform. Then when liberal prospects seemed brightest the German people supinely surrendered their freedom to Bismarck in exchange for the pottage of political unity. In the years that followed, the language used by Englishmen to express their disgust and hatred for Bismarck was even more vivid than that later hurled at Adolf Hitler. Still, they did not entirely give up hope: when Bismarck went, they argued, all would be well. But after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, British expectations were again dashed: a few years of the erratic rule of William II made men sigh for the Iron Chancellor.

Even these repeated disappointments failed to daunt the more sanguine among British liberals. This charitable attitude is well illustrated by Sir Edward Grey's reaction to Treitschke's books with which he became acquainted only in 1914. Though he found them appalling — "every ideal except that of force is abolished" — and though he was quite willing to believe that Treitschke spoke for the rulers of Germany, Grey refused to believe that the German people as a whole were so bad. "The rest of the Germans are people more akin to ourselves than any other race," he wrote.[1] Three years later, Woodrow Wilson was to draw the same distinction between the evil rulers and the good people of Germany.

During the early postwar years the Anglo-Saxon optimists seemed vindicated. Then came Adolf Hitler, and the old refrain was taken up once more. In December 1938, Neville Chamberlain asserted that his dealings with Nazi Germany showed faith, not in the Nazis, but in history: ". . . the complete subordination of individual independence to something which is

[1] G. M. Trevelyan: "Grey of Fallodon." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937, p. 308.

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called the State but which really only means those who for the time being rule the State, would be insupportable because it runs counter to all our most fundamental conceptions of the framework of human society." He argued, however, that this was no reason for refusing to have contact with the authoritarian states. "History teaches us that no form of government ever remains the same."

Optimism is usually an amiable vice, but in politics, as Machiavelli pointed out in an age very like our own, "leave it to time" may be a dangerous maxim, "for time, driving all things before it, may bring with it evil as well as good." And a hundred years, even in the history of nations, is a long time. During the century just past, the "fifty mad professors at Frankfurt" whom Disraeli denounced gave place to "the crazy minister at Berlin," as Palmerston called Bismarck. And Bismarck was followed by William II, who, Lord Salisbury thought, "must be a little off his head." Today we are left to contemplate the future. One war to save democracy led to the substitution of Adolf Hitler for the Kaiser. Would another such war produce — a liberal Germany? If the past has lessons to teach, we shall not be too confident. Perhaps, as the outstanding statesmen and writers of Germany have constantly reiterated during the past century, the German people believe that the liberal creed is not adapted to them. And indeed, is it not possible that they are right? At any rate, we may profitably listen to what they have to say on the matter.

Heinrich von Treitschke, the professor who so terrified Grey and other Anglo-Saxons from 1914 to 1918, is well suited to be our guide. He was the mentor of countless German university students from 1858 to his death in 1896, and throughout most of those years his favorite course of lectures dealt with politics. He had hoped eventually to distill the essence of these lectures into a definitive work on political science. But this hope he never realized. In 1897, however, his lectures were edited from the notes of his students and were published as his "Politik." It was not until the World War that there appeared an English translation — to which Arthur Balfour and A. Lawrence Lowell contributed introductions.[2] President Lowell contented himself with some general remarks about Treitschke's "many startling conclusions." Mr. Balfour, like Sir Edward Grey, was shocked by

[2] New York: Macmillan, 1916, 2 volumes. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent citations will refer to this edition of the "Politics."

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Treitschke's immorality: "His Utopia appears to be a world in which all small States have been destroyed, and in which the large States are all either fighting, or preparing for battle."[3]

Born in 1834, the son of a Saxon general of Czech descent, Treitschke's formative years were spent in the atmosphere of alternating hope and despair which preceded and followed the revolution of 1848. Before the revolution, German nationalists had been liberals in the sense in which Englishmen understood that word, and the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 had been filled with men who looked to England for guidance and inspiration. By the time Treitschke began the usual tour of universities, the revolution had been crushed, and the liberal nationalists were in exile or living in discouraged silence. The disillusionment of his friends, and his own growing deafness, tempted the young student to seek refuge in the life of a poet. Even his poetry, however, was saturated with political conflict, and he soon took up the teaching of history and politics at Leipzig. These early writings when read today seem confused and contradictory: now he preaches the liberal doctrines of individualism and cosmopolitanism; now he proclaims the necessity for a strong Prussian army to smash the internal and foreign enemies of German nationalism. At the time, these contradictions were an asset because the same confused aspirations were present in the minds of most young German nationalists. His students revered him as a prophet. The Saxon authorities, however, naturally objected to a professor who urged Prussia's conquest of the lesser German states, including Saxony, and in 1863 he was glad to move to Freiburg in more nationalist Baden. Again he won the ardent support of his students. By 1866 his fame was so great that Bismarck sought his services as a scholarly press agent in the impending war with Austria, offering the hope of a professorship at the University of Berlin as a reward. Treitschke was tempted, and not only because a post at Berlin meant financial security and professional recognition. He was a nationalist, and he felt that Bismarck was setting out to unify Germany in the only possible way — by the Prussian battalions. But Bismarck was ruling Prussia in defiance of the constitution, and a believer in constitutional government like Treitschke could not serve such a master. He therefore refused the offer. When, however, war came and Baden sided with Austria, he resigned his post at Freiburg. The contradictions in

[3] I, xxvii, xliv.

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his thought had driven him to the sidelines in the great struggle which was to determine the future of Germany.

The success of Prussia in the Seven Weeks' War, and the partial unification of Germany which Bismarck carried through in 1867, ended Treitschke's doubts. In the latter year he returned to Baden as a professor at Heidelberg, and thereafter he was an unquestioning supporter of the Iron Chancellor. In flaming essays he prepared the German people for war with France, steeled their courage during the war when it came, and prepared their minds for the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles and for the Peace of Frankfurt in 1871.

The completion of political unity was not the end of the story for Treitschke. Germans, he believed, still lacked the spiritual unity, the self-confidence, and the zest for new achievements which characterized the peoples of older states like England. Eagerly, he set out to remedy these defects in the national character. To stimulate pride in the past glories of his country he undertook to write a "History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century" which he had carried to 1848 at the time of his death. In the columns of the *Preussische Jahrbücher* and from his seat in the imperial Reichstag he attacked the enemies of German greatness and exhorted his countrymen to new endeavors. In 1874 he received the coveted call to the University of Berlin. There, as earlier at Leipzig, Freiburg and Heidelberg, he drew crowds to his lectures. Old men waited at the door long before the lectures began, in the hope of getting a seat; more hardy souls listened outside to the raucous, half-strangled voice of the deaf speaker; and newspapers faithfully reported his words.

Adulation there was aplenty, but it was not won by the methods of a sycophant, as Arthur Balfour suggested in his introduction to the "Politics." This became evident after Bismarck's fall, when Treitschke heaped scorn on the new advisers of William II. Other enemies he had in great number — Socialists, Jews, social reformers, capitalists — all of whom he attacked in language as memorable as it was virulent. In combat with foes at home he was tireless; yet the foreign jibes at his narrow patriotic tone he shrugged aside: "But even the foreign world will some day have to accustom itself to the sentiments of New Germany."[4] Even in his last years, when his eyes failed him, he continued to cry out of the silent darkness against the slothful opulence which, he

[4] "History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century." New York: 1915–19, v. V, p. 611.

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felt, was corrupting the heroic simplicity of German life. His last speech, delivered a year before his death in 1896, was such a castigation of national weaknesses that Germany's enemies were glad to quote it against her in 1914.

Treitschke intended that his "Politics," like all his teaching and writing, should intensify the — to him — insufficient national pride of his countrymen. One evidence of national weakness was the vogue of western, and particularly British, political thought in Germany. Dazzled by the prestige of political economists like Adam Smith and political philosophers like Jeremy Bentham, Germans talked about natural law, the contractual basis of sovereignty, the self-evident natural rights of the individual citizen and the brotherhood of man. The British, Treitschke warned his hearers, had not taken these ideas too seriously themselves. "England, in her rôle of advocate for Liberalism, set all Europe by the ears, and under cover of the latent discontents which she herself had fostered, she conquered half the world."[5] But in the process England herself absorbed some of the poisonous doctrines she was disseminating; as a result, the Merry England of earlier centuries had been converted into a drab and decadent land where only a tradesman could be happy. Treitschke warned that if the Germans were to escape a similar fate, they must forsake fallacious alien teachings. The foundations of a true art of politics, he declared, had been laid in eighteenth-century Germany by such teachers as Herder. On these foundations he would build.

Politics, Treitschke argued, must always remain an art. This did not mean, however, that experience should be disregarded. On the contrary, the weakness of British thought arose precisely from its reliance on abstract theory, while the strength of German thought was its refusal to consider anything which was not supported by the lessons of history. Politics was really applied history. But no two historical situations were alike, and therefore the political scientist could never hope to prophesy with the same accuracy with which the natural scientist could foretell the results of an experiment. History could warn against actions which had invariably proved disastrous. History could provide working principles of action: the statesman must study the trends of history if he was to hope for success. But the margin of error would always be great. ". . . for the real point is to understand

[5] II, 585.

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how the Divine plan has unfolded itself little by little in all the variety of actual existence."[6]

Using all history as his laboratory, Treitschke set out to discover the nature of the state. Was the state born, and did it live, in accordance with "the laws of nature and nature's God?" Experience, he contended, provided no evidence to support the doctrine of natural law. Of the innumerable states known to history, no two had been alike; each possessed an individual character, determined in every case by time, place and environmental circumstance. Were governments instituted among men to secure the inalienable rights of their citizens, and were they subject to revolution if these rights were not secured? Again, Treitschke argued, history knew nothing of such rights or of such governments. With unimportant exceptions — which, examined closely, proved not to be exceptions — states had grown up as the expression, the essential outward form, of a national society. To Treitschke, the conclusion was obvious. Far from being a mechanism to be set up, altered or dismantled at will, the state was a living personality, "the most supremely real person, in the literal sense of the word, that exists."[7] History was the biography of states, the story of the strength and weakness, the virtues and sins, the achievements and tragedies of collective personalities.

A reader trained in Anglo-Saxon traditions of statecraft, and therefore contemptuous of philosophical abstractions, will naturally be most skeptical as to the validity of Treitschke's reasoning. Nevertheless, think of them what we will, the consequences of his conclusions are, in practice, far-reaching. If it be granted that states are, as he maintained, "thoroughly capable of bearing responsibility and blame," the statesman is no longer bound by the code of private morality; his actions become good or bad as they advance or injure the interests of the state. "The statesman has no right to warm his hands with smug self-laudation at the smoking ruins of his fatherland, and comfort himself by saying 'I have never lied;' this is the monkish type of virtue."[8]

There are further consequences. For the individual, the law of self-preservation has numerous exceptions: life may be sacrificed for family, for country, for God. Above the state, however, is God

[6] II, 619.
[7] I, 17.
[8] I, 17, 104.

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alone. For Treitschke, history is "the objectively revealed Will of God, as unfolded in the life of the State."[9] If the state is not merely a person, but a God-directed person, then for it there is no exception to the law of self-preservation. And to live means to be strong. With wearisome emphasis, Treitschke insisted that power was the first need and the distinguishing characteristic of the state. He believed that all the resources of the state — physical, intellectual and moral — contributed to the reservoir of national power. But the reservoir itself was the army. As the expression of national power, the army must be truly national, recruited by compulsory universal service. A professional army, no matter how highly trained, would not suffice; such an army did not gather up and intensify the strength of the state. The lack of universal service in England, in his opinion, explained "the want of chivalry in the English character, which strikes the simple fidelity of the German nature so forcibly." A national army is a civilizing instrument in time of peace; in war it is essential, because in modern war all the resources of the state must be thrown into action. The sublimity of war follows from the fact that the battlefield is the ultimate test of national character. "Brave peoples alone have an existence, an evolution or a future; the weak and cowardly perish, and perish justly. The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it is simply foolish to desire the suppression of their rivalry." Since the great national personalities can suffer no compelling power superior to themselves, and since history will always be in constant flux, some nations declining, some growing in power, war must be accepted as part of the divinely appointed order. And as a corollary, it must be obvious that "the large state is the nobler type," while absence of power "accounts for the undeniably ridiculous element which we discern in the existence of a small State."[10]

Such were the practical consequences of the belief that the state is "the most supremely real person, in the literal sense of the word, that exists." What lessons did these truths, founded on historical experience, hold for Germany?

Before the nineteenth century, Treitschke maintained, the teeming resources of Germany had been wasted by statesmen who refused to recognize that the state was a living personality. With mingled anger and pathos he traced the errors of the

[9] I, 13.
[10] I, 34–35; II, 394–96.

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mediæval emperors and the Hapsburgs. As early as the seventeenth century, he believed, it was obvious that Prussia alone was true to the Germanic genius; in the march of subsequent events "we see the secret forces of Nature themselves at work, for Prussia's Crown was not always a willing agent." At last men appeared who could read the message of history — William I, Bismarck and Roon. They imposed the Prussian, the truly German, stamp on the other German states; they created a state capable of guiding, controlling, encouraging the tumultuous strength of German society which had hitherto been dissipated.[11]

Treitschke saw nevertheless that there was still much to be done before the national character of Germany would be fully developed. Remnants of provincialism persisted. Worse, the old cosmopolitanism was still strong: Catholics still gave political as well as religious loyalty to Rome, while workmen were seduced by international Jewish Socialism. The Jew found even more dangerous opportunities in the rise of urban commerce and industry: trade knew no frontier, and since the Jew knew no fatherland, he turned instinctively to trade. Jews had always fostered the disintegration of nations, Treitschke believed. They must not be permitted to undermine the hard-won unity of Germany. If the German Jews could not make up their minds to forget what Treitschke described as their international loyalties, a wave of anti-Semitism was inevitable. Until the Jew had made his decision, the German must be constantly on guard against corruption through the Jewish press or through Jewish artists. "Whenever he finds his life sullied by the filth of Judaism the German must turn from it, and learn to speak boldly about it." [12]

Abroad, too, Treitschke pointed out his country's duties. In this age of great states, Germany must expand if she was not to see the world dominated by "the Russian knout or the English money bags." On the Continent, there remained only one task: to obtain control over the mouths of the German Rhine. Holland need not be annexed — a customs union would suffice. Such a union, by opening the Dutch coast, would enlarge Germany's window to the sea. Sea power was the indispensable prelude to colonial power; it was also a good in itself for the sea helped strengthen national morale. "This Germany of ours was once the greatest of the Sea Powers, and, God willing, so she will be again."

[11] II, 359 ff.
[12] I, 298–302.

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Holland, he continued, also had a colonial empire, and this, added to the colonies of Germany, would serve as a basis for further expansion. We must "see to it that the outcome of our next successful war must be the acquisition of colonies by any possible means." As things stood, German strength was being drained away, and the strength of rival states increased, by the emigration of millions who could not live in the crowded homeland. This drain must cease. The French had solved the problem by not having children. For Frenchmen, this was a logical answer; they were born calculators "and import the arithmetical spirit even into the kindly relations of married life." Such an escape was impossible for Germans. ". . . we hold that every man should be a man, and place his confidence in God. The German is a hero born, and believes that he can hack and hew his way through life. Reckoning and begrudging are not for him."[13]

Such are the arguments most emphasized in the "Politics." It is easy to see why Allied propagandists translated these volumes. They contained, according to Arthur Balfour, an accurate prophecy of German policy; they foreshadowed all those designs which England was fighting to thwart. "They could not have been written before 1870," said Balfour. "Nothing quite like them will be written after 1917."[14]

When Treitschke was discovered by the British, his writings had long been relegated by Germans to the list of unread classics: he was honored, in Prince Bülow's words, as "the prophet of the national ideal."[15] With the advent of National Socialism his works were resurrected. The Nazis, seeking precursors in German history, canonized Treitschke as a prophet of the Third Reich. His "History of Germany" was put on the list of one hundred most acceptable books compiled for the guidance of National Socialist booksellers. A volume of selections from his works appeared in 1933, with a laudatory introduction by Alfred Rosenberg, the high priest of Nazi doctrine. A year later the National Socialist historian Walter Frank published a pamphlet called "Embattled Scholarship," to which the leader of the youth movement, Baldur von Schirach, contributed an introduction.[16] Ostensibly, Frank's tract was written to commemorate Treitschke's centenary. Actually, it was a virulent attack on Ger-

[13] I, 116–19, 213, 230–32.
[14] I, viii.
[15] "Memoirs of Prince von Bülow." Boston: Little, Brown, 1931–32, v. III, p. 114.
[16] Walter Frank: "Kämpfende Wissenschaft." Hamburg, 1934.

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man scholarship of the generation before 1933. After Treitschke's death, Frank contended, German historians had retreated to an ivory tower, from which they had looked down with indifferent neutrality on the struggles of the German people. They refused to lead, refused to fight, refused above all to admit that a German must see the past through German eyes, and that German historical writing must serve the national cause. In particular, Frank pilloried Hermann Oncken, a scholar whose writings had won international acclaim. All this was past, Frank rejoiced. Now, with Treitschke as a guide, German scholarship would once more take its place in the battle line, would fight for the German idea.

This challenge was accepted by the dean of German historians, Friedrich Meinecke. Unlike that of Frank, Meinecke's career reached back to Treitschke's day; in fact, it was he who had nominated Treitschke as editor of the most important German historical journal, the *Historische Zeitschrift*. Meinecke himself had succeeded Treitschke as editor in 1893, and in 1934 he still held this position of leadership. This legacy he was unwilling to betray. Therefore, although Frank had carefully directed his attack against less revered scholars, Meinecke unhesitatingly struck back. Frank, he maintained, had falsified both the teachings of Treitschke and the traditions of German scholarship. Treitschke, according to Meinecke, had always been the foe of any ideal which threatened the freedom and the sacredness of the individual, whether the threat came from political authorities of the day or from collectivist philosophies. Treitschke had fought throughout his life for freedom of inquiry, and he had never wavered in his recognition that free inquiry meant the certainty of divergent conclusions. In his insistence on the moral importance of the individual personality, he was a child of German idealism: "In his admiration for Bismarck, he did not forget Goethe." Undoubtedly, Meinecke admitted, the generation just past had produced no one comparable in stature to the giants of whom Treitschke was the last; but German historians had been true to the ideals formulated by their great predecessors. Above all, they had defended the right and the necessity of free inquiry, which was the basis of all historical truth.[17]

The result was a foregone conclusion. In November 1935, Meinecke's name was gone from the cover of the *Historische Zeitschrift*, and the first article was contributed by Walter Frank.

[17] *Historische Zeitschrift*, CL, 1–9; CLII, 101–103.

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Contemptuously Frank described the fate of those scholars who, boasting of their impartiality and objectivity, had thought the National Socialist revolution a temporary evil to be lived through in silence until sanity returned. They had been swept aside. Everyone now understood that there was room in Germany only for those who could say, like Treitschke, "The patriot in me is a thousand times stronger than the professor!" Now German scholarship could be brought back into harmony with national life. "The march of the storm columns and the song of the masses and the solitary struggles of the scholar and the artist, will create tones which will blend together, freely and without compulsion, into one great German symphony." However, Frank hastened to add the warning that refusal to speak or teach in harmony with the ideals of the New Germany would be treated as "a revolt of insolent slaves, who must be beaten down with the whip."[18]

Meinecke's voice can be silenced. But will the voice of Treitschke, speaking from volumes which form part of the National Socialist *Acta Sanctorum*, blend into the one great German symphony? Or will it encourage those who would call a different tune?

Treitschke placed the state, the power of the state, the needs of the state, in the foreground of his "Politics" because he believed that Germans lacked reverence for the state, that they were a cosmopolitan, not a national people. But in the last years of his career this belief was unfounded: he had not perceived the changes which had taken place in German ways of thinking since he first began to preach the blessings of unity in the days when there was no German Empire. By the nineties he was preaching to the converted. The "rough national pride, splendid in its one-sidedness" which he had admired in an Englishman like Canning, had become superabundant in Germany. Undoubtedly the uneasiness of foreigners like Austen Chamberlain who listened to Treitschke's diatribes and observed the ecstasy of young Germans in the lecture hall, was well-founded. Treitschke must stand as one of those who encouraged the blind, uncontrolled lust for expansion in prewar Germany. The "Politics" is valuable today because from its pages we can learn how much of contemporary Germany is rooted deep in the past and therefore unlikely to be easily uprooted.

[18] *Ibid.*, CLIII, 6–23.

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The "Politics" is no less valuable as a measure of the gulf separating the Third Reich from nineteenth-century Germany. The distinguishing characteristic of German political life today is that it is totalitarian, that neither the individual in Germany nor the rest of the world outside Germany can appeal to any power higher than the "national will." The question as to what agency enforces that will is irrelevant; it is the claim to exclusive power and right which is significant.

Such a claim was not even thought possible by Treitschke, much less upheld by him. Against the older western European traditions of political thought, which exalted the individual citizen and mankind above the state, he urged the central importance of the state. Yet he accepted limitations on the power of the state as self-evident. He did not stress these limitations precisely because they seemed to him self-evident. He urged his students to study Aristotle because the Greeks revered the state. They did, he added, exaggerate the importance of the state, but modern students were in no danger of falling into this error. "The different circumstances of our lives prevent this, and above all that recognition of our undying personality which Christianity has brought us, through which we realize that man can never be merely a member of the State, when he is free to think as he will of God and the Kingdom of God." Modern Europeans, he declared, realized that the citizen could be a member of several different groups, political and non-political, "without identifying his whole personality with any one of them." The state might try to use its power to impair freedom of conscience, "although it would be madness to attempt it amongst us; it would meet with such resistance that it would have to acknowledge its own impotence." He contended that the growth of strong national states would increase the freedom and independence of the individual. "The State feels that its own strength and glory rests ultimately on the freedom of reasonable, thoughtful men." To him, a national army such as that of Germany presupposed political freedom and general satisfaction with the government; otherwise it would be dangerous to put arms into the hands of the people.[19]

And as the state was strong only if the citizen was free, so the state would realize that there was a real family of nations. "Every State will realize that it is an integral part of the community of

[19] I, xxxii, 4, 76; II, 22, 441.

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other States in which it finds itself placed, and that it must live with them on some kind of terms, bad or good, as the case may be." War was the ultimate arbiter in quarrels between states, and treaties could not endure forever in a dynamic world, but "a state which went upon the principle of despising faith and loyalty would be constantly threatened by enemies." International law had no absolute sanctions behind it, only mutual give-and-take; but even on this basis Treitschke thought it possible to look forward to "a harmonious comity of nations, who, concluding treaties of their own free will, admit restrictions upon their sovereignty without abrogating it."[20]

Cold calculation of national interest would suffice to prevent tyranny at home and anarchy abroad, Treitschke believed. He reminded his hearers, however, that, in the ultimate, all power, including the power of the state, was from God. Treitschke insisted that a political philosophy which was indifferent to the means by which power was won and the ends for which it was used was founded on "deep immorality;" ruin awaited the state which made power an end in itself, rather than a means for service to "the highest moral welfare of the human race."[21]

Treitschke and the Germany of his day had not forgotten Goethe in their admiration for Bismarck. Though that Germany had travelled far from the individualism and cosmopolitanism of Goethe's Weimar, it was still far from the Munich of Adolf Hitler and Paul Goebbels. Goethe, Treitschke, Goebbels — here are fixed points through which the line of German history must be traced. If we have supreme confidence in the teachings of history, we may project the line into the future. But whether we will draw comfort from the vista thus opened to the imagination depends on the degree to which we share the optimism of that long line of Anglo-Saxons which stretches back through Edward Grey and Woodrow Wilson to that forgotten liberal, Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant Duff, who admitted in 1866 that Bismarck's influence had been "simply evil," but who remained serenely confident that the Iron Chancellor would fail because, "when any institutions come directly into contact with the spirit of the time, they may resist for five years, or ten, or twenty, but down they must go in the end."[22]

[20] I, 28; II, 588–600.
[21] I, viii, 84, 85.
[22] Sir M. E. Grant Duff: "Studies in European Politics." Edinburgh, 1866, p. 234, 245.

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AIMS OF RECENT BELGIAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Paul van Zeeland

AT THE beginning of 1936 the international policy of Belgium was based on two documents, one complementing the other: the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Pact. Belgium had no other commitments. Writers sometimes refer to "agreements between General Staffs." But these were limited arrangements made between the Belgian and French General Staffs; they were purely defensive and technical, they did not constitute a diplomatic instrument, and they came into operation only when and if Belgium so decided. However, in order that there should be no misunderstanding on this point, Belgium decided that the arrangements should be revised, and negotiations in that sense were completed early in March 1936.

By an irony of fate, the signatures to the new arrangement were exchanged on March 6, 1936 — only one day before the Rhineland was occupied by German troops. Thus, at the precise moment when Belgium and France were entering an agreement in conformity with the spirit and letter of Locarno, that Pact was being openly violated by Germany. The German violation had no justification in any action by Belgium. She had been completely loyal to her partners in the Pact, and particularly to Germany; yet it was Belgium for whom the appearance of German troops in the Rhineland entailed the most serious consequences.

The shadow of war seemed suddenly to have fallen across Europe. Representatives of France, Italy, England and Belgium — all the Locarno signatories who had remained faithful to their obligations — assembled in conference, first in Paris, then in London. Almost at once a divergence between the English and French points of view became apparent. France seemed disposed to resort to arms, if necessary, to enforce the terms of the treaty. M. Sarraut, it will be remembered, made a strong speech to that effect over the radio. But the British Government, supported almost unanimously by British public opinion, was unwilling to contemplate the use of force to prevent the Germans from installing troops in German territory. In the end, the London Conference offered Germany terms under which the conflict could be settled. Meanwhile, foreseeing the possibility that Germany

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might not accept, the Conference provided for a strengthening of the bonds between the Locarno signatories.

Belgium entered whole-heartedly into this arrangement. It had the advantage of avoiding an immediate war; it emphasized the unity of France and England; and it paved the way for a general settlement later on. Yet it obviously was nothing more than a provisional solution. Another general agreement would later have to be put in the place of the Locarno Pact. The Belgian representatives at the London Conference did not hesitate to state this. They saw that time was working against an equitable, peaceful and permanent solution. In their view, the London Agreement was a temporary one and should result either in leading Germany to make a new agreement or in paving the way for some other solution. But months passed and nothing happened. The Powers followed the traditional policy of "wait and see," while Germany's attitude became more and more rigid.

This course of events did not please Belgium. She tried to make her more powerful neighbors realize that the passage of time was modifying the Agreement and that such a provisional situation could not last indefinitely. Gradually she came to see that the policy of the Great Powers went counter both to her own best interests and to the methods by which she thought peace could best be maintained. On October 14, 1936, then, Belgium reached an important decision. On that date the Council of Ministers met under the presidency of King Leopold III. The King made a solemn address in which he indicated plainly what course the country should take. The Government decided to assume full political responsibility for this speech and to publish it.

Contrary to what has often been said, Belgium was not returning to the same position of neutrality which had been imposed upon her by the Powers in 1839 as one of the conditions of her national existence. That position carried several advantages and guarantees; but it also implied a sort of "handicap" or inferiority. Belgium's independence as a sovereign state was limited, for she could not adopt a foreign policy of her own choice; no matter what the circumstances, she was compelled to remain neutral.

Naturally, in 1936 Belgium had no desire to revert to any such status. Nor did she wish to make a declaration of so-called "voluntary neutrality." For either those words were devoid of sense, or else they meant that the country promised to remain neutral. Such a promise would have to be kept; it would therefore consti-

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tute a limitation on the country's freedom of action and hence a diminution of its independence.

In certain circumstances some countries may find it in their own best interest voluntarily to adopt a policy of neutrality. But Belgium was not in that position. The attitude she took was merely a continuation of what had been her desire ever since the World War — namely, to be completely and absolutely herself. It was wrongly described abroad as Belgium's "new policy" and sometimes was erroneously confused with "neutrality." It was more correctly summed up in two words: independence and equilibrium.

The word independence meant that Belgium accepted no limitations on her freedom of action and undertook no engagement of any kind outside the Covenant of the League of Nations. The word equilibrium meant that Belgium had no intention of pulling other people's chestnuts out of the fire, of entering the orbit of any other country, or of favoring the exclusive interests of any other country whatsoever — particularly one of the Great Powers.

Such was the purport of the King's speech and of its publication by the Belgian Government. The implication was clear that the country no longer wished to be held to the London Agreement. Belgium had accepted the heavy responsibilities involved in the Agreement only because they were temporary. She felt that so much time had elapsed that the Agreement had lost its meaning and that she therefore was justified in deciding to put a formal end to it.

II

The Belgian Government immediately set about mending its diplomatic and military fences. First, it explained at great length to the other signatories of the London Agreement why it had decided to withdraw. After discussions conducted in the best spirit, France and Britain came to an understanding and solemnly stated their position in what is known as the "Brussels Declarations." In this document France and Great Britain formally released Belgium from her obligations under the Pact of Locarno and the London Agreement but still recognized their obligations to help her under the terms of those two treaties. The fact that they continued to guarantee her territorial integrity meant that they must come to her aid if she was attacked, but

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that she was under no reciprocal obligation. Of course, the two Powers subscribed to terms which were so advantageous to Belgium knowing the latter's frequently expressed determination to defend herself against any attack and her desire to remain faithful to the Covenant of the League. However, this was not a *sine qua non*. The two Powers merely recognized the fact of Belgium's attitude. Belgium was left to decide when the guarantee would become operative and to appeal to her guarantors if she felt herself in danger. Her independence was complete. Obviously there was a vast difference between this and neutrality, voluntary or imposed.

The Belgian Government's desire for an equilibrium naturally required that it accept a similar guarantee from Germany. Negotiations to this end culminated in the Declaration of October 13, 1937, in which Germany reconfirmed her pledge to respect the inviolability and integrity of Belgium under all circumstances. She also declared her willingness to lend assistance to Belgium if the latter were attacked. This spontaneous gesture by Germany once again set the seal of German sanction on the restoration of the cantons of Eupen and Malmédy to the Belgian mother country following the World War. However, there was one reservation in the German Declaration. The obligation to respect the integrity of Belgium would cease should that country coöperate in military operations against Germany. This proviso might so well have been taken for granted that it can hardly be called a reservation and in no way modified the Declaration.

The Belgian Government took "due notice" of the German Declaration, and the German Government in turn "duly noted" the Belgian Government's quite proper expression of its point of view regarding independence and the defense of Belgian territory. But no condition attached to the obligations assumed by Germany. Belgium assumed no corresponding obligations, but reserved her complete freedom of action.

Belgium's intention in entering into these agreements was to remain aloof from armed conflicts between the Great Powers. She had to make this intention known in such fashion as to allow of no misunderstanding. That is why the policy of independence and equilibrium was stated in formal terms. All of Belgium's responsible authorities repeatedly declared in the clearest manner that anyone who tried to force a way through the country — whether by land, sea or air — would be resisted.

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III

It was not enough for Belgium to wish to keep out of possible conflicts between her more powerful neighbors; she had to be prepared to make her wish respected. She therefore had to marshal all her resources, both military and economic.

An inevitable consequence of King Leopold's speech was a marked increase in Belgium's military establishment. The period of military service was more than doubled; the number of officers was increased by one fourth; the army estimates in the ordinary budget were increased by several hundred millions of francs; while the supplementary budget provided considerable outlays for arms and fortifications. All these measures emphasized the defensive character of Belgian military policy.

In the opinion of most technical experts it would be practically impossible for any army to force its way through Belgium *rapidly*. Thus an invasion of Belgium, by consuming much valuable time, would be a manœuvre of little or no strategic value. Moreover, both the Germans and the French have fortified their own frontiers facing Belgium. Since neither country fears a Belgian invasion, these defenses can be directed only against a third Power whose armies might attempt to march through Belgium. They added to Belgium's security by making it still more difficult for a hostile army to use Belgian territory as a military corridor.

At the time of the Munich crisis, Belgium was probably one of the countries least threatened by war. The Government nevertheless ordered important measures of mobilization. Comparatively speaking, the number of men which it mobilized at that time was one of the highest in Europe. The wise precaution permitted Belgium to demonstrate to all and sundry that she would stop at nothing to preserve her territorial inviolability. In so doing she not only loyally fulfilled her international duties but increased her chances of keeping out of war. Action of a similar sort but on a still more massive scale demonstrated the same determination at the start of the crisis which gripped Europe in August this year.

IV

Logical and clear as Belgium's policy was, various doubts could not be prevented from arising, both at home and abroad, concerning the country's international position. In what I have

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written so far I have tried to be strictly historical; I have merely described events, refraining as much as possible from interpreting them. With my American readers especially in mind, I should now like to express a personal opinion about certain causes and effects, subject to the natural reservations necessary when one discusses things still in the process of evolution.

In 1939, for reasons which I do not pretend to fathom, people abroad suddenly began to attach an increasing significance to the difficulties arising from the existence of two national languages in Belgium — French and Flemish. These difficulties are genuine. But they have always existed. And while the diversity inherent in any country where two languages and two cultures live side by side may create serious problems, it also creates cultural riches: it broadens our horizons, it promotes our intercourse with other peoples, and it facilitates the interplay of ideas and emotions. It has enabled men living on a poor soil and without natural frontiers to preserve their political independence, their personality and their common nationality through many vicissitudes. That the difficulties which accompany these advantages wax and wane at different moments, that they change their character, that sometimes they are exclusively linguistic and sometimes predominantly cultural, that at certain periods one group is the more dynamic of the two — all this, to my way of thinking, is natural, normal and inevitable.

Relations between the Flemish and the Walloons have unquestionably undergone many changes since the World War. But at the present time my personal belief is that almost all legitimate Flemish grievances have been redressed. This is not to say that all difficulties have been eliminated. Recently it became the Walloons who complained, sometimes correctly, of attacks on their rights — or, rather, of irritating pinpricks. Admittedly the situation has not been satisfactory. Those who have examined it dispassionately know that practical and relatively simple solutions exist. And though there will always be difficulties they are not of such a character as to endanger the solidity of the state or in themselves to shift Belgian foreign policy in one direction or the other.

At one time I might have felt tempted to prove this statement by a long theoretical argument. Today, however, I need only quote the results of the elections held a few months ago. Belgium is generally admitted to be one of the most liberal states in the

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world, preserving all the fundamental liberties of the past century — freedom of the press, of speech, of meeting, and so forth. Under such conditions electoral results are particularly significant. In the last elections two parties holding extreme views on the language issue participated — the Walloon Party and the Flemish Nationalists. The former were newcomers; and they received only a fraction of one percent of the votes. The latter — though they had many years of experience and though they were very active and violent — received only 7.93 percent of the total votes cast. I might add that, despite their exaggerations, the Flemish Nationalists for the most part confine themselves to advocating federalism. Now personally I believe that federalism is contrary to Belgian traditions and needs and that its adoption might put the country in mortal danger. Nevertheless, others may perfectly well hold a different opinion without in any way being traitors at heart.

What I have just said is confirmed by two other indications. In the cantons of Eupen and Malmédy, restored to Belgium by the Treaty of Versailles, the pro-Belgian parties defeated the others, despite a particularly active pro-German propaganda. As for the Rexists, whose extremism everyone knows and who are open admirers of the totalitarian philosophies, they lost 17 out of their 21 deputies.

There also was agitation in certain influential circles in recent months in favor of a closer understanding with The Netherlands. This idea has gradually ripened. The relations of the two countries have steadily become closer and friendlier. The formation of a defensive bloc, uniting the economic and military forces of Belgium and The Netherlands, would obviously alter the equilibrium of forces in Western Europe and would increase the chances that both would be able to stay out of wars between neighboring states. At the moment when I write these lines, this idea seems to have come either too soon or too late. But perhaps an occasion for it will appear.

Other suggestions have been turning up here and there in the Belgian press, indicating a *parti pris* on some question of general principle, or perhaps revealing a sentimental preference for the position taken up by our former allies. But it should be noticed that in no case have these suggestions gone so far as to envisage any break with the policy of independence described in these pages. Nobody, as I write, has yet favored an alliance which

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would mix Belgium in wars where her vital interests were not directly at stake.

The Belgian people have faith in their army, small, perhaps, when judged by Great Power standards, but nevertheless strong and resolute. And they trust, at least up to a certain point, in the effectiveness of our national policy of independence and equilibrium. Should this trust prove to have been exaggerated, one finds in every citizen, regardless of the social stratum to which he belongs or the language which he speaks, a single and universal determination: "If we are attacked, we shall defend ourselves."

Every Belgian knows that we owe our present national existence to the fact that we resisted in 1914. The course of events in Central Europe in 1938 and 1939 demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, audacity — which means, if necessary, the struggle of one man against ten — is the only form of prudence for a small nation. A great merit of our policy of independence and equilibrium has been that it showed every Belgian that the sole reason for which he would be called upon to fight would be to defend his country and his home. For this he *will* fight, to a man, and to the end.

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THE SPANISH PHALANX AND LATIN AMERICA

By H. Rutledge Southworth

FROM its inception the Spanish Phalanx has frankly been a Fascist group. Its founder was José Antonio Primo de Rivera, a handsome and reckless young lawyer who could never forget that his father had been Dictator of Spain. When José Antonio and his friends issued a magazine to publicize their ideas (the first and only number appeared on March 16, 1933) they called it *El Fascio*. José Antonio declared: "We are Fascists, because we find our origins in Mussolinian principles; we are Nazis, because in National Socialist doctrines vibrate our faith and doctrine. But we are, above all, Spaniards. The National Syndicalist State, corporative and totalitarian, is of Spanish type. It is not a block from the Italian or German quarry. It is a Spanish creation." This is the line which the Phalanx has followed ever since its official foundation at Madrid on October 29, 1933 — Fascism, but Spanish Fascism.

General Francisco Franco, speaking to a United Press correspondent in July 1937, followed the same line. The new Spain, he said "will follow the structure of the totalitarian régimes, like Italy and Germany. It will adopt corporative forms, for which most of the formulas are already found in our own country, and it will destroy the liberal institutions which have poisoned the people. As in all empires, special attention will be given to the hierarchic principle: love of country, social justice and the protection of the middle and laboring classes will be encouraged. It will be inspired, of course, by the models of Italy and Germany, but with characteristics clearly national. It will be a suit cut to Spain's own measure."

On March 4, 1934, the Phalanx officially merged with the J.O.N.-S. ("Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista") and became the "Falange Española y de las J.O.N.-S." The J.O.N.-S. was itself the result of several previous mergers. Perhaps the origin of all these groups traces back to the appearance in Madrid, one month before the Spanish Republic came into being, of a little magazine called *La Conquista del Estado* ("The Conquest of the State"), published by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and Ernesto Giménez Caballero, who were later to collaborate with José Antonio in the short-lived *El Fascio*. The manifesto of this magazine read in part: "Every Spaniard who will not face with proper greatness the approaching events is obligated to leave the front lines and let his place be taken by firm, courageous phalanxes." This appeal called for the establishment of the Empire as well as for various domestic measures such as the creation of a syndicalist structure for Spanish economy, preparations for a revolution, the use of terrorism, defense of the army's position and power, and opposition to all forms of regional autonomy.

Meanwhile in Valladolid, Onésimo Redondo, a hard young man of twenty-six, Doctor of Laws from Salamanca and recently an instructor in Castilian at the University of Mannheim, was building up another pro-Fascist group. His weekly paper *Libertad* had first appeared on June 13, 1931, with the cry: "Workers, Castilians: Be on guard against the dark schemes of the Internationals who are waiting to fall upon our land: the Masonic International, the

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Socialist International, the Communist International." Redondo was the first to bring Hitler's writings to a Spanish audience when in 1931 he published chapters of "Mein Kampf" in *Libertad*. In 1933 he hailed Hitler as the new Charlemagne and saw the hooked cross as the eternal forerunner of the Latin cross of Christ. In August 1931, Redondo formed the "Junta Castellana de Actuación Hispánica," with a sixteen-point program calling for an Imperial Spain, a purely Spanish Government, and a "syndical, corporative organization protected and regulated by the State." In November 1931 the "Junta Castellana" and the group around *La Conquista del Estado* joined to make the J.O.N.-S.

The program of the J.O.N.-S. demanded the centralization of power in Madrid and the suppression of all attempts at creating Basque and Catalan autonomy, for the unification of Spain was to be the first step toward the rebuilding of the Empire. The program also called for the subordination of individuals and social groups to the needs of the State and for the overthrow of the parliamentary régime. It advocated "the imperial expansion of Spain," with immediate claims for Gibraltar and Tangier; it demanded the placing of labor unions "under the special protection of the State;" and it proposed the creation of a National Syndicalist state "which would entrust its highest political jobs to men under forty." This last point (later dropped by the Phalanx) emphasizes the appeal which the party sought to make to the disinherited youth of Spain, humiliated by the loss of her Empire.

Of the two merging groups that formed the Phalanx as it was before the civil war, the J.O.N.-S. was the stronger and more aggressive. Onésimo Redondo was physically and mentally tougher than José Antonio, who was chosen leader of the Phalanx mainly because of the political power of his family name. Both the J.O.N.-S. and the Phalanx at the time of their merger were insignificant political blocs; even at the outbreak of the military revolt over two years later, they could claim less than 100,000 members.

In September 1934 the National Council of the Spanish Phalanx met in Madrid, unnoticed by the important political groups, and adopted a twenty-seven point program. Through Franco's edict number 255 (April 19, 1937), this program, minus the last point, became law throughout Nationalist Spain. It is therefore a document of great practical significance. Briefly, the Falangist objective is Fascist in domestic affairs and imperialistic in foreign policy. The highly centralized, regimented, militaristic state of the Phalanx is not an end in itself but an instrument for reëstablishing its power over Spain's former dominions.

The spiritual basis of the program was best described by the aged ex-anarchist thinker, Ramiro de Maeztu, now dead, in his book "Defensa de la Hispanidad," published in 1934 and highly praised by the Spanish Primate, Cardinal Gomá y Tomás. The word *hispanidad*, coined or resurrected by Maeztu, expresses the mystique of Spanish National Syndicalism just as German racism expresses the mystique of National Socialism. *Hispanidad* includes all those, regardless of race, who live under Spanish culture and religion — for example, the Indians of South America. A map of *hispanidad* published in a Nationalist reissue of Maeztu's book includes most of the United States as part of the lost empire. *Hispanidad* does not exclude foreign

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peoples whom it may convert, but does exclude foreign ideas such as masonry, liberalism, Protestantism, Socialism and Communism. (A survey of Falangist literature will show that the afflictions of Spain are listed approximately in that order of importance.)

We need not take up here the Falangist propositions dealing with the political and economic reorganization of Spain's internal affairs. These are matters to which the United States can, presumably, remain largely indifferent. There are, however, three points in the creed of the Phalanx — and therefore in the avowed policy of the Nationalist Government — which are of importance to the United States because they concern international affairs, and particularly because they concern Latin America and Pan Americanism.

Point three of the Falangist program declares: "We have a will to empire. We affirm that the full historical significance of Spain implies an empire. We demand for Spain a preëminent place in Europe. We will not tolerate either international isolation or foreign interference. Regarding the countries of Spanish America, we strive for the unification of culture, of economic interests and of power. Spain considers that her position as spiritual axis of the Hispanic world gives her the preëminent place in their common enterprises."

Point four says: "Our armed forces, on land, on sea and in the air, must be as efficient and as numerous as may be necessary to insure at all times the complete independence of Spain and the world leadership which is her due. We shall restore to the army of land, sea and air all the public dignity they merit and we shall cause, following their ideals, a military sense of life to pervade all Spanish activities."

And point five states: "Spain will again seek glory and wealth on the sea. Spain must aspire to become a great maritime power, for the pursuit of danger and for commercial reasons. We demand for the Motherland naval and aërial strength equal to any."

That the Phalanx takes these imperialistic injunctions seriously is amply demonstrated by the writings of Falangist publicists. Early in 1935, after the Nazi triumph in the Saar, Redondo published an article which his Falangist followers two years later were to describe as being "the announcement of a new age." Redondo wrote: "A united Germany is the beginning of a strong alliance between all the German countries. And a united Spain will be the bastion of the revivified *hispanidad*. Thus, as the Germany of Hitler has recovered the Saar and sooner or later will conquer the will of Austria, so National Syndicalist Spain will restore the united Empire of all the nations that speak Spanish . . . Spain will renew her historic task of redeeming the barbarous peoples and the Spanish-German alliance will place us at the head of the world."

In an article by Miguel Gran appearing in the February 1937 issue of the official Falangist magazine *Fe* it was stated: "For the America of our culture, our faith and our blood, we wish more than just living together, more than friendship. We desire unity: unity of mind, unity of economy, and unity of power. We desire to put an end to 'Monroeism,' in order to put in its place our affirmation: 'The Spanish world for the Spanish' ['Lo hispano, para los hispanos']."

At the time of the Lima Conference in December 1938, Franco's Nationalist

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press roundly denounced the policy of the United States and warned the Latin American countries against the imperialism of "Tio Sam." Typical of this newspaper comment was that of the San Sebastián *Voz de España* which declared on December 9, 1938, that the Lima Conference was "organized by Jews and atheists so that the United States could enslave the American hemisphere." On December 20, the Burgos correspondent of the London *Times* reported that the Nationalists were watching Lima "with some anxiety" because "Spanish thinkers desire that the cultural and economic links between Spain and the countries to which she gave birth . . . should be tightened." In Nationalist Spain, the *Times* said, "Any attempt by a non-Spanish nation to extend its tutelage over Spanish America is regarded with deep suspicion. Above all, Spain and the Spanish-speaking nations are exhorted to be on their guard against the 'Peligro Yanqui.' Mr. Roosevelt, it is said, is attempting to transform the 'good neighbourliness' . . . into armed solidarity and secure for the United States predominance throughout America in the cultural and economic fields."

Concerning the foreign policy of Franco's Government we have the remarkable book "Que es 'Lo Nuevo' . . ." published in 1938. This work, a competent and comprehensive statement of the nature and aims of Spanish Fascism, was written by José Pemartín, Chief of University and Secondary Education in the Nationalist Government. Pemartín affirms that one of the imperatives of Spanish existence is: "To extend and expand our great Latin, Christian, Hispanic culture and our political jurisdiction, above all over the South American countries of Hispanic soul and language." Pemartín not only indicates that Pan Americanism is to be displaced by Pan Hispanicism but that the United States is to be drawn into the Pan Hispanic orbit. He writes: "If we leave Europe and take up a world point of view, we see that over in America there is most certainly reserved to seemingly weak and backward Spanish America the same noble mission of Latinity as in Europe: the conversion of North America to Catholicism. This will seem an impossible dream to some superficial minds. Nevertheless, bear in mind how easily the material prosperity and the already low moral level of the United States have crumbled since the Wall Street crash of November 1929. Think also of this — the United States is not a nation but a huge conglomeration of peoples and races, under the moral depression of the defeat which Japan will inflict on them, sooner or later."

Franco's emissaries in Spanish America — members of the Spanish race, speaking the Spanish language, worshipping in the Spanish Catholic faith, with a militaristic Spanish Motherland behind them — have in Falangism a doctrine that possesses undoubted attractions for many Latin Americans. This is particularly true of the ruling classes and cliques. By adopting or imitating Falangist slogans and methods they may hope to give their power a new lease on life and to stem the tide of democracy. Now that Franco is victor in Spain, every instinct for self-preservation will drive the Phalanx towards the completion of its program, towards the conquest of its empire. It must make Pan Hispanicism strong enough to challenge and defeat Pan Americanism.

This movement is independent of what may be done by Italy, Germany or Japan in Latin America. These are, and will always remain, alien forces in that

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region. No imperative of expansion drives them to Spanish America. Franco, on the other hand, seems inexorably driven in that direction by the supreme imperatives of Falangism. He cannot expect to expand in Europe. His action in case of a European war will therefore be dictated largely by considerations of empire. He may seek to be neutral, or he may even oppose his late allies. But no matter which policy he pursues in the end, it will be at the expense of Pan Americanism, for the reconquest of the Empire must always be the ultimate goal of Spanish Fascism.

Three ties bind Spanish Americans to Spain: language, race and religion. (These are also exactly the differences that separate Spanish America from the English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant United States.) Every book, magazine and newspaper leaving Spain for Latin America will now carry the call of the Falangist Motherland. "Our language is the nervous system of our spiritual empire and the real and tangible inheritance of our historical-political empire," reads a Franco decree of September 20, 1938. The superior appeal of Falangist propaganda, written in Spanish by Spaniards with a Spanish point of view, as compared with that from Germany, Italy or the United States, cannot be overemphasized. When, in May 1939, President Roberto Ortiz of Argentina decreed the dissolution of all political organizations directed from abroad, he gave them ninety days in which to revise their by-laws to conform to "democratic principles" and ordered that their names, statutes and by-laws be printed in Spanish. This last provision was, of course, no penalty for the Phalanx; and it serves to illustrate the enormous initial advantage which that body possesses over its allies and competitors in Latin America. Indeed, from this decree it would almost seem as if the thing feared by the Argentine President was the foreign language and not the totalitarian agitation.

Every device possible will be utilized by Spain to tell the people of South America that they are not merely Bolivians, Peruvians, Chileans, etc., but also members of the mystic body of *hispanidad*. In the campaign the Phalanx can count on the support of the Catholic Church, dominant in South America as in Spain. As long ago as 1934 Cardinal Gomá y Tomás, speaking at Buenos Aires on the day (October 12) celebrated in Spanish countries as the "Día de la Raza" (Day of the Race), gave high praise to Maeztu's book and its concept of *hispanidad*. The Cardinal called upon the South American countries to turn toward Spain and away from the threats of "Monroeism, statism, Protestantism, Socialism or simple mercantilism." He deplored the separation of the colonies from Spain, which he attributed to "the itching to try new democratic forms of government." He declared that democracy was dying and was unable to "serve as a basis for *hispanidad* and mould the people of the race into a great unity for defense and conquest."

That the coöperation of the Catholic Church with Falangist imperialism can be dangerous to Pan Americanism is understood clearly by many American Catholics. As Professor Francis X. Connolly of Fordham University wrote in the Jesuit weekly *America* (April 18, 1939): "If the new state of Generalissimo Franco is successful, it is very likely that all our conferences and economic blandishments will come to nothing and what we inaccurately call Latin America may truly become Spanish America."

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THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION UNDER FASCISM

By Egidio Reale

ON TAKING power in October 1922, Mussolini declared his intention of remaining faithful to the Italian Constitution. The only changes contemplated in the fundamentals of Italian government, he said, would be to "adapt the parliamentary procedure" (by depriving the legislature of some of its power in favor of the executive), to impose the Government's policies on the bureaucracy (which had become increasingly a law to itself as a result of the frequent change of ministries) and to limit the exercise of certain rights and liberties previously enjoyed by the Italian people. Whether the measures Mussolini adopted in putting these changes into effect violated the provisions of the Italian Constitution is a question on which there has been much difference of opinion. This divergence is, in part at least, due to the nature and wording of the Constitution itself.

This document, known as the *Statuto*, was promulgated by King Charles Albert of Piedmont on March 4, 1848. Having been drawn up before the outbreak of the February Revolution in Paris, its authors had modelled it on the 1830 Constitution of the July Monarchy, which dated from 1830. The Constitution was drawn up by the King and his close advisers; the people of Piedmont in no way participated. In conferring this document, the King described it as the "fundamental law, eternal and irrevocable, of the Monarchy." And indeed, one of the grave shortcomings of the *Statuto* is that it contains no provision for amendment. True, some articles are sufficiently vague or qualified by provisos to allow considerable latitude in their interpretation. For instance, article 26 specifies: "Individual liberty is guaranteed. No one may be arrested or brought to justice except in such cases as are provided by law and in the manner which it prescribes." Article 27 stipulates: "The domicile is inviolable. No domiciliary search can take place except in pursuance to the law and in the manner which it prescribes." Article 28 stipulates: "The press is free, but a law shall check its abuses."

But not all the articles of the *Statuto* include provisions of that nature giving the legislative bodies a certain amount of discretion. Most of them are definite and categorical, and allow of little, if any, room for "amendment by interpretation." The only procedure for a revolutionary government, then, was to ignore whatever parts of the Constitution it disliked and to replace them with legislation or decrees more to its taste. Consequently, it was not strange that only a few months after the March on Rome, the politicians and the newspapers of the anti-Fascist opposition began accusing Mussolini of overthrowing the Constitution. The Opposition hoped in this way to rally the forces, at that time still strong, which clung to representative government and to parliamentary institutions. Only in 1925 did Mussolini accept the challenge of his opponents. On June 22 of that year, at the final session of the Fascist Congress, he unmasked his true intentions. "The Constitution," he said, "cannot be a hook on which to hang each generation. . . . Day after day, we

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are obliged to violate it." He concluded by announcing that it was his will that every institution be adapted to "the ineffaceable reality of Fascism" and by hurling forth his new watchword: "All power to all Fascism."

No one can say that Mussolini has failed to keep his word. Indeed, he has far exceeded it, for ever since 1925 the process of "fascistizing" the state has been going on at an ever accelerating pace. Mussolini has not only modified constitutional institutions in order to adapt them to the exigencies of his new régime; he has destroyed them outright, one after the other. He has suppressed every right guaranteed the Italian people by their Constitution. Individual liberty, the inviolability of the home, freedom of the press and of assembly, the sanctity of property, the prohibition against creating special tribunals and extraordinary commissions, the irremovability of judges — all these are now only a memory.

Principal among the rights guaranteed the Italian people by the *Statuto* of Charles Albert was that of Article 24: "All inhabitants of the realm, regardless of title or rank, are equal before the law." This Article also went on to declare that "The enjoyment of civil and political rights and admission to civil and military posts are open equally to all, except for such cases as are determined by law." Under Fascism, this equality was first seriously abridged by the laws excluding from most government jobs all citizens who were not members of the Fascist Party or who were suspected of lack of fidelity to the régime. The recent laws directed against the Jews discriminate between citizens of different racial origin and thus have destroyed that equality altogether.

The Crown itself has had to submit to restrictions. The throne continues to be hereditary according to the Salic Law (Article 2), but the principal organ of the Party, the Fascist Grand Council, must be summoned to advise on "every legal matter concerning the succession to the throne, the powers of the King and the Royal prerogatives." In form, the King continues to wield executive power by means of his Government under the direction and responsibility of the Prime Minister. However, the Fascist Grand Council, "supreme coördinator of every activity of the régime born in the Revolution of October 1922," compiles, and keeps up to date, a list from which the King must choose his ministers. Technically, the King retains the rights to declare war and to make treaties of peace, alliance, commerce and the like (Article 5). But these prerogatives are in practice annulled by the Fascist order in which the Head of the Government monopolizes executive power. Finally, the law creating the new Chamber of Fasci and Corporations has taken from the King the right, given him by the *Statuto* (Article 9), to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and call elections.

The same procedure has been followed regarding parliamentary institutions. According to the Constitution, the bodies exercising legislative power are the King; the Senate, composed of members appointed by the King for life from certain specified classes of citizens; and the Chamber of Deputies, composed of members chosen by the electorate. What has become of these bodies under the Fascist dispensation? The Senate has been preserved; Mussolini has merely curtailed its powers and modified its membership by appointing Senators faithful to the régime. The Chamber of Deputies, on the other hand, has been abolished, to make way for a body completely subservient to the executive power.

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According to the *Statuto*, the Chamber was to be composed of deputies elected by electoral districts; they were to represent the nation and they were elected for five-year terms (Articles 39, 41, 42). A periodic renewal was thus assured, thereby permitting changes in public opinion to be reflected in the legislature. During the first years after the advent of Fascism the electoral system was modified so as to assure the Government of a strong and stable majority. The law of December 13, 1923, divided the nation into 15 election districts, each of which was to elect a certain number of deputies. The party whose list of candidates secured the largest number of votes automatically received two thirds of the seats in the Chamber, provided that it had obtained 25 percent of the total votes cast in the election. The distribution of the remaining seats among the minority parties was made proportionally in each district. This law was superseded by one of February 15, 1925, which supposedly reinstated the old single-member constituency but which nevertheless guaranteed electoral predominance to the party then in power. However, this law was never enforced.

Though enacted to assure the Government of a sure and lasting majority, these laws did not abolish the elective and representative character of the Chamber. It was only after the suppression of all political parties except the Fascist that the voters were deprived of their electoral freedom. The reform of the Chamber embodied in the law of May 17, 1928, empowered the Fascist Grand Council to draw up a single list of candidates, which the electors were to accept or reject *en bloc*. Under this system the Deputies were in effect chosen by the Party and were therefore subject to its severe discipline. They were not elected in the proper sense of the word. Both chambers became mere registry bureaus, forced to approve unanimously every proposal and act of the Government. Monologues by Il Duce or members of his Government replaced parliamentary debates, and applause was substituted for criticism.

But this was not enough. Though chosen by the Party leaders, though deprived of the right to oppose or criticize, the Chamber of Deputies was still a reminder, at least in name, of the old liberal constitutional régime. Quite naturally, therefore, Mussolini felt that this last vestige of a disappearing order should be destroyed. On March 10, 1938, the Fascist Grand Council voted unanimously to replace the Chamber of Deputies with a new political organism founded on the two great Fascist institutions: the Party and the Corporations. The law creating this new Chamber of Fasci and Corporations was adopted by acclamation in both branches of the Parliament. There was no debate; only the rapporteurs and a member of the government made addresses. Thus it was that in December 1938 the Italian Chamber of Deputies ceased to exist. For 90 years it had performed its duties and had served as the symbol of constitutional, representative monarchy. By its suppression the Italian constitutional crisis, which began in October 1922, came to an end in the complete destruction of the order created by the *Statuto* of 1848.

The new Chamber of Fasci and Corporations is not a parliamentary institution. It is not an elected body. Its members do not call themselves deputies, but "national councillors;" they are chosen because of their functions in the Party or in the Corporations. This new Chamber, headed by Il Duce, is composed of members of the Fascist Grand Council, of the National Council

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of the Fascist Party and of the National Council of Corporations. This raises the question as to who are members of these three constituent bodies.

The Fascist Grand Council, whose president is Il Duce and whose secretary is the Party Secretary, consists of the following: (1) life members — the three Quadrumviri of the March on Rome who still survive (De Bono, De Vecchi and Balbo); (2) functional members, appointed by Royal decree on Mussolini's suggestion because of the high offices they fill in the civil, military or corporative administration (*e.g.* Cabinet members, president of employers' confederations and of trade unions); and (3) extraordinary members, chosen by the Head of the Government from among those who have deserved well of the nation and of the Fascist Revolution.

The statutes of the Fascist Party (promulgated by royal decree on April 28, 1938, and modified by royal decree on November 21, 1938) confer membership in its National Council on the following: (1) the members of the National Directory, which includes the Secretary of the Party, three vice-secretaries, the administrative secretary, and eight other members; (2) the federal secretaries of the provincial organizations; (3) the party inspectors; (4) the secretary, vice-secretary and two inspectors of the Fasci abroad; and (5) the presidents of two official veterans' organizations. By no means are all of these chosen by the Party. The Secretary is appointed and recalled by royal decree at Mussolini's suggestion, and he is responsible to Il Duce directly, not to the Party. The inspectors are chosen and recalled by the Secretary of the Party, to whom they are responsible. The members of the National Directory, as well as the federal secretaries, are appointed and recalled by Il Duce on the motion of the Party Secretary.

The National Council of Corporations, the structure of which was revised by the law of January 5, 1939, is composed of the members of the Central Corporative Committee and of the councils of the 22 corporations into which Italian economic life has been divided for the purposes of the Corporative State. The Central Corporative Committee is made up of (1) Ministers and Under Secretaries of State; (2) the vice-secretaries and the administrative secretary of the Fascist Party; (3) the representatives of the Fascist Party who act as vice-presidents in the 22 corporations; (4) the ten presidents of the employers' and workers' confederations, artisans' unions, and the National Fascist Institute of Coöperation. The members of the councils of the corporations who sit in the new Chamber are appointed, and demoted, by royal decree or by the Head of the Government.

The members of the new Chamber serve only for the period during which they belong to one of these national councils. Altogether they constitute an assembly of around 650 or 700 men. Unlike the old Chamber, the new one has no fixed legislative term. Incidentally, it might be added that the procedure of the Senate has been altered to coincide with that of the Chamber.

Such being the composition of the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations, what are its functions and powers? It does not have the right to discuss, much less to criticize, the acts and projects of the Government. It does not select its president — he and the vice-presidents are appointed by royal decree. The president in turn selects the other officers. He also appoints and convokes the committees through which the Chamber carries on most of its work. The

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ostensible function of the new Chamber is to assist the Government in making laws. It can see that this task is performed in various sorts of meetings: at plenary sessions of the entire Chamber, by the general budget committee, by the permanent legislative committees, or by special *ad hoc* committees set up when the need arises. The Chamber has the right to discuss and approve the following measures: bills of a constitutional character; general legislative delegations; the budget and financial reports of the state, of autonomous administrations of the state, and of any public agencies which are of national importance and which are directly or indirectly financed by the state. The Chamber can also be convoked to discuss and approve other bills when the Government so wishes, or when such a step is proposed by a plenary session or by a committee and is approved by Il Duce. Bills which are not laid before the Chamber as a whole are examined by the proper committee. Il Duce may submit, for special discussion and approval, any bill which he decides must be acted upon immediately. However, this normal procedure may be superseded by the issuance of royal decrees in the event of an emergency created by war or by financial difficulties, or when the legislative committees have not had time to finish their work within the time allotted them.

No bill submitted to the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations for approval can be rejected or amended without the consent of Il Duce. And, in order to avoid those surprises always possible in a secret ballot, the law provides that the Chamber shall vote openly. Every contrary vote is considered an act of insubordination against the Party; the voter automatically loses his seat in the Chamber and is excluded from public life.

The new Fascist Chamber has been defined by jurists of the régime as "the synthesis of the values and the forces residing in the nation." That is a high-sounding phrase signifying as much or as little as one may choose to read into it. The inescapable fact, which no amount of verbiage can conceal, is that the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations in no way represents the will of the Italian people. The creation of that impotent if decorative body merely marked the completion of the process by which Fascism transformed the old liberal state of the *Statuto* into a totalitarian state where all power is concentrated in the hands of one man, Il Duce.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

SECURITY: CAN WE RETRIEVE IT? By SIR ARTHUR SALTER. New York: Reynal, 1939, 391 p. $3.50.

Sir Arthur is admittedly one of the most painstaking analysts of current political and economic problems. His temper seems sometimes almost too judicious, for the sweet reasonableness of his book, even when read before the outbreak of war, could hardly fail to strike the reader as a *vox clamantis in deserto*. In the field of British policy he supported rearmament, but believed that with it should go a clear statement of the precise terms, including colonial concessions, which the Empire might make in order to satisfy the "legitimate" ambitions of the anti-*status quo* Powers. He called for a general all-round settlement, in the name not of craven "appeasement" but of common sense. Even if this proposal were not adopted — and Sir Arthur foresaw that its adoption was improbable — the democracies would at least have strengthened their moral position. One interesting feature of the book is the author's pen portraits of several of Britain's statesmen now most in view.

LA DÉSAGRÉGATION DE L'EUROPE. By FRANCESCO NITTI. PARIS: Spes, 1938, 568 p. Fr. 25.

A survey of a disordered world by a former Prime Minister of Italy, now in exile.

DICTATORSHIP IN THE MODERN WORLD. EDITED BY GUY STANTON FORD. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1939, 362 p. $3.50.

A new edition of a good symposium. Ten of the fifteen contributions are entirely new, and three of the others have been revised and expanded.

WHAT IS LIBERTY? By DOROTHY FOSDICK. New York: Harper, 1939, 194 p. $2.00.

An original study in political theory by an instructor in Smith College.

CIVILISATION: THE NEXT STEP. By C. DELISLE BURNS. New York: Norton, 1939, 291 p. $2.75.

Civilized life, holds Mr. Burns, is only at its beginning and one of the ways to insure its survival is to give in to the dictators.

NOT PEACE BUT A SWORD. By VINCENT SHEEAN. New York: Doubleday, 1939, 367 p. $3.00.

A worthy sequel to "Personal History," covering the author's experiences in Spain, Vienna, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere between March 1938 and March 1939, and showing their relationship to the main current of history during that period.

LE DÉCLIN DES GRANDES DÉMOCRATIES ET LE RETOUR À L'AUTORITÉ. By JEAN JACOBY. Paris: Les Libertés Françaises, 1939, 222 p. Fr. 15.

Shallow and hackneyed criticism of democracy and praise of totalitarianism, with a dash of anti-Semitism and monarchism.

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THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. By Michael Oakeshott. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 224 p. $3.50.

Documents and original statements illustrating the philosophy of fascism, nazism, communism, Catholicism and democracy.

A GUIDE TO THE ENCYCLICALS OF THE ROMAN PONTIFFS FROM LEO XIII TO THE PRESENT DAY (1878–1937). Compiled by Sister M. Claudia Carlen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1939, 247 p. $2.00.

A bibliographical reference book, officially approved by the Church.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE. Edited by William Anderson. New York: Appleton-Century, 1939, 453 p. $4.00.

A handy reference work covering England, France, Germany, Italy and Russia.

LE POUVOIR EXÉCUTIF DANS LES DÉMOCRATIES D'EUROPE ET D'AMÉRIQUE. By Émile Giraud. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 414 p. Fr. 80.

A thoroughgoing comparative study, practical and well organized.

PROPAGANDA BOOM. By A. J. Mackenzie. London: Gifford, 1938, 368 p. 10/6.

In this enlightening book propaganda is studied coldly as a science. The author examines at some length the propaganda techniques of the Soviets, Italy and the Nazis.

L'ARMÉE MODERNE. By General [Louis] Maurin. Paris: Flammarion, 1938, 269 p. Fr. 20.

A prominent French military authority discusses technical and strategic problems in language understandable by the layman. His work is divided into three parts — the battle, the administration of the army and the organization of the nation in arms.

BOMBS BURSTING IN AIR. By George Fielding Eliot. New York: Reynal, 1939, 173 p. $1.75.

A hard-hitting essay on the influence of air power in international relations, by a recognized American military commentator, who on the whole deflates some recent extravagant claims as to the effectiveness of the air arm.

AIR ATTACK ON CITIES. By J. Thorburn Muirhead. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1938, 128 p. $1.50.

A terrifying problem discussed calmly and concretely.

KRIEG UND WIRTSCHAFT. By Paul Wiel. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1938, 145 p. M. 5.

War economy, the author holds, is a branch of military science, not economics.

LA NEUTRALITÉ ET SON RÉVEIL DANS LA CRISE DE LA S. D. N. By Bertrand d'Astorg. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 171 p. Fr. 40.

An historical and legal survey.

SYSTEM DER PAKTE: DIE POLITISCHEN VERTRÄGE DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT. By Walter Wache. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1938, 425 p. M. 16.

The postwar system of treaties described and illustrated with charts. Two thirds of the book consists of an exhaustive index of treaties signed between 1914 and 1937.

NON, GENÈVE NE PROTÈGE PAS LES MINORITÉS NATIONALES! By Gustave Köver. Geneva: Bureau Central des Minorités, 1938, 234 p.

Numerous documents reproduced and annotated to show the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations as a protector of minorities.

LA PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS. By René Reydellet. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1938, 166 p. Fr. 33.

An historical and legal study.

NATIONALE AUTONOMIE: RECHTSTHEORIE UND VERWIRKLICHUNG IM POSITIVEN RECHT. By Theodor Veiter. Vienna: Braumüller, 1938, 316 p. M. 9.50.

An instructive documentation on the Nazi doctrine of autonomy for national groups — at least as it was before the annexation of Bohemia-Moravia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCES OF INFORMATION: A HANDBOOK ON THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By A. C. de Breycha-Vauthier. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 118 p. $1.00.

A handy reference work.

THE WORLD OVER: 1938. Edited by Joseph Hilton Smyth and Charles Angoff. New York: Harrison-Hilton Books, 1939, 590 p. $4.00.

The first half of the book is a running commentary on events in 1938 and the second half is a chronology arranged by country.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, 1939. Edited by M. Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 1,507 p. $5.50.

The latest issue of the world's most famous reference annual.

1939 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR. Edited by Walter Yust. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1939, 748 p. $10.00.

An indispensable source for information of all sorts.

General: Economic and Social

THE END OF ECONOMIC MAN: A STUDY OF THE NEW TOTALITARIANISM. By Peter F. Drucker. New York: Day, 1939, 268 p. $2.50.

Mr. Drucker, formerly an editor of the *Frankfurter General Anzeiger*, believes that in Europe both capitalism and socialism are doomed, for neither has managed to provide the mass of the people with security and well-being. The resultant disillusionment has paved the way for the essentially non-economic doctrines of the Fascist and Nazi states. The better part, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of Mr. Drucker's text is devoted to an illuminating — if not entirely acceptable — analysis of the totalitarian systems.

THE GROWTH OF COLLECTIVE ECONOMY. By F. E. Lawley. London: King, 1938, 2 v. 35/.

This is a fundamental treatise, being both a comparative study and a general synthesis. Volume I treats the subject nationally and Volume II internationally.

A JOURNAL OF REPARATIONS. By Charles G. Dawes. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 527 p. $5.00.

The diary of the chairman of the experts' committee which drew up the reparations plan bearing his name. An important contribution to postwar history.

LE RÔLE INTERNATIONAL DES GRANDS MARCHÉS FINANCIERS. By Roger Nathan. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 182 p. Fr. 25.

A clear, readable exposition of a dry subject.

DIE ÖKONOMISCHEN GRENZEN KAPITALISTISCHER ORGANISATION UND TECHNIK. By Karl Bernhard. Saarbrücken: Saardeutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1938, 181 p.

A dissertation above average in thought and presentation.

CURRENCY DEPRECIATION AND MONETARY POLICY. By Milton Gilbert. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939, 167 p. $2.00.

The experience of Australia, Britain, Sweden and the United States.

WORLD FINANCE, 1938–1939. By Paul Einzig. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 307 p. $3.00.

More essays by the inexhaustible Dr. Einzig.

DIE BERGWIRTSCHAFT DER ERDE. By Ferdinand Friedensburg. Stuttgart: Enke, 1938, 504 p. M. 30.

A massive compilation of politically and economically important data concerning the mineral wealth and mining activities of each country in the world. There are 40 maps, 139 statistical tables and extensive bibliographies.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE RACES OF EUROPE. By Carleton Stevens Coon. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 739 p. $7.00.

A much-needed scientific treatise, by a Harvard professor.

DIE FARBIGE GEFAHR. By Paul Bang. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1938, 224 p. M. 4.80.

A warning to the white race against the growing strength of the black, based on the author's travels in the Americas.

The World War

DAS ERDÖL IM WELTKRIEG. By Ferdinand Friedensburg. Stuttgart: Enke, 1939, 131 p. M. 10.

A scholarly, documented monograph by a recognized authority.

THE AMERICAN DEFENSE OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS, 1914–1917. By Alice M. Morrissey. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939, 230 p. $2.50.

The conclusions of this monograph are that "The United States went to war with Germany because it passed a moral judgment on her behavior, because it insisted upon a broad interpretation of neutral rights, and because after developing a huge economic interest in one side, it lacked an economic deterrent to going to war with the other." Certain omissions in the bibliography throw doubt on the author's thoroughness.

PROPAGANDA FOR WAR. By H. C. Peterson. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939, 357 p. $3.00.

A scholarly monograph on the "Campaign Against American Neutrality, 1914–1917" which is said to have been carried on by British propagandists. The author, an assistant professor of history in the University of Oklahoma, had access to the *American Press Résumé*, published by the propaganda authorities for the sole use of the British Cabinet. Professor Peterson's conclusions as to the magnitude of the rôle of British propaganda in warping American neutrality remain open to question.

JOFFRE ET GALLIÉNI À LA MARNE. By Captain P. Lyet. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1938, 158 p. Fr. 18.

An acute and detailed examination into the rôles of the two generals in the famous battle, published for the Historical Service of the French General Staff.

LA DEUXIÈME GRANDE OFFENSIVE ALLEMANDE DU PRINTEMPS, 1918. By Captain Ferlus. Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1938, 160 p. Fr. 18.

A reconstruction of the tactics of the third battle of the Aisne and the battle of the Matz, with several plans.

LA MARINA ITALIANA NELLA GRANDE GUERRA. VOLUME IV: LA GUERRA AL TRAFFICO MARITTIMO. Florence: Vallecchi, 1938, 605 p. L. 15.

This most recent volume in the Italian Navy's official history covers the operations in the Adriatic during the first four and one-half months of 1917.

I CINQUEMILA DI BLIGNY. By Gustavo Traglia. Milan: Ceschina, 1938, 203 p. L. 10.

This little book recalls the contribution made by Italian soldiers on the French front.

ERICH LUDENDORFF: SEIN WESEN UND SCHAFFEN. Edited by Mathilde Ludendorff. Munich: Ludendorff, 1938, 678 p. M. 23.

A glorification of the brains behind the German war machine. This book, prepared by various hands, is in large format, luxuriously printed and lavishly illustrated.

SOLDAT IM ALTEN ÖSTERREICH. By Carl Freiherr von Bardolff. Jena: Diederich, 1938, 350 p.

The War memoirs of a high staff officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army, whose Pan German sympathies later led him into the Nazi camp.

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DER RUMÄNIENKRIEG, 1916. By Lieutenant General Ernst Kabisch. Berlin: Schlegel, 1938, 207 p. M. 3.60.

An illustrated history of the conquest of Rumania.

MIT DEN TÜRKEN ZUM SUEZKANAL. By Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein. Berlin: Schlegel, 1938, 308 p. M. 7.50.

These memoirs of a German General Staff officer with the Turkish troops on the Palestine front from 1914 to 1917 are particularly important due to the fact that the records of the German Military Mission to Turkey have been lost.

DER KRIEG IN DEN TÜRKISCHEN GEWÄSSERN. VOLUME II: DER KAMPF UM DIE MEERENGEN. By Rear Admiral Hermann Lorey. Berlin: Mittler, 1938, 221 p. M. 8.

A fundamental work, prepared under the auspices of the German Navy. There are several sketches in the text and 16 maps folded in at the back.

LA GUERRE D'INDÉPENDANCE DE FINLANDE, 1918. By J. O. Hannula. Paris: Payot, 1938, 206 p. Fr. 30.

An authoritative history, by a General Staff officer in the Finnish Army, on an important but hitherto almost unknown episode in the World War. There are numerous illustrations and battle plans.

DIE VERRATENE ARMEE. By Konstantin W. Sakharov. Berlin: Reichel, 1938, 435 p.

An account of the Kolchak campaign, based on personal experiences.

WEISSE FLAMME ÜBER RUSSLAND. By Nicolai Maximoff. Berlin: Holle, 1938, 455 p. M. 5.80.

The author's personal adventures with the White armies in southern Russia.

The United States

THE RISE OF AMERICAN NAVAL POWER, 1776–1918. By Harold and Margaret Sprout. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939, 398 p. $3.75.

This important and scholarly work fills a long-felt need for a sound historical treatment of the development of American naval policy in both its diplomatic and international aspects.

DEMOCRACY HAS ROOTS. By M. L. Wilson. New York: Carrick and Evans, 1939, 199 p. $1.75.

A synthesis of a number of lectures delivered at the Department of Agriculture on vital American domestic and foreign problems, political as well as economic, by a number of experts. The compiler is Under Secretary in that department.

JUDA ENTDECKT AMERIKA. By Othmar Krainz. Bad Furth bei München: Deutscher Hort Verlag, 1938, 216 p. M. 4.80.

A Nazi version of how the Jews have permeated American life.

POLITICS AND PUBLIC SERVICE. By Leonard D. White and T. V. Smith. New York: Harper, 1939, 361 p. $3.00.

The civic art in America examined somewhat according to the Socratic method by two University of Chicago professors, one a former United States Civil Service Commissioner and the other a member of Congress.

SECRET AGENTS AGAINST AMERICA. By Richard Wilmer Rowan. New York: Doubleday, 1939, 267 p. $2.00.

A sensational exposure of foreign espionage in North America.

SECRET ARMIES: THE NEW TECHNIQUE OF NAZI WARFARE. By John L. Spivak. New York: Modern Age Books, 1939, 160 p. 50 cents.

Concrete evidence on the operations of Nazi espionage, sabotage and propaganda in the United States, Mexico and Central America.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INVISIBLE TARIFF. By Percy W. Bidwell. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939, 286 p. $2.50.

A detailed study on how our import trade is impeded by the maze of legislative and administrative restrictions that have grown up alongside the tariff duties, by the Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

FOREIGN LOAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1933. By Benjamin H. Williams. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, for the American Coördinating Committee for International Studies, 1939, 56 p. 50 cents.

A concise, documented study covering both financial and political aspects of the subject, prepared by a professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN A CHANGING WORLD. Edited by Willard L. Thorp. New York: Farrar, 1939, 820 p. $5.00.

Various American economic problems discussed by ten authorities.

AN ECONOMIC PROGRAM FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By Seven Harvard and Tufts Economists. New York: Vanguard, 1938, 91 p. $1.00.

A defense of New Deal economics.

GOVERNMENT PRICE-FIXING. By Jules Backman. New York: Pitman, 1938, 304 p. $3.00.

American practice under the New Deal.

ADJUSTING YOUR BUSINESS TO WAR. By Leo M. Cherne. New York: Tax Research Institute of America, 1939, 238 p. $6.50.

Most American businessmen will find this book indispensable, since it outlines the Government's plans for mobilizing the nation's industry if the country goes to war.

AMERICAN LABOR. By Herbert Harris. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938, 459 p. $3.75.

A sound, unbiased history of the American labor movement.

Western Europe

HISTOIRE SECRÈTE DE LA CONCILIATION DE MUNICH. By Alfred Fabre-Luce. Paris: Grasset, 1938, 111 p. Fr. 10.

A very readable and quite unconvincing defense of Munich by a well-known French political writer evidently in close touch with M. Bonnet.

LE CHEMIN DE MUNICH. By Paul Lombard. Paris: Éditions de France, 1938, 296 p. Fr. 18.

Another example of French "Munichism," this time by a right-wing journalist. For those who followed events carefully the author will seem to distort the history of French foreign policy from January 1936 to September 1938 in order to attack it. Here again only M. Bonnet meets with favor.

LA CINQUIÈME COLONNE CONTRE LA PAIX DU MONDE. By Bertrand Gauthier. Paris: Bureau d'Éditions, 1938, 112 p. Fr. 2.50.

A Leftist *exposé* of the Fascist spy and sabotage system.

LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE (4 SEPTEMBRE, 1870 — 3 AOÛT, 1914). By Georges Bourgin. Paris: Colin, 1939, 224 p. Fr. 15.

A competent *précis* from 1870 to 1914.

LE SECRET DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE. By Alfred Fabre-Luce. Paris: Grasset, 1938, 240 p. Fr. 18.

The author blasts both Right and Left for their parts in reducing France to the pretty pass in which he now finds her.

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BRIAND. By Georges Suarez. Paris: Plon, 1938–1939, Volumes I, II and III, Fr. 120.

This work is superior to the average run of French political biographies. Suarez had access to Briand's diary and papers, from which he quotes liberally. Historians will find this an invaluable source in spite of its diffuseness and occasional inaccuracies. The present volumes go down to 1916; two others will complete the series.

BARTHOU. By Wilhelm Herzog. Zurich: Verlag Die Liga, 1938, 328 p. Swiss Fr. 7.80.

The career and policy of the late French Foreign Minister, traced by one who believes that France and England should pursue the line laid down by Barthou.

FRANKREICH ZWISCHEN FURCHT UND HOFFNUNG. By Johannes Stoye. Leipzig: Meiner, 1938, 330 p. M. 5.80.

An interpretation of the history, social and political problems, and recent foreign policy of France. Attention is focused on the relations of France and Germany, which the author holds need not necessarily be hostile.

NEUES WERDEN IN FRANKREICH. By Paul Distelbarth. Stuttgart: Klett, 1938, 397 p. M. 4.80.

An attempt to describe the intellectual life of contemporary France, in the interest of Franco-German understanding.

NOTRE LUTTE POUR LA PAIX. By Maurice Thorez. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1938, 199 p. Fr. 12.

Extracts from the speeches and reports of the secretary general of the French Communist Party, designed to show how it has consistently stood for peace — "from the false peace of Versailles to the betrayal of Munich."

DE WENDEL. By Louis Launay. Vaucresson (Seine-et-Oise): Author, 1938, 121 p. Fr. 20.

A none-too-friendly history of the rise to financial power of a great French family, important in industry, banking and politics.

DÉFENSE NATIONALE: NOTRE SÉCURITÉ. By Paul Bénazet. Paris: Grasset, 1938, 202 p. Fr. 18.

A vigorous defense of the military policy of the French Parliament and a criticism both of the civil administration in the War Ministry and of the Army command, by the Chairman of the Senate Air Committee.

LA NATIONALISATION ET LE CONTRÔLE DES USINES DE GUERRE. By A. Bigant. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1939, 231 p. Fr. 40.

A historico-legal treatise on an important French political problem.

L'ARMÉE DE L'AIR, 1936–1938. By Pierre Cot. Paris: Grasset, 1939, 249 p. Fr. 18.

A former Minister of Air discusses French military aviation from the political, economic and strategic angles. He does not hesitate to criticize or to make suggestions.

FRANCE: A HISTORY OF NATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1789–1939. By Shepard Bancroft Clough. New York: Scribner, 1939, 498 p. $3.50.

An annotated treatise by an assistant professor in Columbia University.

L'ORDRE NOUVEAU: FACE AU COMMUNISME ET AU RACISME. By Jacques Bardoux. Paris: Hachette, 1939, 250 p. Fr. 18.

The ideas of a Rightist Senator, member of the Institut, on international relations in recent years and on the political and economic reforms which he believes should be adopted if France is to fight off the racist and Communist menaces.

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LA C.G.T.: COLONIE SOVIÉTIQUE. By J. Chazoff. Paris: Éditions de France, 1939, 131 p. Fr. 10.

A condemnation of the Third International and the French Communist Party.

POSSIBILITÉS ET CONDITIONS D'UNE POLITIQUE IMPÉRIALE. By Pierre Lequime. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1938, 238 p. Fr. 25.

Superficial proposals for creating self-sufficiency in the French colonial empire.

WILHELMINA REGINA. Edited by Jonkheer Jan Feith. The Hague: Zuid-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1938, 196 p. Fl. 2.50.

The Netherlands' progress in many fields during the last forty years.

THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By S. Shepard Jones. Princeton: Princeton University Press, for the American Scandinavian Foundation, 1939, 298 p. $3.00.

A scholarly monograph on the parts played in the League's activities by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The author is Director of the World Peace Foundation.

DAS REICHE UND DAS ARME SCHWEDEN. By Fredrik Böök. Berlin: Hobbing, 1938, 271 p. M. 8.40.

Chapters on the political, economic and social life of the Swedish people.

RUSSLANDS GRIFF UM NORDEUROPA. By Vitalis Pantenburg. Leipzig: Schwarzhäupter-Verlag, 1938, 171 p. M. 5.60.

A warning that Russia plans to overrun the Scandinavian countries and a description of the defensive measures which those nations have adopted or should adopt.

GERMANY PUSHES WEST. By Gerhard Schacher. London: Hurst, 1939, 256 p. 10/6.

In his "Germany Pushes South-East," published in 1937, Dr. Schacher predicted with considerable accuracy the events that actually took place in Central Europe the following year. He now turns his attention to Germany's Western neighbors and warns against making light of Nazi pressure on such countries as Switzerland, Belgium, etc. On the whole his analysis is sound; its principal defect is perhaps in overestimating the Nazi strength in Central and Eastern Europe and in underestimating Poland's determination to resist.

THE STRANGE DEATH OF ADOLF HITLER. Anonymous. New York: Macaulay, 1939, 381 p. $2.50.

A fantastic, though elaborately circumstantial, yarn about a man who doubled for Hitler. The story winds up with Hitler's death by poisoning on September 29, 1938 — on the eve of Munich. Exciting reading for those who like to have their leg pulled.

VERS LA PLUS GRANDE ALLEMAGNE. By H. Beuve-Méry. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1939, 112 p.

A concise, closely articulated narrative of the current *Drang nach Osten*.

DEUTSCHTUM IN ALLER WELT. By Wilhelm Winkler. Vienna: Deuticke, 1938, 160 p. M. 4.

Statistical tables concerning German-speaking people throughout the world.

L'AUTARCHIA IN GERMANIA. Rome: Confederazione Fascista degli Industriali 1938, 339 p. L. 25.

A concrete study of the achievements of the German drive for autarchy.

THE NEW INQUISITION. By Konrad Heiden. New York: Modern Age Books, 1939, 188 p. 50 cents.

An account of the pogroms in Germany during November 1938.

SCHÖNERER, DER VORKÄMPFER: EINE POLITISCHE BIOGRAPHIE. By Erwin Mayer-Löwenschwerdt. Vienna: Braumüller, 1938, 390 p. M. 5.80.

The life and philosophy of an Austrian Pan German and anti-Semite who was one of the principal forerunners of Hitler.

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UNSERE KOLONIEN. By Elmar Vinibert von Rudolf. Leipzig: Hase, 1938, 207 p. M. 2.85.

A good example of the extensive literature now being published in Germany to arouse popular interest in the campaign for colonies.

LOST LIBERTY? By Joan and Jonathan Griffin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 290 p. $2.50.

Two eyewitnesses describe the last days of the Czechoslovak Republic. They have had access to documents of the Ministry of the Interior giving the Government's reports of activities of German agents provocateurs throughout September. An important contribution.

WE SHALL LIVE AGAIN. By Maurice Hindus. New York: Doubleday, 1939, 367 p. $3.00.

Mr. Hindus, noted for his vivid books on Soviet Russia, toured Czechoslovakia in the weeks preceding and during the Munich crisis. This is an intensely human record of his experiences among the people, in the remote villages of Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia as well as in the cities of Bohemia and Moravia.

EYEWITNESS IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA. By Alexander Henderson. London: Harrap, 1939, 336 p. 10/6.

A British journalist's account of the Czech crisis adding little to what we already know.

LA DÉSAGRÉGATION DE LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE. By Georges Blondel. Paris: Denoël, 1939, 92 p. Fr. 10.

A professor in the École des Sciences Politiques briefly reviews the political and historical function of Czechoslovakia in a tone not unfriendly to Germany.

DAS NOTRECHT DES STAATES. By Kurt Reber. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1938, 111 p. Swiss Fr. 4.50.

A legal study on the operation of the Swiss constitution in times of crisis.

STORIA DI UNA NAZIONE PROLETARIA. By H. Fraenkel. Florence: Sansoni, 1938, 257 p. L. 18.

A financial history of United Italy, lacking in any references to sources consulted.

MUSSOLINI UND DAS NEUE ITALIEN. By Gert Buchheit. Berlin: Neff, 1938, 495 p. M. 6.

The Fascist State, the new Empire and Mussolini, described for German readers.

MUSSOLINI IN DER SCHWEIZ. By Marcel Bezençon. Zurich: Schweizer Druck-und Verlagshaus, 1939, 87 p. Swiss Fr. 2.

A somewhat sentimental account of Mussolini's stay in Switzerland in 1902–04.

MUSSOLINI. By Francisco Frola. Mexico City: Masas, 1938, 204 p.

The origins of fascism unflatteringly narrated for Latin American consumption.

LE CORPORATISME ET LE RÉGIME DE LA PRODUCTION ET DU TRAVAIL EN ITALIE. By Piero Sacerdoti. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 149 p.

An uncritical description, with many relevant documents, by a professor at the University of Milan.

L'ECONOMIA ITALIANA NEL SESSENNIO, 1931–1936. By the Banca d'Italia. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1938, 3 v. L. 90.

An invaluable compendium of facts and figures on all phases of Italian economic life.

PRINCIPII DI ECONOMICA CORPORATIVA. By Luigi Amoroso. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1938, 367 p. L. 30.

A somewhat theoretical analysis of Italy's corporative economy.

VITA DEL CARDINALE GASPARRI. By Francesco Maria Taliani. Milan: Mondadori, 1938, 308 p. L. 20.

A life of the papal Secretary who made the 1929 Lateran Treaties with Mussolini.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN THE SPANISH CIVIL STRIFE. By Norman J. Padelford. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 710 p. $6.00.

The Spanish civil war revived many old questions of international law and created some new ones. Professor Padelford of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy has sought to collect all available information and documents bearing on this struggle and to interpret them and the very tangled diplomacy that they represent — or conceal. In his effort to be impartial, or scholarly, he occasionally arrives at conclusions which some will call into serious question. Despite its title, this work is not a diplomatic history, for the author is interested in diplomacy only in so far as it concerns questions of law. Over two thirds of the book is devoted to documents and to a "list of instances of interference with foreign shipping."

LOS INTELECTUALES Y LA TRAGEDIA ESPAÑOLA. By Enrique Suñer. San Sebastian: Española, 1938, 175 p. Ptas. 5.

Spain's intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals castigated as the true authors of the civil war, by a professor in the University of Madrid.

GUERRE CIVILE TOTALE. By J. Martin-Blazquez. Paris: Denoël, 1938, 288 p. Fr. 25.

This is a moving and important book concerning the manner in which the Loyalist Government organized and carried on the war. The author was an officer connected with the War Ministry at Madrid.

FRONT DE LA LIBERTÉ: ESPAGNE, 1937–38. By Simone Téry. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1938, 332 p. Fr. 24.

A passionate, partisan account of a French Leftist's experiences in Loyalist Spain.

YO HE CREÍDO EN FRANCO. By Francisco Gonzálbez Ruíz. Paris: Imprimerie Coöpérative Étoile, 1938, 173 p. Fr. 10.

The author was Governor of Murcia before the outbreak of the civil war. Lured to Rebel territory by false promises, he was imprisoned. He later escaped to France and wrote this book about his disillusionment in Franco.

MADRID. By César Falcon. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1939, 358 p. Fr. 24.

A Spanish Communist's not impartial account of events at Madrid up to March 1937.

DIPLOMAT IM ROTEN MADRID. By Felix Schlayer. Berlin: Herbig, 1938, 231 p. M. 4.

A German-born Norwegian diplomatic agent in Madrid reports on the "red terror."

ROUGE ET OR: CHRONIQUES DE LA "RECONQUÊTE" ESPAGNOLE, 1937–1938. By Eddy Bauer. Paris: Attinger, 1939, 237 p. Fr. 25.

A Swiss journalist records the war from the Rebel side.

GENERAL FRANCO. By G. R. Farquhar. London: Pallas, 1939, 122 p. 1/.

Superficial, uncritical.

LA VÉRITÉ SUR GUADALAJARA. By Bernard Deschamps. Paris: Denoël, 1938, 218 p. Fr. 18.

An unconvincing attempt to show that there was no Italian defeat at Guadalajara.

LE DESTIN DE L'ESPAGNE. By Pierre d'Arcangues. Paris: Denoël, 1938, 212 p. Fr. 18.

Spain's "way out" lies in the return of Alfonso XIII, with Franco as Premier.

SALAZAR: PORTUGAL AND HER LEADER. By Antonio Ferro. London: Faber, 1939, 364 p. 8/6.

A record of the conversations between the dictator of Portugal and a Portuguese journalist, somewhat after the fashion of Ludwig's "Conversations with Mussolini." Salazar is revealed as an austere recluse, sincerely animated by a desire to revive his country's economy. One of the better books on contemporary Portugal.

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LE PORTUGAL DE SALAZAR. By Émile Schreiber. Paris: Denoël, 1938, 147 p. Fr. 15.

The author regards Salazar's régime as authoritarian, not totalitarian, and on the whole finds its political and economic achievements to be quite substantial.

Eastern Europe

WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.S.R. By W. P. and Zelda K. Coates. London: Lawrence, 1939, 251 p. 6/.

A Leftist synthesis of Soviet foreign policy since 1934.

L'U.R.S.S.: TELLE QU'ELLE EST. By Yvon. Paris: Gallimard, 1938, 287 p. Fr. 28.

The author was a French technician and Communist who went to Russia in 1923; he worked there until 1933, when he managed to leave, thoroughly disillusioned. From his description of the Soviet industrial system one gathers that there is little liberty in Russia and that the standard of living of the average Soviet worker is low.

VU ET ENTENDU EN U.R.S.S. By J. Bouré. Paris: Presses Modernes, 1938, 184 p. Fr. 13.

A French master mechanic visits Russia and finds it good.

SURVIVAL: THROUGH WAR AND REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA. By D. Fedotoff White. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939, 395 p. $3.00.

The personal narrative of an officer who fought in the Russian Navy during the World War and in Kolchak's army against the Reds, and who was captured by the latter and worked in a Bolshevik government department until 1921, when he escaped via Finland to the United States.

ESCAPE FROM RUSSIAN CHAINS. By Ivan Solonevich. London: Williams and Norgate, 1938, 350 p. 12/6.

A well-written sequel to the author's "The Soviet Paradise Lost," in which he recounts his experiences in a Soviet labor camp and his escape to Finland.

DER VERRATENE SOZIALISMUS. By Karl I. Albrecht. Berlin: Nibelungen-Verlag, 1939, 654 p. M. 10.

The author, at one time a Württemberg civil servant, turned Communist and went to Russia, where he says he became a high official in the forest and timber industry in the late twenties. On his return to Germany, the Gestapo arrested him. When released he went to Turkey and then Switzerland. Yet this book was published in Germany and has had a wide sale there. Whether his experiences are authentic or not is difficult to judge, but his many photographs of chaotic industrial conditions and the activities of forced labor in the pre-Five Year Plan days will be found interesting.

G.P.U. JUSTICE. By Maurice Edelman. London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, 231 p. 6/.

A description of how the Soviet police operate, based on the experiences of a German engineer caught in their toils in 1937. On the whole he paints the G.P.U. in less lurid colors than has usually been the case.

FROM TSARDOM TO THE STALIN CONSTITUTION. By W. P. and Zelda K. Coates. London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, 320 p. 10/6.

Russia's economic progress under the Soviets. The authors rely chiefly on Russian sources and sometimes show more Stalinist fervor than scholarly detachment.

KONSTITUTSIYA SOYUZA S.S.R.: I KONSTITUTSII SOYUZNYKH RESPUBLIK. Moscow: Yuridicheskoye Izdatelstvo, 1939, 274 p. 50 cents.

The constitutions of the Soviet Union and its constituent republics.

DIE SCHWERINDUSTRIE IN RUSSISCH-ASIEN. By Michael Rosenberg. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1938, 260 p. M. 6.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A technical study of the Ural-Kusnezk Kombinat, with ample notes, bibliography and 2 maps.

FINPLAN I BALANS VNESHNETORGOVOGO OB'EDINENIYA. By A. Belenky and Others. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 1939, 313 p. $1.00.

An official analysis of Soviet foreign trade.

A CRITIQUE OF RUSSIAN STATISTICS. By Colin Clark. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 76 p. $2.60.

An attempt to test the accuracy of Russian statistics by comparing them with those of other countries and by examining their internal consistency.

ASPECTS DE LA FINLANDE. By Henry de Chambon. Paris: Revue Parlementaire, 1939, 249 p. Fr. 30.

A competent, illustrated bird's-eye view of Finland's history and current problems.

THE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE BORDER STATES. PART II: ESTONIA. By Malbone W. Graham. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939, 168 p. $1.50.

A scholarly monograph on the first months of independent Estonia, with documents.

ESTNISCHE HANDELSPOLITIK. By Alfred Vendt. Emsdetten: Lechte, 1938, 131 p. M. 4.20.

The historical and economic bases of Estonia's development.

DAS JUDENTUM IM OSTEUROPÄISCHEN RAUM. By Peter-Heinz Seraphim. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1938, 736 p. M. 8.

A serious, documented and on the whole objective treatise on the history and present condition of the Jews in Eastern Europe, by a lecturer at the University of Königsberg. The book is free from most of the usual manifestations of anti-Semitism. There are statistical tables, a bibliography and numerous sketches and diagrams.

MOJE WSPOMNIENIA. Volume I. By Stanislaw Wojciechowski. Lwów: Książnica-Atlas, 1938, 368 p.

The first volume of the autobiography of the second President of the Polish Republic. Though a Socialist, Wojciechowski broke with Pilsudski in 1914 for he could not follow the latter's pro-German line. The last third of the book concerns the war years.

WALKA O ŚLASK CIESZYŃSKI W LATACH, 1914–1920. By Franciszek Szymiczek. Katowice: Wydawnictwa Instytutu Slaskiego, 1938, 212 p. Zl. 6.

Notes on the disputed Teschen region with 3 maps and a 12-page English summary.

POLOGNE ET ROUMANIE. By Stanislas Lukasik. Paris: Librairie Polonaise, 1938, 422 p. Fr. 182.

The first, and historical, part of this scholarly volume is devoted to an examination of the political, economic and cultural relations between the two peoples.

DISGRACE ABOUNDING. By Douglas Reed. London: Cape, 1939, 488 p. 10/6.

This is a successor to "Insanity Fair" which Mr. Reed, formerly London *Times* correspondent in Southeastern Europe, published last year. In the present book he continues to report, in his disconnected and rather formless way, on his peregrinations in Central Europe. In the process he continues his campaign of diatribe against various of his pet aversions, including the Nazis, the Jews and the Labor Party. Yet in spite of his violence and exaggerations — perhaps because of them — he manages to make a number of telling points that apparently still need driving home among many of his countrymen. A postscript brings his account down through the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

AGRARVERFASSUNG, GESELLSCHAFT UND SIEDLUNG IN SÜDOSTEUROPA UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER TÜRKENZEIT. By Richard Busch-Zantner. Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1938, 158 p. M. 6.

The social structure of the Balkans explained as a resultant of Turkish feudalism.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATIONAL INCOME OF HUNGARY, 1924–25 TO 1936–37. By Mattias Matolcsy and Stephen Varga. London: King, 1938, 116 p. 15/.
Graphs, copious statistics and explanatory text.

THE POLITICS OF THE BALKANS. By Joseph S. Roucek. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939, 168 p. $1.50.
A compact, well-organized description of the realities of political life in the Balkan countries (Rumania, Jugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Bulgaria) taken both collectively and individually. The author stresses the dynamics of Balkan politics rather than the constitutional structure of the various governments.

KULTURNA I POLITIČNA ZGODOVINA SLOVENCOV, 1848–1935. By A. Ocvirk. Ljubljana: Akademska Založba, 1938, 2 v.
A cultural and political history of the Slovenes.

LA BULGARIE ET LE PACTE BALKANIQUE. By Boris Kostoff. Paris: Éditions Jel, 1938, 157 p. Fr. 40.
A well-written, instructive book on Bulgaria's policy towards her Balkan neighbors.

BŬLGARIYA I OBSHTESVOTO NA NARODOTĚ. By G. P. Genov. Sofia: Danov, 1938, 189 p.
Bulgaria's relations with the League discussed by a Bulgarian professor, a supporter of treaty revision and the rights of minorities.

BORIS III: RECHI. Edited by N. Atanasov. Sofia: Bŭlgarska Kniga, 1938, 198 p.
The public speeches of King Boris of Bulgaria.

DIE LANDWIRTSCHAFTLICHEN VERHÄLTNISSE ALBANIENS. By Dalib Zavalani. Berlin: Parey, 1938, 152 p. M. 14.60.
A scholarly treatise, with maps and statistical tables, by an Albanian expert.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

IN SEARCH OF PEACE. By Neville Chamberlain. New York: Putnam, 1939, 309 p. $3.50.
This book consists of some thirty speeches, largely on foreign affairs, delivered between May 31, 1937, and May 11, 1939, in defense of a policy which the author has now abandoned for one diametrically opposed to it. These pronouncements sound thoroughly sincere and thoroughly uninspired, and as the epitome of the mental and moral outlook of the British middle class they furnish an excellent explanation of Mr. Chamberlain's hold on his electorate.

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: AN OUTLINE. By a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 304 p. $3.00.
A comprehensive and remarkably objective examination into the factors upon which British interests rest in the various parts of the world. The subject is divided into its regional aspects, with two concluding chapters on imperial defense.

L'ANGLETERRE ET LA SÉCURITÉ COLLECTIVE. By Jean Schwoebel. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 434 p. Fr. 60.
A pedestrian chronology of Britain's policy towards the League, disarmament, the Kellogg Pact and the like.

MEDITERRANEAN CRISIS. By Harry J. Greenwall. London: Nicholson, 1939, 259 p. 5/.
A brisk, if not particularly sound, explanation of the decline of British power in the Mediterranean since 1919.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KÖNIG, LORDS UND GENTLEMEN. By Karl Heinz Abshagen. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1938, 233 p. M. 6.80.
How the "ruling class" monopolizes political power in Britain.

LLOYD GEORGE, 1863–1914. By W. Watkin Davies. London: Constable, 1939, 467 p. 12/6.
A somewhat critical, though not particularly revealing, record of Lloyd George's prewar career.

MISS BAX OF THE EMBASSY. By Emily Bax. Boston: Houghton, 1939, 311 p. $3.00.
Diplomacy and diplomats during the decade before the World War as seen by an observant secretary in the American Embassy at London.

ULSTER AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1939: HELP OR HINDRANCE? By Henry Harrison. London: Hale, 1939, 231 p. 10/6.
A serious-minded investigation into the political and economic consequences of the separation of Ulster from the rest of Ireland, by an Irish Nationalist. There is a lengthy appendix of documents and statistics.

CANADA. London: The *Times*, 1939, 276 p. 75 cents.
Numerous illustrated essays by representative Canadians.

THE SPIRIT OF FRENCH CANADA. By Ian Forbes Fraser. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 219 p. $2.75.
As revealed in French Canadian literature. A scholarly study.

AUSTRALIEN: DER MENSCHENSCHEUE KONTINENT. By Heinrich Hauser. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1939, 260 p. M. 6.50.
A survey of Australian problems stressing the need for colonists.

DEMOCRACY'S DANGER. By Sir Herbert Gepp. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1939, 315 p. 6/.
Addresses and articles by a prominent Australian businessman.

CONTEMPORARY NEW ZEALAND: A SURVEY OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY. New York: Oxford University Press, for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1938, 276 p. $4.00.
A factual survey of New Zealand's economic and social policies and of the Dominion's relations with the Empire and the rest of the world.

THE SPIRIT OF INDIA. By W. J. Grant. New York: Scribner, 1938, 120 p. $3.75.
A thoughtful, friendly, illustrated description of India and her major problems.

INDIA OF THE PRINCES. By Rosita Forbes. London: Gifford, 1939, 319 p. 10/6.
Chatty travelogue on the India not under direct British rule.

INDIA'S NORTH-WEST FRONTIER. By Sir William Barton. London: Murray, 1939, 308 p. 10/6.
The history and present problems of one of the most troublesome areas in the British Empire, by a distinguished member of the Indian Civil Service.

The Near East

LA TURQUIE PASSÉ ET PRÉSENT. By Marcel Clerget. Paris: Colin, 1938, 207 p. Fr. 15.
A neatly assembled manual on Turkey's human geography, history and economics.

THE TURKEY OF ATATURK. By Donald Everett Webster. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939, 337 p. $2.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A compendium of information on postwar Turkey by a sociologist, formerly on the faculty of International College at Izmir.

LA NUOVA TURCHIA. By Ettore Anchieri and Others. Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1939, 161 p. L. 10.

Compact historical, political, socio-economic, and cultural data by four Italian experts.

LA CONFÉRENCE DE MONTREUX ET LE RÉGIME DES DÉTROITS. By Juliette Abrévaya. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1938, 172 p. Fr. 30.

A legal study by a young Turkish scholar.

TÜRKIYEDE ZIRAÎ BUHRAN. By Sevket Raşit Hatipoğlou. Ankara: Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü, 1936, 253 p.

An official publication on the agrarian crisis in Turkey, with German translation.

NO EASE IN ZION. By T. R. Feiwel. New York: Knopf, 1939, 365 p. $3.75.

A thoughtful discussion of the Zionist movement and of the present state of Palestine set against the background of world affairs and showing how the fate of Zionism depends on the power politics of the larger nations.

Africa

SCIENCE IN AFRICA. By E. B. Worthington. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 746 p. $4.00.

This book, "a review of scientific research relating to tropical and southern Africa," is a companion piece to Lord Hailey's magnificent "African Survey." It is issued by the Committee of the African Research Survey under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and will be indispensable to all who are interested in the development of Africa's natural resources or in its colonization.

WAS WIRD AUS DIESEM AFRIKA? ERLEBTER KAMPF UM EINEN ERDTEIL. By Gustav Adolf Gedat. Stuttgart: Steinkopf, 1938, 287 p. M. 4.20.

How Africa looks to a German whose preoccupations seem largely religious.

AFRIKANISCHER FRÜHLING: EINE REISE. By Friedrich Sieburg. Frankfurt: Societäts-Verlag, 1938, 416 p. M. 7.50.

A German journalist inspects France's possessions in North and West Africa.

POUR UNE POLITIQUE D'EMPIRE. By Eugène Guernier. Paris: Alcan, 1938, 211 p. Fr. 30.

Collected essays, most of which deal with Morocco.

ITALIA, FRANCIA, TUNISIA. By Giuseppe Morpurgo. Rome: "Augustea," 1938, 191 p. L. 15.

A documented analysis of the legal status of Italians in Tunisia.

LES ITALIENS DE TUNISIE ET L'ACCORD LAVAL-MUSSOLINI DE 1935. By Charles Monchicourt. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 233 p. Fr. 30.

An historical, political and legal study, full of facts and sound analysis.

ERWACHTES LIBYEN: EINE REISE DURCH TRIPOLIS. By Ursula Lederle-Grieger. Berlin: Scherl, 1938, 204 p. M. 3.30.

A young German lady visits Libya and is impressed.

LA LIBIA OCCIDENTALE NEI SUOI PRINCIPALI ASPETTI ECONOMICO-STATISTICI NEL QUINQUENNIO, 1931–35. By A. M. Morgantini. Tripoli: Consiglio Coloniale dell'Economia Corporativa per le Provincie di Tripoli e di Misurata, 1938, 249 p. L. 25.

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An excellent source for facts and figures about the economic development of Tripolitania. There are several maps, and numerous graphs and statistical tables.

IL FRONTE SUD. By Rodolfo Graziani. Milan: Mondadori, 1938, 360 p. L. 40.
This is Marshal Graziani's own account of his campaign in southern Ethiopia, documented with numerous facsimiles and illustrated with plans, maps and photographs.

ECHEC AU LION. By Paule-Herfort. Paris: Baudinière, 1938, 286 p. Fr. 15.
A French journalist, enthusiastically pro-Fascist, recounts her experiences with Graziani's army in the Ethiopian War.

CON S. E. DE BONO: NEL TURBINÌO DI UNA PREPARAZIONE. By Guido Battaglini. Intra: Airoldi, 1938, 372 p. L. 10.
An abundantly documented description of the military preparations carried out in Eritrea during the early months of 1935 prior to the Ethiopian War.

ASCIANGHI. By Raffaello Casertano. Rome: Tumminelli, 1938, 187 p. L. 15.
Reminiscences on the campaign in northern Ethiopia.

SOMALIA. VOLUME I: DALLE ORIGINI AL 1914. Rome: Ministero della Guerra, 1938, 340 p. L. 25.
This first volume of an official history of Italy's second oldest colony takes the story up to 1914. There is an extensive appendix of documents and large maps.

MY TANGANYIKA SERVICE AND SOME NIGERIA. By Sir Donald Cameron. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 293 p. 10/6.
The author served ten years as a colonial governor in Africa; his memoirs admirably show how Britain administers her far-flung empire with such marked success.

KOLONIALPROBLEME DER GEGENWART. By Th. Gunzert and Others. Berlin: Mittler, 1939, 140 p. M. 4.80.
Five of these seven essays concern German colonization in Africa.

DER WEISSE KAMPF UM AFRIKA. VOLUME II: DEUTSCHLAND IN AFRIKA. By Oskar Karstedt. Berlin: Stollberg, 1938, 360 p. M. 10.
This history of the origins of German colonialism and of the development of the former German colonies in Africa has been recommended by various high Nazi organs as an authoritative source of doctrine and inspiration for party leaders.

CAMEROUN, CRÉATION FRANÇAISE. By Georges R. Manue. Paris: Sorlot, 1938, 124 p. Fr. 10.
Why France should not return the Cameroons to Germany.

UNTER DREI GOUVERNEUREN. By Wilhelm Methner. Breslau: Korn, 1938, 452 p. M. 6.
Memoirs of an official in German East Africa, 1902–1917.

AFRICA'S PERIL: THE COLOUR PROBLEM. By H. R. Abercrombie. London: Simpkin, 1938, 269 p. 8/6.
An outspoken appeal for the segregation of the blacks in South Africa.

The Far East

INSIDE ASIA. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1939, 599 p. $3.50.
This latest book by a foremost journalist is a fitting counterpart to his "Inside Europe." Proceeding from Japan south and westward through China, Singapore, India and the Near East, he sketches the leading personalities and gives a compact *précis* of the principal problems in each of the countries. Mr. Gunther recently returned from an extensive tour of all the most exposed parts of Asia and his account has timeliness as well as readability.

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CHINE ET JAPON, 1938. By R. d'Auxion de Ruffé. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1939, 421 p. Fr. 36.

A French Rightist journalist, long resident in China, tries to persuade his countrymen of the justice of Japan's case against China.

JAPAN: GOVERNMENT — POLITICS. By Robert Karl Reischauer. New York: Nelson, 1939, 221 p. $1.75.

Japanese political thought, organization and history in simple terms, by a young Princeton professor, killed at Shanghai in 1937. Selected bibliography and glossary.

PEASANT LIFE IN CHINA. By Hsiao-tung Fei. New York: Dutton, 1939, 300 p. $3.50.

A description of village life and economy in the Yangtse valley, by a trained observer.

WHO'S WHO IN CHINA. Shanghai: The China Weekly Review, 1936, 315 p. $5.00 (U. S.).

Short biographies and photographs of over 1,500 persons.

THE MENACING SUN. By Mona Gardner. New York: Harcourt, 1939, 338 p. $2.50.

An American journalist, twelve years resident in Japan, reports entertainingly on her travels in the southeast corner of Asia, and incidentally on Japanese penetration there.

Latin America

HISTORIA DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA MEXICANA DE 1917. By Félix Palavicini. Mexico City: Author, 1938, 2 v.

The author of this important book on the genesis of Mexico's present constitution was a member of the Constituent Assembly that drew it up.

LA RÉVOLTE DU MEXIQUE. By Pierre Lyautey. Paris: Plon, 1938, 249 p. Fr. 18.

An observant Frenchman visits Mexico and rediscovers its past.

MANUAL DE HISTORIA DE CUBA. By Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez. Havana: Cultural, 1938, 676 p.

A competent survey of the economic, social and political history of Cuba.

LE ROMAN DE CUBA. By Rober-Raynaud. Paris: Fasquelle, 1938, 189 p. Fr. 15.

A popularized history of Cuba.

A PURITAN IN VOODOO-LAND. By Edna Taft. Philadelphia: Penn, 1938, 407 p. $3.00.

Colorful impressions of Haiti.

SOUTH AMERICAN PRIMER. By Katherine Carr. New York: Reynal, 1939, 208 p. $1.75.

A praiseworthy achievement in conciseness and informativeness concerning the recent history and present problems of the nations of South America.

A HISTORY OF BRAZIL. By João Pandiá Calogeras. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939, 374 p. $5.00.

A translation and adaptation (by Professor P. A. Martin of Stanford University) of an outstanding history by a Brazilian scholar and statesman.

UNTER FREMDEN STERNEN. By Siegfried von Vegesack. Bremen: Schünemann, 1938, 329 p. M. 9.

Two years of travel in Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Chile.

ESTUDIO DE LA HISTORIA DE CHILE. By Luis Galdames. Santiago: Nascimento, 1938, 556 p. Pesos 15.

The latest edition of the standard history of Chile.

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By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. *France:* Gerda M. Anderson, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIV^e^. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. Since 1928 a list of Government documents has been printed in the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations.*

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

BANK for International Settlements. Ninth Annual Report. 1st April 1938–31st March 1939. Basle, 8th May 1939. 137 p. 29½cm.

CANTON AND ENDERBURY ISLANDS

JOINT ADMINISTRATION of Canton and Enderbury Islands in the South Pacific Ocean. Agreement between the United States of America and Gt. Britain. Effected by Exchange of Notes. Signed April 6, 1939. Washington, 1939. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 145.) Also United Kingdom, Treaty Series No. 21 (1939). Cmd. 5989.

CHILDREN

CHILD WELFARE information centre. Annual report on child welfare, for the third session of the advisory committee on social questions (June 19th, 1939). Geneva, 1939. 201 p. 21½ cm. (League of Nations, C.91.M.50.1939.IV.[C.Q.S./P.E./C.I.106].5.)

CHINA — COÖPERATIVES

CHINESE Industrial Co-operatives. General Report. May, 1939. By Rewi Alley. Hongkong, Hongkong Promotion Committee, 1939. 31 p. 18½ cm.

CHINESE Industrial Co-operatives. Northwest Headquarters Report. September, 1938–March, 1939. Hongkong, Hongkong Promotion Committee, 1939. 28 p. 18 cm.

COMMERCIAL POLICY

ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. Observations on the present prospects of commercial policy. Geneva, 1939. 27 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations. C.179.M.108.1939.II.B. 1939.II.B.3.)

ADDRESS delivered by Herr Funk, Minister of Economic Affairs and President of the Reichsbank, before the Central Committee of the Reichsbank (Translation), March 30, 1939. Berlin, 1939. 19 p. 20½ cm.

THE ECONOMIC Consequences of Import Quotas by Paul Naudin. Copenhagen Congress, 1939. Paris, International Chamber of Commerce, 1939. 20 p. 27 cm. (Doc. No. 4.)

NEW TRENDS in world trade and commercial policy, by Fernand Baudhuin, professor at the University of Louvain (Belgium). Paris, International Chamber of Commerce. Copenhagen Congress, 1939. 7 p. 27 cm. (Doc. No. 2.)

REPORT of the Coördination Committee on the economic and financial questions contained in the agenda of the twentieth ordinary session of the Assembly. Geneva, 1939. 25 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, A.16.1939.II., 1939.II.B.4.)

COÖPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA

AUTHORIZING the President to render closer and more effective the relationship between American Republics. . . . Report to accompany H.R. 5835. House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 508. Washington, 1939. 19 p. 23 cm.

—— . . . Report to accompany H.R. 5835. Senate, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 608, Washington, 1939. 19 p. 23 cm.

PROVIDING GOVERNMENT facilities to the governments of American republics for certain purposes. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 76th Congress, 1st Session on S.J. Res. 89, a joint resolution to authorize the Secretaries of War and of the Navy to assist the governments of American republics to increase their military and naval establishments, and for other purposes. Washington, 1939. 24 p. 23 cm.

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

PERMANENT COURT of International Justice. Election of the Members of the Court for the period January 1st, 1940, to December 31st, 1948. List of candidates nominated by the national groups. Geneva, 1939. 13 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.167.M.98.1939.V.)

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THE PANEVEZYS-SALDUTISKIS Railway Case, order of June 30, 1938, judgment of February 28, 1939. Leyden, 1939, 756 p. 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series C (Pleadings, Oral Statements and Documents), No. 86.)

THE ELECTRICITY COMPANY of Sofia and Bulgaria (Preliminary objection). Judgment of April 4th, 1939. Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff's, 1939. 155 p. French and English. 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B. — Fasc. No. 77.)

THE "SOCIÉTÉ Commerciale de Belgique." Judgment of June 15th, 1939. Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff's, 1939. 190 p. 24 cm. French and English. 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B. — Fasc. No. 78.)

EXCHANGE OF COMMODITIES

AGREEMENT between the Government of the United Kingdom and the United States Government for the exchange of cotton and rubber. London, June 23, 1939. London, 1939. 6 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 31 (1939) Cmd. 60.48.) 1 d.

FISCAL POLICY

FISCAL COMMITTEE. Report to the council on the work of the ninth session of the Committee. Held at Geneva from June 12th to 21st, 1939. Geneva, 1939. 19 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.181.M.110.1939.II.A.13.)

PREVENTION of international double taxation and fiscal evasion. Two decades of progress under the League of Nations, by Mitchell B. Carroll. Geneva, 1939. 53 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, F./Fiscal/111. 1939.II.A.8.)

INTERNATIONAL Double Taxation. Copenhagen Congress, 1939. Paris, International Chamber of Commerce, 1939. 40 p. 27 cm. (Doc. No. 6.)

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

AUTHORIZING temporary detail of United States employees possessing special qualifications to governments of American republics and the Philippines. Report [to accompany H.R. 3134.] House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 80. Washington, 1939. 3 p. 28 cm.

——. REPORT [to accompany S. 902.] Senate, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 128. Washington, 1939, 3 p. 28 cm.

AN ACT to amend the Act entitled "An Act authorizing the temporary detail of United States employees, possessing special qualifications, to governments of American republics and the Philippines, and for other purposes," approved May 25, 1938. 2 p. 23 cm. (Public No. 63, 76th Congress, 1st Session.)

NAVAL MISSION. Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia. Signed at Washington, November 23, 1938. Washington, 1939. 12 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 140.) 5c.

ILLEGITIMACY

ADVISORY COMMITTEE on Social Questions. Study on the legal position of the illegitimate child. Geneva, 1939. viii, 194 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.70.M.24.1939.IV. 1939.IV.6.)

INTERNATIONAL LOANS

REPORT of the Committee for the study of International Loan Contracts. Geneva, 1939. 41 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations. C.145.M.93.1939.II.A., 1939.II.A.10.)

MONEY

DEVALUATION of dollar and stabilization fund. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, 76th Congress, 1st session on S. 910, a bill to extend the time within which the powers relating to the stabilization fund and alteration of the weight of the dollar may be exercised. Washington, 1939. 246 p. 23 cm.

SILVER. Hearings before a special committee on the investigation of silver. Senate. Seventy-sixth Congress, 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 187 (74th Congress) . . . February 7, 1939, Part 1; March 21, Part 2; March 23, Part 3; April 4, Part 4; April 7, Part 5; April 29, Part 6; April 8, Part 7; April 8, Part 8. Washington, 1939. (Printed for the use of the Senate Special Silver Committee.)

INTERNATIONAL Monetary Questions. A survey of Recent Developments by Marcus Wallenberg, Jr. Copenhagen Congress. Paris, International Chamber of Commerce, 1939. 9 p. 27 cm. (Doc. No. 3.)

MONEY AND BANKING

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE Service. Money and Banking 1938/39, Volume I: Monetary Review. Geneva, 1939. 173 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1939. II.A.3. [1].)

——Money and banking 1938/39, Volume II: Commercial and central banks. Geneva, 1939. 202 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1939. II.A.3.[2].)

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NATIONALITY

NATIONALITY laws of the United States. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report proposing a revision and codification of the nationality laws of the United States, prepared at the request of the President of the United States, by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Labor. Washington, 1939. 3 vols. 29 cm. (Printed for the use of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st sess.) Part 1, Proposed code, with explanatory comments; part 2, Comparative print of the text of the proposed and present nationality laws; part 3, Existing constitutional, statutory, and treaty provisions at present in force.

"NEUTRALITY"

NEUTRALITY ACT of 1939. . . . Report to accompany H.J. Res. 306. House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 856. Washington, 1939. 24 p. 23 cm.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY policy. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., on present neutrality law (Public Res. No. 27) (75th Congress) proposed amendments thereto, and related legislation affecting the foreign policy of the United States. April 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and May 2, 1939. Washington, 1939. iv, 639 p. 23 cm.

NUTRITION

HEALTH ORGANISATION. Technical commission on nutrition. GUIDING PRINCIPLES for studies on the nutrition of populations. By Dr. E. J. Begwood, Professor at the University. Geneva, 1939. 281 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations. C.H.1401.[C.H./Com.Exp.Alim./50(2).].1939. III.1.)

PALESTINE

PALESTINE. Statement of Policy. London, 1939. 12 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 6019.) 2d.

REPORT by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the year 1938. London, 1939. xii, 422 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 166.)

PEACEFUL CHANGE

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Conference. Peaceful change. Population and peace. A survey of international opinion on claims for relief from population pressure. By Fergus Chalmers Wright. Paris, 1939. 373 p. 24 cm. (International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.)

CONFÉRENCE PERMANENTE des hautes études internationales. Études danubiennes I. Chronique des événements politiques et économiques dans le bassin danubien 1918–1936. AUTRICHE. Paris, 1938. 178 p. 24½ cm. (International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.)

—— —— —— ROUMANIE. Paris, 1938. 144 p. 24½ cm. (International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.)

—— —— —— TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE. Paris, 1938. 100 p. 24½ cm. (International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.)

—— —— —— YOUGOSLAVIE. Paris, 1938. 53 p. 24½ cm. (International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.)

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Conference. Danubian studies I. Chronology of political and economic events in the Danube Basin 1918–1936. BULGARIA. Paris, 1938. 120 p. 24½ cm. (International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.)

—— —— —— HUNGARY. Paris, 1938. 86 p. 24½ cm. (International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.)

RURAL LIFE

EUROPEAN CONFERENCE on Rural Life 1939. General technical documentation. CO-OPERATIVE action in rural life. Survey prepared by the coöperation service of the International Labour Office. Geneva, 1939. 42 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.I.M.I. 1939. Conf. E.V.R.2. European Conference on Rural Life 9.)

—— —— GENERAL SURVEY of medico-social policy in rural areas prepared under the auspices of the Health Committee. Geneva, 1939. 46 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.60.M.22.1939.Conf. E.V.R.13. European Conference on Rural Life 13.)

—— —— THE ORGANISATION of technical instruction for agriculturists by J. van der Vaeren, President of the International Commission for Instruction in Agriculture, Secretary-General of the Belgian Ministry of Agriculture, Professor in the University of Louvain, Member of the Paris Academy of Agriculture. Geneva, 1939. 29 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.75.M.36.1939.Conf. E.V.R.14. European Conference on Rural Life 14.)

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—— —— SICKNESS insurance and rural medical assistance. Prepared by the International Labour Office. Geneva, 1939. 33 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.87.M.47.1939. Conf. E.V.R.15. European Conference on Rural Life 15.)

—— —— INTELLECTUAL ASPECTS of rural life. Prepared by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. Geneva, 1939. 56 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.90.M.49.1939.Conf. E.V.R.16. European Conference on Rural Life 16.)

—— —— RECREATION in rural areas. Report prepared by the International Labor Office. Geneva, 1939. 34 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.109.M.64.1939.Conf.E.V.R.17. European Conference on Rural Life 17.)

—— —— RURAL housing and planning. Report prepared under the auspices of the Health Committee. Geneva, 1939. 58 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C12.5.M.77.1939. Conf.E.V.R.20. European Conference on Rural Life 18.)

A series of National Monographs drawn up by Governments is being issued.

STATISTICS

STATISTICAL year-book of the League of Nations. 1938/39. Geneva, 1939. 330 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, 1939.II.A.9.)

COMMITTEE of Statistical Experts. Report to the Council on the work of the eighth session. (Held in Geneva from April 22nd to 27th, 1939.) Geneva, 1939. 10 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.133.M.85.1939.II.A.(C.E.S.145.).1939.II.A.5.)

INDICES of industrial production. Report drawn up by the Committee of Statistical Experts. Geneva, 1939. 16 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, Studies and Reports on Statistical Methods No. 6, C.133.M.85.1939.II.A.[C.E.S.145.]. Appendix II.1939.II.A.7.)

HOUSING statistics. A minimum programme of housing statistics drawn up by the Committee of Statistical Experts. Geneva, 1939. 14 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, Studies and Reports on Statistical Methods No. 5, C.133.M.85.1939.II.A.(C.E.S.145.). Appendix I.1939.II.A.6.)

MINIMUM list of commodities for international trade statistics. Addendum and corrigendum to the revised edition prepared by the Committee of Statistical Experts and published in Studies and Reports on Statistical methods No. 2 (C.226.M.128.II.A. Appendix III). Geneva, 1939. 4 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, C.133.M.85.1939.II.A.[C.E.S.145.]. Appendix IV.1939.II.A.14. Corrigendum.)

STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS

STRATEGIC and critical materials essential to national defense. Report to accompany S.572. U. S. Senate, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 119. Washington, 1939. 12 p. 23 cm.

ACQUISITION of strategic and critical materials. Conference report to accompany S. 572. House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 688. Washington, 1939. 5 p. 24 cm.

AN ACT to provide for the common defense by acquiring stocks of strategic and critical materials essential to the needs of industry for the manufacture of supplies for the armed force and the civilian population in time of a national emergency, and to encourage, as far as possible, the further development of strategic and critical materials within the United States for common defense. 3 p. 23 cm. (Public No. 117, 76th Congress, 1st Session.)

TRADE

REVIEW of World Trade, 1938. Geneva, 1939. 85 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1939.II.A.11.)

UNITED STATES — FOREIGN SERVICE

SECOND PLAN on Government reorganization. Message from the President of the United States transmitting reorganization plan No. II. Washington, 1939. 13 p. 23 cm. (House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 288.)

AN ACT to provide for reorganizing agencies of the Government, and for other purposes. 6 p. 23 cm. (Public No. 19, 76th Congress, 1st Session.)

Abolishes the Agricultural and Commercial Foreign Services and incorporates them in the Foreign Service of the United States.

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